The problem of evil and the theodicies in Jewish, Christian, and Muslim thought by Akbas, Muhsin
The Problem of Evil and Theodicy 
in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Thought 
Muhsin Akbaý 
This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the. 
requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
of the University of Wales 
University of Wales, Lampeter 
1999 
1 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Paul Badham, who has 
supervised my research, for his valuable attention, guidance, suggestions, and comments. 
I would also like to thank to Professor Rabbi Dan Cohn-Sherbok for his helpful 
supervision in the Jewish side of this study, and to Dr. Dawüd al-`Alanü for his valuable 
suggestions in the Islamic side of this work. 
It is necessary that I extend my deepest gratitude to the Higher Educational 
Counsel of Turkey and canakkale Onsekiz Mart University for their financial support 
without which this study would not have emerged. I would also like to thank to Professor 
Mehmet Aydm and Professor Hanifi Özcan at the Faculty of Divinity at Dokuz Eylül 
University, Izmir for they encouraged me to pursue an academic career in Philosophy of 
Religion. I am very happy to thank to the members of the library and the ACS at 
Lampeter for their assistance during my research. Finally, I would like to express my 
deepest gratitude to my wife, Emine, for her patience, support, and encouragement 
throughout my research. 
Il 
Abstract 
This thesis is the study of the problem of evil and theodicy in Jewish, Christian, 
and Islamic traditions. The principal aim of the study is to explore, discuss, and compare 
and contrast the major responses to the problem of evil offered in the sacred writings, 
theology and philosophy of the three Abrahamic faiths. I have demonstrated how 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam understood the problem of evil, and responded to the 
atheistic argument from evil. 
In Preamble, I give a brief introductory to the discussions of the problem of evil 
in the western philosophy of religion. I outline the atheistic formulations of the problem 
of evil, the theistic concept of God, evil, and theodicy. In the Part Two, I explore the 
Jewish, Christian, and Islamic responses to the problem of suffering. In Part Three, I 
compare and contrast the responses offered in the Part Two. 
I conclude from the discussion of the responses that some features of 
Augustinian and Irenaean theodicy in Christian tradition can be detected in Jewish and 
Islamic theodicies. While the former does not provide a reasonable answer to the fact of 
evil, the latter is promising. However, the Irenaean type of theodicies, too, do not solve 
the problem of evil conclusively. They provide a reasonable solution affirming both the 
belief in God and evil. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The problem of evil is one of the major issues of the Western philosophy of 
religion. It is the generic name for to the atheistic argument from the existence of evil 
against the theistic belief in God. As an academic discipline, philosophy of religion 
examines the reasonableness and coherence of religious beliefs such as belief in God, life 
after death, miracle and the like taking into account the data available in modern 
knowledge, particularly science and philosophy. Since the perception of religion differs 
from one religion to another, and interpretations of knowledge, and methodology of 
philosophy vary with each philosophical theory, philosophy of religion shows a manifold 
structure consisting of various theological and philosophical viewpoints including of 
atheism. 
The problem of evil is one of these atheistic arguments based on the so-called 
inconsistency of the reality of evil, suffering, and pain in the world with the existence of 
all-powerful and compassionate God. Atheism as a philosophical position can be 
characterised as a way of denial of the theistic belief in God. Atheist philosophers put 
forward several arguments to justify the atheistic assertion that religious claims, and 
particularly that God exists, are logically inconsistent and unreasonable. Personal 
experiences of pain and sorrow may also lead individuals to ask themselves such 
questions as "why me? " and "what have I done to deserve this? ". This is what can be 
called the practical problem of evil, which requires applicable solutions suited to personal 
circumstances. On the other hand, the philosophical problem is a challenge and threat of 
the reality evil to the theistic belief in God. Atheist philosophers formally state this as a 
philosophical argument in the western philosophy of religion. 
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The major theistic religions of the world against which the question of evil is 
raised particularly are Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It is the claim of the three 
religions that they have originated from the same ancestral source, namely the patriarch 
Abraham. That is why they are often called the Abrahamic faiths. Moreover, the three 
religions all affirm that there is a good and all-powerful God. For that reason, they are 
also called the theistic and monotheistic faiths. 
Furthermore, I can say this much at this point that Jewish, Christian, and Islamic 
traditions agree with the fact that there is evil, suffering and pain in the world even 
though there are different interpretations regarding to the nature of evil. The happenings 
of evil are, in fact, partly a reason for the existence of religions. That is to say, the theistic 
faiths aim at removing evil and suffering from human lives providing peace and 
happiness in this world as well as in life after death. Therefore, the atheistic argument 
from evil directly challenges each three theistic faiths requiring an answer that reconciles 
the existence of evil in the world with the existence of all-powerful and compassionate 
God. 
It is the purpose of this study to explore, discuss and compare the responses to 
the problem of evil offered by the major theistic faiths, namely, Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam. In pursuing this purpose, I shall, firstly, look up the sacred writings of the three 
theistic faiths as the foundation of theological and philosophical responses to evil and 
suffering. I shall focus on the canon of Jewish scriptures, namely, Tanakh for the Jewish 
scriptural responses, on the New Testament for the Christian biblical responses, and 
finally on the Qur'än for the Muslim scriptural responses to the problem of evil. At this 
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point, I need to note that since the Apocaryphal/Deuterocanonical Books' are not 
included in Tanakh, they will not be my primary concern here. 
Having outlined their scriptural foundations, I shall explore the theological and 
philosophical theodicies within each religious tradition. As this is an exhausting subject, 
the study will focus on the major responses offered by Jewish, Christian, and Muslim 
theologians and philosophers. The primary objective here is to examine the theodicies, 
and then to discuss whether they propose an adequate solution to the problem of evil. 
Doing this, it is inevitable that there will be repetition. Repetition of similar responses 
and notions becomes necessary for two reasons. Firstly, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam 
share similar responses apart from some dissimilar answers. In this sense, I feel that there 
is a need to indicate the solutions of each religion to evil separately. Secondly, since the 
other purpose of this study is to compare and contrast the responses to the problem of evil 
in the three religions, there is a need to show the theodicies within the framework of the 
each faith in question separately first. This necessarily involves in some repetition. 
1 The ApocaryphaUDeuterocanonical Books are a collection of sacred writings which is a part of the Greek 
translation of the Hebrew Bible, namely, the Septuagint, but not a part of Tanakh, the Jewish sacred 
scriptures. 
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PART ONE 
PREAMBLE 
I. THE CONSTITUENTS OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
The formulation of a problem and the clarification of its components are 
obviously important for any scholarly investigation. It is particularly important for a 
study examining the problem of evil and theodicy from the standpoint of religious 
traditions. The discussion and comparison of religious and philosophical responses 
depends to a certain degree on the exposition of the problem of evil. This is particularly 
true for such a study like this one in the sense that it will examine the answers offered by 
Jewish, Christian and Muslim religious traditions. 
The problem of evil is related a great deal to the question of what lind of deity 
we are talking about. The reality of evil and suffering may not create the same problem 
for any faith. It is generally asserted that theistic faiths such as Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam, which affirm the existence of an all-powerful, benevolent, and merciful supreme 
being, are the most vulnerable in the face of evil. Therefore, before starting to explore the 
responses, one needs to clarify the technical terms that have crucial importance to 
determine the problem, and to discuss the theodicies. In order to avoid the possibility of 
involving in the exhausting discussions of God and evil in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic 
traditions, I shall outline the problem of evil as it is expressed in the Western philosophy 
of evil literature. Then, the theistic concept of God, the notion of evil, and the concept of 
theodicy are to be clarified. 
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A. The Formulations of the Problem of Evil 
Everyday occurrences of suffering and death in the world may lead many people 
to question the belief in God, who is all-loving and powerful. Although this attitude is 
largely identified with atheistic attitude, the believer, too, may be vulnerable to such 
everyday phenomena. Whatever one's religious belief is, few people could dispute that 
there is plenty of suffering and pain in the world. Amidst all these disasters and 
sufferings, it becomes difficult to hold a belief in a loving and merciful God. Therefore, 
the core of the problem of evil is the question as to how to reconcile evils and sufferings 
of the world with the theistic belief in God. 
On the philosophical level, the problem of evil is presented as an atheistic 
argument against the theistic belief in God. It is one of the most influential arguments of 
atheism. The problem attempts to point that theistic belief in God is incompatible with 
the reality of evil in the world. As German theologian Hans King rightly put it, the 
problem of evil is regarded as "the rock of atheism. "2 Evil has been for centuries a reason 
for denying the existence of God. 
Philosophers of religion generally detect two different forms of the problem of 
evil. One is the logical problem of evil, also called the deductive problem and the a priori 
problem; the other is the evidential problem of evil, also called the inductive problem and 
the a posteriori problem. The essential reason behind the logical form of the problem is 
to show that "religious beliefs lack rational support, " and that the central elements of the 
belief in God particularly are inconsistent with the existence of evil in the world. 
2 Hans King, On Being a Christian, trans. by E. Quinn, (New York, Doubleday, 1976), 432. 
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Therefore, the atheist's effort is to present these so-called irrationalities. The most 
influential champion of the logical version of the problem of evil is John L. Mackie. He 
states "the simplest form" of the logical problem as follows: 
"God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to 
be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of 
them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are 
essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian must adhere and 
cannot consistently adhere to all three. " 3 
Mackie contends that there is a contradiction between the three propositions. If God is 
omnipotent, why does he not prevent evil? If he is good and merciful, how come there is 
suffering and pain in the world? 
However, the inconsistency of the existence of God and evil is not so clear. It is 
possible that God has reason to allow evil. In order to attain a greater good God may 
allow evil. If it is so, there is no contradiction in saying, God is omnipotent, God is good, 
and also evil exists. To show how the contradiction arises some additional statements are, 
as Mackie himself affirms, 4 needed. 
R. D. Bradley, another fervent defender of the logical form of the problem of 
evil, expresses these additional premises as follows: 
"If God is willing that evil exists, then he is not perfectly good. Premise (1) 
3 John L. MacIde, "Evil and Omnipotence, " in Mind. " A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy, 
(Apri1,1955), 64, no. 254,200. 
4 Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence, " 200-1. 
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If God is unwilling that evil exists, and it exists nevertheless, then he is 
not omnipotent. Premise (2) 
But God must be either willing or unwilling that evil exists. Premise (3) 
Therefore, 
if evil exists, God is either not perfectly good or not omnipotent "s 
On the other hand, the theist asserts that God is all-powerful, perfectly good, and 
at the same time that evil is a reality of the world. In response, the atheist raises the 
question as to why is this evil in the world if there is God as the theist claims. He should 
not have brought about evil willingly as he is a perfectly good being. If there is evil 
contrary to his will, then he has, the atheist asserts, not enough power to prevent the 
occurrence of evil. Since it cannot be thought from logical point of view that God is both 
willing and unwilling at the same time, the atheist alleges that there is a contradiction in 
terms in the claim that God is all-powerful, perfectly good, and that evil is real as a 
product of the God's creative power. So theism is accused of being irrational in its 
assertion. The theist who claims to be rational needs, therefore, to show that at least one 
premise of the logical argument is incorrect, or the argument itself is logically defective. 6 
The other version of the problem is the evidential problem of evil, also called the 
a posteriori problem and the inductive problem. It can be stated in its simplest form in 
the way that the existence of abundant, and excessive evil in the world gives "rational 
support" for the atheistic conviction that God does not exist. The discussion in this 
sRD. Bradley, "A Proof of Atheism, " Sophia: A Journal for Discussion in Philosophical Theology, (April 
1967), 6, no. 1,38. 
61 shall not discuss the logical problem further here for it is explored in A. Plantinga's Free-Will Defence. 
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version of the problem changes from "logical inconsistency" of the parts of the belief in 
God, to the "implausibility" of this belief in question in the face of the variety and 
abundance of evil in the world. William L. Rowe, one of the contemporary exponents of 
this theory, states the evidential form of the problem of evil as follows: 
"1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient 
being could have prevented without thereby preventing the occurrence of any 
greater good. 
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any 
intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby preventing 
the occurrence of some greater good. 
Therefore, 
3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. "' 
This argument is largely based on the atheist's assumption that in the world 
there are unnecessary, meaningless and intense human and animal suffering. An all- 
powerful, perfectly good, and all-knowing Being would not permit pointless and 
excessive evil. However, such unnecessary and pointless evil does, the atheist asserts, 
exist in the world. Then, the atheist argues that one has a rational ground for not believing 
in the theistic belief that God exists. The theist is called to answer whether there is 
pointless and excessive evil and suffering in the world threatening the theistic belief in 
God as he is also asked to defend assertions about the existence and character of God. 
7 William L. Rowe, Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction, (California, Dickenson Publishing Company, 
Inc., 1078), 87. 
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B. The Theistic Concept of God 
The existence of evil, as we have seen, poses a serious problem for the theist 
who holds that there is a God who has power to do everything he wills and is perfectly 
good, and that evil is a reality of the world. Thus, the atheist who raises the problem of 
evil especially maintains that there are certain ways in which evil does not create a 
problem. 8 Firstly, the problem of evil can simply be avoided by limiting God's supreme 
attributes such as omnipotence and goodness; or denying the reality of evil. If God is 
regarded as lacking the supreme power or the perfect goodness to create a universe where 
evil does not exist, this deity would not be responsible for evil taking place in the world 
outside of his power. 
Nevertheless, a belief in such a deity entails that the God of Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam must be discarded. So a strange and impaired notion of theism, if 
it can be called theism, can avoid the atheistic attacks based on the existence of evil. I 
shall return to this matter when I am discussing Process Theodicy among the Christian 
Theodicies. Secondly, to deny the reality of evil by asserting that evil is illusory may 
settle the problem of evil. Yet, all orthodox monotheistic religions have the concept of the 
devil or Satan as the personification of pure evil. Satan and its evils are not regarded 
illusory. In addition, it is not reasonable to regard physical deformities and mental 
deficiencies we encounter in the world as good. 
° H. J. McCloskey, "God and Evil, " The Philosophical Quarterly (April 1960), 10, no. 39,98. See, also, 
Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence, " 200. 
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Thirdly, the fact of evil is not a problem for certain forms of religious dualism 
suggesting that God is the creator of goodness only, and that evil is originated by some 
other cause as in ancient Zoroastrian and Manichaean religions. It is ambiguous whether 
Zoroastrianism was originally in a dualistic form when its founder Zoroaster (c. BCE 
618-541) preached it. 9 However, there is no doubt that later Zoroastrianism expounded 
two rival deities, namely, Ahura Mazda (or Ormuzd) as the deity of goodness, and Angra 
Mainyu (or Ahriman) as the deity of evil. In addition, Zoroastrianism called its followers 
to take part on the side of the good deity in the constant fight against evil. 10 So, Ahura 
Mazda could not be responsible for disasters caused by the deity of evil, namely Angra 
Mainyu. Therefore, it cannot be talked about the problem of evil in Zoroastrianism in the 
sense that theistic faiths face. 
We can see John Stuart NO (1806-1873) as the champion of the modem 
dualistic position in the nineteenth century. " Having rejected the classical teleological 
argument for the existence of God, he concludes that the "author of the cosmos worked 
under limitations; that he was obliged to adapt himself to conditions independent of his 
will and to attain his ends by such arrangements as those conditions admitted of. "2 Mill 
supposes that one of the reasons that limits God's power is the nature of the material "not 
admitting of any arrangements by which his purposes could be more completely 
9 John Bowker, Problems of Suffering in Religions of the World, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1977), 271. 
lo Ninian Smart, The World's Religions: Old Traditions and Modern Transformations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 218. 
" J. Hick calls Mill's position "the external dualism", see Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 27. 
12 J. S. Mill, Theism, ed. by R. Taylor, (New York, The Liberal Arts Press, 1957), 34. 
11 
fulfilled "13 As John Hick points out, since Mill's dualistic position does not even face. the 
problem of evil, it cannot be appropriate to say that his external dualism solves it. 14 
It can be argued that the problem of evil may be avoided by adopting a dualistic 
position such as in Zoroastrianism and Mill. Yet, this brings about further problems 
concerning the notion of God and the creation. Moreover, any dualistic concept of God is 
contradictory with the monotheism of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. All three 
proclaim that God is the only creator of existence that is present and to come out; and he 
has no partner whatsoever in his deeds. Therefore, monotheistic concept of God suggests 
that he is the ultimate cause of everything, both good and evil. 
Finally, the reality of evil may not create a problem for some certain concepts of 
God such as Paul Tillich's concept of God as "being-itself. " He believes that "God is 
being-itself, not a being, " so it cannot be naturally talked about whether evil can be 
attributed to the Almighty Being. If he is being itself, it means that there is nothing but 
him only. In this sense, there is nothing external to him to pose a threat. On the other 
hand, process theology, also called "dipolar theism, " has a different concept of God from 
the traditional theistic concept. Process theologians contend that God is "eternal-temporal 
consciousness, knowing and including the world in His actuality. "15 
Charles Hartshorne, an influential process theologian, explains the process 
notion of God asserting that God has two sides, concrete and abstract. His abstract side is 
13 Mill, Theism, 39. 
14 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 29. 
is Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, Philosophers Speak of God, (Chicago, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1976), 17. 
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absolute, unchangeable and constant, but the concrete side is, on the contrary, 
influenceable, and changeable. At the same time, God, both abstract and concrete nature 
together, is "unsurpassably excellent. " Hartshorne clarifies that he does not mean that 
"unsurpassable" means ultimately perfect in terms of classical theism. He means that 
there is no creature as powerful and good as him. 
To explain this, Hartshorne employs what he calls "dual transcendence" 
principle. According to this principle, "there is no contradiction in saying that God is both 
finite and infinite" or simple and complex, or cause and effect and so on. Hartshorne 
argues that "for its a logical truism that S is P and P is not S can be consistent if they 
apply to A in different respects or aspects. "16 Therefore, evil does not constitute a threat 
to process concept of God claiming that God has still been changing on one of his aspects 
within the universe. Consequently, the reality of evil is a problem only for the theistic 
faiths professing that God is all-powerful, perfectly good, infinite and the only Being that 
created everything visible and invisible. 
How do the theist describe God? The contemporary theist Richard Swinburne 
describes God as "a person without a body (i. e., a spirit) who is eternal, is perfectly free, 
omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and the creator of all things. "17 It seems to me 
that this description is in accord with the main monotheistic faiths of the world religions, 
namely, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The three "Abrahamic faiths" proclaim that 
16 Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Revolutionary Concept of Prehension, " International Philosophical Quarterly, 
(New York 1979), 19,261 ff. 
17 Richard Swinbume, The Existence of God, (Oxford, At The Clarendon Press, 1979), 8. 
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there exists an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-benevolent God, 18 even though each one 
of these monotheistic religions puts special emphasis on different characteristics of God. 
While Christian tradition heavily stresses "the love of God" towards mankind, the 
sovereignty and power of God are highlighted in Islamic and Jewish tradition. 
It ought to be pointed out here that this variation of emphasis in the attributes of 
God in one religion does not exclude the other omni-attributes of God in another. That is 
to say, it does not mean that Islam does not affirm the love of God, or Christianity divine 
power. God in all three religions is a perfectly good, all-powerful, all-knowing deity. 
What happens is that certain divine attributes are emphasised more than others in 
accordance with particularies of each faith. 
As opposed to theism, there is the negative position widely called atheism. In 
this sense, atheism is the absence and denial of the theistic belief in God. Because the 
term atheism consists of the prefix "a-", and the noun "theism" One of the meanings of 
the prefix "a-" is identical to the meaning of the preposition "without" like asocial, 
anarchy, and the like; so "a-theism" literally means "without theism. "19 That is to say, 
atheism is the lack and denial of the belief in God. 
It ought to be mentioned at this point that Alvin Plantinga, the theist philosopher 
well-known with his significant solution to the problem of evil, namely the Free-Will 
Defence, calls the enterprise of alleging the irrationality of the belief in God by argument 
"natural atheology. " The term atheism in this work will be used in the sense of an 
18 Paul Badham, "Towards a Global Religious Solution to the Problem of Evil, " in W. Cenkner (ed. ), Evil 
and the World Religions, (New York, Paragon House, 1996), 241. 
'9 George H. Smith, Atheism: The Case Against God, (New York, Prometheus Books, 1979), 7. 
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intellectual position that negates the theistic belief in God by reasons and arguments, 
particularly by the reality of evil in the world. 
C. Evil, Suffering and Pain 
The existence of evil and suffering in the world is one of the main components 
of the problem of evil against the existence of God. The Oxford English Dictionary 
describes the adjective "evil" as "the antithesis of good in all its principal senses. 940 
Although the adjective "bad, " not evil, is just the opposite of "good, " the term "evil" is 
used in the most extensive sense of discontentment, dissatisfaction, or disparagement of 
any kind. Each specific evil condition and event is expressed by other words such as 
suffering, pain, disaster, etc. 
Evil is generally classified in the literature of the problem of evil as moral evil, 
and natural evil. On the one hand, moral evils are bad actions originating from human 
beings such as cruelties, massacres, and traits like hatred, pride and the like. Natural evils 
are, on the other hand, some adversities caused by nature such as earthquakes, floods, 
famines, mental and physical deformities of foetuses and the like. Besides, there are some 
composite evils brought about by both nature and human attitudes, such as causing 
disasters by way of building houses around seismic regions and so on. While it is a 
natural phenomenon that earthquakes occur around fault lines in seismic regions, building 
houses in seismic areas gives rise to heavy casualties. 
20 The Oxford English Diction y, second edition, prepared by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), S, 471. 
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D. Theodicy 
The term "theodicy" is sometimes used in a similar sense with the phrase "the 
problem of evil, " a popularly recognised term consisting of the forms of the problem of 
evil and their suggested defences. The word theodicy originally comprised of the Greek 
equivalent of God, and of justice in the sense of the justification of God. It is widely 
accepted that G. Wilhelm Leibniz coined the term "theodicy" as a technical term 
expressing specifically the Christian defence of God in spite of the existence of actual 
evil . 
21 Afterwards, it has become a general name for the problem itself and, at the same 
time, for the responses of particular faiths and philosophers to it. Thus, when I refer to the 
word theodicy in the rest of the work, it will be used in the general sense of the responses 
to evil unless specified. 
In the literature of philosophy of religion, there are different conceptions of 
theodicy. Richard Swinburne and Alvin Plantinga understand "theodicy" as an 
intellectual endeavour aiming at reconciling the reality of evil in the world with "the 
being of a God who might, or might not, exit "u On the other hand, John Hick affirms 
that "the theodicy project stands ... within an already operating belief in God. "23 For 
Hick, this is within the Christian concept of God. Kenneth Surin concurs with Hick, 
"theodicy is inaugurated by an act of accusation... In responding to her 
adversary, the theodicist engages in an attempt to convince, to 
21 Hick, Evil and the Love of God, 6. 
u Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 82. 
23 Hick, "An Irenaean Theodicy, " in Stephen T. Davis (ed), Encountering Evil (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
1986), 39. 
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persuade... Theodicy in this sense is a species of rhetoric, and is thus 
irreducibly performative. In this respect, God exits, as the One who is 
accused"24 
Therefore, the endeavour of theodicy needs to be theological in order to justify a 
particular conception of God. 
From historical point of view, the need for reasonable answers to the questions 
posed by opponents of Christianity such as Gnosticism and the innate human nature to 
explain beliefs intelligibly seem to have contributed the emergence of Christian theodicy. 
Moreover, the Hellenistic philosophy has immensely influenced the rationalisation of 
Christian tenets from the first century onwards. Therefore, the venture of theodicy can be 
seen as a rational attempt at reconciling the belief in God's goodness and power with the 
evils of this world. What is characteristically Christian in this entire endeavour is the 
meaning of Jesus Christ's life and death. Thus, the meaning of suffering, particularly that 
of Jesus, have a central place in Christian thought. In this aspect, the problem of suffering 
seems to have been felt more pressing by Christian theologians and philosophers than 
their Muslims and Jewish counterparts; that is, if we ignore the recent tragedy of the 
Holocaust. 
24 Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, 107, n. 21. 
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PART TWO 
THE THEODICIES 
II. THE JEWISH THEODICIES 
The Jews have, as one of the most ancient nations of the world, experienced a 
great deal of suffering, perhaps more than any other nation on earth. As the Jewish 
historian Heinrich Graetz (1817-1891) notes, "This is the eighteen-hundred-year era of 
the diaspora [from the destruction of the second temple in CE 70 down to 1850] of 
unprecedented suffering, of uninterrupted martyrdom without parallel in world history. 10 
They have experienced a lot of pain, loss, grief, defeat, pogroms and holocausts for five 
millennia. The experience of suffering seems to have deeply affected the Jewish people 
and faith. The Jewish sacred books still carry the scars of historical instances of suffering 
in their rituals, prayers, and even in their festivals. 
Before exploring the answers offered in the writings of the Hebrew Bible, I 
believe it is appropriate to mention the context in which the problem of evil occurs. The 
story of the Exodus from Egypt seems to present itself a good starting point. Yahweh was 
the God of the Jewish people, and he had chosen them as his own flock. God and the 
people of Israel had made a covenant, and both promised not to break their words. 
Yahweh was going to protect them, and they were going to worship none but Yahweh. 
When God had saved them from the torments of the Pharaoh and from the exile in Egypt, 
the Jewish people held firmly their faith in Yahweh. 
u Heinrich Graetz, "The Diaspora: Suffering and Spirit, " in Nahum N. Glatzer (ed. ), Modern Jewish 
nought: A Source Reader (New York: Schocken Books, 1977), 20. 
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At the mountain Sinai, or Horeb, God gave them the Ten Commandments, and 
demanded from the Jews to obey them. It was a mutual agreement between God and the 
Jews. However, this agreement had also implied that God, too, had to keep his promise to 
protect and prosper the Jewish nation. It seems that both sides did not keep their side of 
the contract at times. This seems to have raised a serious problem for the Jews leading 
them to question their faith. 
The first place to look for the Jewish reactions to the instances of suffering is the 
writings of the Hebrew Bible. Whether the biblical writings are taken as the word of God, 
as many orthodox Jews accept today, or the experience of certain individuals in Jewish 
history with God, I believe that they are the foundation of the Jewish responses to 
suffering in later ages. In Jewish Scriptures, the question is not simply why suffering 
exists at all. It seems that the biblical authors did not have serious problems with the 
existence of evil in theoretical sense. 
They are, however, troubled by the irregularities in and magnitude of human 
suffering in certain contexts. The question, most of the time, is why afflictions befall on 
the righteous and innocent while the wicked prospers. As Bowker points, "The problem 
is not the fact of suffering but its distribution. "26 The basic assumption seems to be that 
suffering is acceptable as long as it is in proportion with the wickedness committed. This 
brings us to one of the major answers of the Jewish Scriptures; that is, suffering is a 
punishment for sin. 
26 John Bowker, Problems ofSu f Bring in Religions of the World, 9. 
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E. The Major Responses of Tanakh 
1. Suffering as Retribution 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines retribution in terms of "requital usually 
for evil done. " In this sense, the notion of suffering as retribution is based on the 
presupposed relation between sin and its punishment. Accordingly, human suffering is 
God's judgement for sin. As a formerly Jewish idea, the prophets and writers of the 
Hebrew Bible affirmed that God's justice manifested itself in this world as well as in the 
hereafter in terms of reward and punishment. Accordingly, human afflictions are God's 
punishment for sin and rewards are His blessing. 
The direct correlation between sin and punishment is one of the most ancient 
answers to the problem of human suffering. A large proportion of Tanakh, the Jewish 
Scripture, considers suffering as a direct consequence of sin. This explanation seems to 
be based on the biblical doctrine of the belief in the just and powerful God and the 
covenant of Israel with him. 27 The covenant signifies that the people of Israel promised to 
God to obey his commandments expressed as the Law. They are warned from the 
beginning that the violation of divine commandments brings about disasters. Therefore, 
the notion of covenant implies a possible reward and punishment. 
We learn from certain biblical passages that the prophets of Israel constantly 
asserted and their followers accepted that there is a correlation between wickedness and 
disaster. For instance, Jeremiah 14: 10 reads, "Thus said the Lord concerning the people: 
27 Robert Gordis, "The Temptation of Job-Tradition Versus Experience in Religion, " Judaism, 4 (1955), 
198. 
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`Truly, they love to stray, they have not restrained their feet; so the Lord has no pleasure 
in them. Now he will recall their iniquity and punish their sin. "28 Since Israel was 
violating the covenant, they must have expected humiliation, defeat, suffering and so on. 
Most of the prophetic assertions presuppose a close link between a national disaster and a 
national sin. 29 Accordingly, a calamity emerges either as a result of a wrong that the 
whole nation perpetuated or as an outcome of a widespread wickedness. 
The references to sufferings as a punishment in this world are ample in the 
Hebrew Bible. In the second passage of the Shema (in Hebrew "Hear"), 30 Deuteronomy 
11: 13-21, God warns the Jews that if they worship other gods, there will be drought, and, 
consequently, they will have to leave soon the God given land. Similarly, the curses that 
shall visit the Israelites are enumerated in Deuteronomy 28: 15-68 if they do not observe 
God's commandments and laws. 
The classical example of this explanation in the Bible is Adam's sin and its 
consequence; that is, his exile from the Paradise. When Adam and Eve ate a fruit from 
the forbidden tree, God punished them with exile from Paradise by throwing them onto 
the earth and to a life that is full of struggle (Gen. 3: 17-19). Furthermore, God destroys 
humankind with the deluge when they do not listen to Noah's warnings and continue with 
28 The version of the Hebrew Bible referred to in this part of the thesis is Tanakh: The Holy Scriptures, The 
New JPS Translation According to the Traditional Hebrew Text, (Philadelphia and Jerusalem: The Jewish 
Publication Society, 1985). 
2' Robert Goldenberg, "Early Rabbinic Explanations of the Destruction of Jerusalem, " Journal of Jewish 
Studies 33, no. 1-2, (Spring-Autumn 1982), 517. 
30 The Shema, the Jewish declaration of faith in one God, is composed of three Biblical passages, Deut. 6: 4- 
9, Deut. 11: 13-21 and Num. 1537-41. 
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their wickedness (Gen. 6: 11-13). Moreover, in spite of Abraham's persistent intercession, 
God destroys Sodom and Gomorra for their sin is very grave (Gen. 18: 20-22). 
Some natural phenomena such as plague (Ex. 7-11), disease (Num. 11: 33; 2 Sam. 
24: 15), drought (Jer. 14: 1-7), famine (Ezek. 5: 12,16), earthquake (Isa. 29: 6; Am. 8: 8), 
lightning (Num. 11: 1) are regarded by the biblical authors as instruments of divine 
punishment. As David Kraemer points out, for the pious people of Israel, evil occurrences 
are "expressions of God's justice, a justice that insists upon obedience to God's will and 
repays nonobedience with suffering in various degrees. "31 When the people of Israel 
violate divine law, the conditions of covenant, disasters visit them. 
Since Israel did not obey the commandments of Yahweh, he inflicted 
humiliation and suffering onto them through natural disasters. In this way, the moral 
imperfection of human beings becomes the cause of such natural evils as disease, famine, 
drought and so on. The flood is, for instance, justified in Genesis 6: 5 because human 
beings are wicked: "The Lord saw how great was man's wickedness on earth, and how 
every plan devised by his mind was nothing but evil all the time. " 
If suffering is a punishment for sin, what about the suffering of the innocent? 
The Jewish people in the past must have realised that every sufferer is not wicked, or that 
many suffer innocently. Among them, there must have been some children or pious 
subjected to affliction as well. It would not be a proper answer to say that they suffered 
because they did not obey divine law or commit immoral conduct. What sin could a child 
31 David Kraemer, Responses to Suffering in Classical Rabbinic Literature (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), IS. 
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have? Their answer was that the innocent suffers because of the sins of his or her 
ancestors. Exodus 20: 5-6 reads, 
"You shall not bow down to them or serve them. For I the Lord your God am 
an impassioned God, visiting the guilt of the parents upon the children, upon 
the third and upon the fourth generations of those who reject Me, but showing 
kindness to the thousandth generation of those who love Me and keep My 
commandments. " 
The psalmist cries for help from God not to punish them for the sins of their 
ancestors: "Do not remember against us the iniquities of our forefathers" (Ps. 79: 8). 
However, not every biblical writer seems to be happy with this thought. Ezekiel, for 
instance, refuses to accept the idea of suffering as a punishment for the ancestral sins. He 
professes, 
"The person who sins, he alone shall die a child shall not share the burden of a 
parent's guilt, nor shall a parent share the burden of a child's guilt; the 
righteousness of the righteous shall be accounted to him alone, and the 
wickedness of the wicked shall be accounted to him alone. " 
Yet, even for Ezekiel the innocent might be a victim of the sins of the wicked 
community. Yet, this does not show that sin passes from one generation to another. It is 
only a natural consequence of the failure of the corporate responsibility within a society. 
Since people live in communities, something that one does inevitably affects others living 
in that community as well. That is why Ezekiel accuses the people of Israel then for the 
downfall of Jerusalem (16: 2). 
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Besides, certain biblical writers seem to object to the idea that suffering is a 
punishment for sin. The reason for that must have been the instances of prosperity of the 
wicked that the Jewish people encountered. Jeremiah, for instance, openly challenges this 
notion although he is well aware of who shall be triumphant. He cries, "You will win, 0 
Lord, if I make claim against You, yet I shall present charges against You: Why does the 
way of the wicked prosper? Why are the workers of treachery at ease? " (Jer. 12: 1). It 
seems that Jeremiah holds onto God's promise that he was going to speak through 
Jeremiah and to stand by him (1: 7-10). Jeremiah continues to believe in God and divine 
justice. 
A similar approach is found in the Book of Job. As the epitome of suffering, Job 
flatly refuses to accept the idea of suffering as a punishment. Having negated the similar 
charges against himself voiced by his three friends Eliphaz, Bildad and Zophar, Job 
accuses God with injustice. Moreover, Job defies any generalisation: "He destroys the 
blameless and the guilty" (Job 9: 20-22). Nevertheless, Job like Jeremiah surrender to 
God's wisdom in the end even though he had no apparent answer from God. 
2. Suffering as Discipline and Test 
The Jewish Scriptures describes the world in moral terms. In this sense, 
suffering has a moral purpose, which is to refine and enrich the human soul. Therefore, 
the idea that suffering is discipline underlines that true human character emerges through 
suffering. Afflictions might be an instrument to develop human nature. Through 
suffering, many may come to know and worship God. Since Israel is the chosen people of 
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God, he cares about them and shows a unique attention to them. 32 The author of the 
Proverbs, for example, advises, "Do not reject the discipline of the Lord, my son; do not 
abhor His rebuke. For whom the Lord loves, He rebukes, as a father the son whom he 
favors" (Prov. 3: 11-12; cf. Ps. 94: 12). In this sense, afflictions are signs of God's love of 
Israel. It is not possible to understand the following passage otherwise: `Bear in mind 
that the Lord your God disciplines you just as a man disciplines his son" (Deut. 8: 5). 
Connected with the idea of discipline is the notion that suffering is a test of faith. 
God apparently puts the faithful to test because he or she has something to be tried of. In 
this sense, suffering is a test of one's sincerity in his or her trust in God on the one hand; 
it is a means of God's blessing on the other. The classic example of this sort is the test of 
Abraham with the sacrifice of his son. Abraham is asked to sacrifice his "favored" son, 
Isaac, as a burnt offering to God. We do not know how Abraham felt, but stress, agony, 
sorrow must have been overwhelming, not enough to doubt of his faith in God though. 
Having convinced of Abraham's faith, God intervenes and replaces the sacrifice of 
Abraham's son with a sacrifice. As a reward, God promises that he will multiply their 
descendants and make them victorious against their enemies (Gen. 2: 1-18). 
God does not take pleasure from the suffering of the wicked as well as the 
righteous. All he wants is that they come to know God and live a righteous life. 
Therefore, suffering of the wicked is to dissuade them from committing anything evil. 
Ezekiel states this view very clearly, "Say to them: As I live-declares the Lord God-it is 
not My desire that the wicked shall die, but that the wicked turn from his [evil] ways and 
32 Kraemer, Responses to Suffering in Classical Rabbinic Literature, 22. 
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live. Turn back, turn back from your evil ways, that you may not die, 0 House of Israel! " 
(Ezek. 33: 11; cf. 18: 23,32). 
3. The Free-Will Explanation 
It is relatively difficult to differentiate the explanations of free-will and 
punishment for sin from each other since they are closely related and interconnected. 
However, as some biblical passages form a ground for later formulations of Free-Will 
Explanation in Jewish theology, it seems appropriate to mention it here even if it is 
briefly. The classical expression of free-will in Tanakh can be found in Deuteronomy 
30: 19-20. Here Moses speaks to the people of Israel: 
"... I have put before you life and death, blessing and curse. Choose life-if you 
and your offspring would live-by loving the Lord your God, heeding His 
commandments, and holding fast to Him. For thereby you shall have life and 
shall long endure upon the soil that the Lord swore to your ancestors, 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to give to them. " 
Hence, the people of Israel either choose to obey divine commandments and live 
on earth or choose not to; in that case suffering is inevitable. While the just is praised for 
his good works he or she achieved, the wicked is condemned to pain and sorrow because 
of what he did. "Hail the just man, for he shall fare well; he shall eat the fruit of his 
works. Woe to the wicked man, for he shall fare ill; as his hands have dealt, so shall it be 
done to him" (Isa. 3: 10-11). This is the biblical expression of the idea that suffering is the 
product of human free-will. That is why the righteous makes soul-searching in the face of 
suffering to find out the sin behind that disaster. 
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Some biblical authors seem to see human heart as a place in which evil 
inclinations of humankind dwell. Jeremiah 17: 9 reads, "Most devious is the heart; it is 
perverse-who can fathom it? " Heart functions in similar way human free-will does. One's 
free choices determine the actions and their consequences, namely, the reward and 
punishment of the actions. The notion that suffering is a human doing is more clearly 
expressed in the following passage of Genesis: "The Lord saw how great was man's 
wickedness on earth, and how every plan devised by his mind was nothing but evil all the 
time" (Gen. 6: 5; cf. 8: 21). 
4. Suffering as Redemption: 
Not every suffering is a punishment for sin or as a choice of human beings. It is 
sometimes a consequence of mission conferred by God on a prophet. In this sense, 
suffering becomes a purposeful and redemptive suffering in the way that it is an outcome 
of a process of expiating the sins of the community. Jeremiah is, for instance, was chosen 
by God to be his servant: "Before I created you in the womb, I selected you; before you 
were born, I consecrated you; I appointed you a prophet concerning the nation" (Jer. 1: 5). 
Jeremiah did not feel like a prophet himself, more like a youngster. Her replies, "I don't 
know how to speak for I am still a boy" (1: 6). 
Nevertheless, Jeremiah is selected to be a servant of God. He was going to 
foretell his people that there were disasters waiting at the gates of Jerusalem because the 
people of Judah have forsaken God and turned to other gods (1: 16). He is told what the 
consequences will be: "They will attack you, but they shall not overcome you; for I am 
with you-declares the Lord-to save you" (1: 19). Jeremiah's suffering becomes so deep 
that he makes an outburst of complaint under the strain of God-given-mission. "Accursed 
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be the day that I was bornl... Why did I ever issue from the womb, to see misery and woe, 
to spend all my days in shame! " (20: 14-18). This is the cry of a servant of God who 
endured sorrow and pain in order to deliver the people of Judah from idolatry. 
The epitome of redemptive suffering in the Hebrew Bible is regarded as the 
suffering of the servant in the so-called Servant Songs (Isa. 40-66). The main point of the 
passage is that the servant's suffering redeems the faults of the people of Israel. The 
Servant Songs, also called the servant passages, are believed to have been written during 
the Babylonian exile. Jerusalem was lost to the Babylonians; the Jews were subjected to 
humiliation, mental and physical anguish. 33 The servant bears suffering not because he is 
guilty but he obeys God. He says, "The Lord God opened my ears, and I did not disobey, 
I did not run away. I offered my back to the floggers, and my cheeks to those who tore 
out my hair. I did not hide my face from insult and spittle" (50: 5-6). Many turned away 
from the servant because of his suffering and sickness. "Just as the many were appalled at 
him, so marred was his appearance, unlike that of man, his form, beyond human 
semblance" (52: 14). 
God intervenes and vindicates his servant. He did not suffer for he sinned. His 
suffering was the punishment for the sins of the people. Isaiah, also called Deutero- 
Isaiah, witnesses that the suffering of the servant is redeemptive suffering building a new 
peaceful future for Israel. Here suffering is not a punishment for sin, but it is atonement 
from the sins of the Hebrew nation. Deutero-Isaiah writes, 
33 Bowker, Problems of Suffering in Religions of the World, 20. 
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"Yet it was our sickness that he was bearing, our suffering that he endured. 
We accounted him plagued, smitten and afflicted by God; but he was 
wounded because of our sins, crushed because of our iniquities. He bore the 
chastisement that made us whole, and by his bruises we were healed" (53: 4-5). 
Harry M. Orlinsky objects that there is any idea of vicarious suffering in the 
servant passages. He extensively scrutinises the biblical notion of the "Servant of the 
Lord, " and traces the origin of the concept the "Suffering Servant" and "Vicarious 
Sufferer. " He asserts that they are both the output of Christianity produced in the period 
subsequent to the death of Jesus. 34 Orlinsky believes that the idea of vicarious suffering 
lacks the support of the rest of the Hebrew Bible and opposes to the concept of the 
covenant. In his words, 
"I know of no person in the Bible, nor has any scholar pointed to any such, 
who took it upon himself, or who considered himself, or who was appointed 
or considered by others, to be a vicarious for wicked people deserving 
punishment. This should hardly be surprising in the light of the covenant "35 
However, Philip Sigal thinks otherwise. He maintains that vicarious suffering is 
of Judaic origin, and its reference to Jesus is "as valid as its application to any other 
figure.. °'36 He believes that the Jewish Scriptures regard the concept of vicarious 
atonement as the redemptive suffering of Israel for the rest of the people of the world. 
34 Harry M. Orlinsky, "Studies on the Second Part of the Book of Isaiah: The So-called 'Servant of the 
Lord' and `Suffering Servant' in Second Isaiah, " in Harry M. Orlinsky (ed. ), Isaiah 40-66: A Study of the 
Teaching of the Second Isaiah and Its Consequences (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1967), 17. 
35 Orlinsky, "Studies on the Second Part of the Book of Isaiah... " 54. 
36 Philip Sigal, The Emergence of Contemporary Judaism (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: The Pickwick Press, 
1980), 1,132. 
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The identity of the suffering servant is a controversial subject as well. There are 
clear references in the Bible that the servant is the people of Israel who endure the 
sufferings in exile (Isa. 49: 3; 52: 13). However, it is also possible that the servant is an 
exemplary Jewish figure such as Job in the Book of Job or Isaac (Gen. 22: 1), the son of 
Abraham. The Christians, to the objection of the Jews, identifies the servant with Jesus. 37 
In this sense, the servant passages are foretelling of Jesus Christ. It seems to me that the 
suggestion of Jacob Agus, a contemporary Jewish thinker, is more reasonable. He states, 
"the life of nearly every prophet could have served for Isaiah as the prototype of his 
vision. "38 The prophets were the people who devoted their life to restoration and 
salvation of Israel. Doing this, they faced humiliation, suffering and even death 
sometimes. In this sense, suffering is a natural consequence of advocating a belief that is 
threatening an authority. Its reward is from God. 
Whether the servant is identified with the nation of Israel or a particular figure in 
history has a secondary significance. What is important for our present purpose here is 
whether the redemptive or vicarious suffering of servant, namely, Israel, Job or another 
person, helps to solve the problem of suffering. I think that the idea of redemptive 
suffering does not seem to offer an adequate response. It is difficult to explain, for 
example, the Nazi Holocaust in terms of redemptive suffering and its victims as the 
suffering servants. As the chief Rabbi of the Great Britain Jonathan Sacks maintains, 
"The `suffering servant' paradigm of Isaiah is no longer adequate to a post-Holocaust 
37 Sigal, The Emergence of Contemporary Judaism, 1, XV-XXQI. 
38 Jacob B. Agus, The Evolution ofJewish Thought: From Biblical Times to the Opening of the Modern Era 
(London and New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1959), 24. 
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world . 
09 For it is a horrendous and unwanted disaster indifferent to aged, children, 
women, believers and unbelievers. 
6. Mystery 
Some of the biblical figures try really hard to find an answer to the problem of 
suffering. Eventually, they feel compelled to acknowledge that this is an unsolvable 
question. They arrive in this conclusion after a harsh questioning God as to why he 
inflicted or allowed affliction to his people. Habakkuk, who lived during a violent period 
before the fall of Jerusalem, cries to God for help (1: 2-6). God's answer to Habakkuk's 
appeal is very concise "My just man shall live by his faith" (2: 4). It seems that Habakkuk 
is satisfied with the answer he got. 
Jeremiah, for instance, openly challenges God even though he is well aware of 
who shall triumph. He cries, "You will win, 0 Lord, if I make a claim against You, yet I 
shall present charges against You: Why does the way of the wicked prosper? Why are the 
workers of treachery at ease? " (Jer. 12: 1). It seems that Jeremiah resorts to God's 
promise that he was going to speak through Jeremiah and to stand by him (1: 7-10). 
Jeremiah continues to believe in God and divine justice. 
The author of Ecclesiastes shares the notion that the problem of evil is insoluble. 
He seems to be convinced that any generalisation of the justification of evil is inadequate. 
The good suffers as well as the wicked. He states, "I have further observed under sun that 
the race is not won by the swift, nor the battle by the valiant; nor is bread won by the 
39 Jonathan Sacks, Crisis and Covenant: Jewish Thought After the Holocaust (Manchester. Manchester 
University Press, 1992), 17. 
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wise, nor wealth by the intelligent, nor favor by the learned. For the time of mischance 
comes to all" (Ecc. 9: 11). 
Having realised the mystery of rational problem of evil, the author of 
Ecclesiastes offers a practical solution. Life is not all misery and sorrow. There are some 
pleasures to enjoy as long as we are alive: "Enjoy happiness with a woman you love all 
the fleeting days of life that have been granted to you under the sun-all your fleeting 
days" (9: 9). John Bowker asserts that it is not right to see the writer of Ecclesiastes as a 
sceptical just because he points to some of the delights of human live 40 He only 
emphasises the significance of the quality of human life. The following is a simple 
expression of this: "... Go made men plain, but they have engaged in too much reasoning" 
(7: 29). What seems to be important for the author of Ecclesiastes is to realise the 
importance of life and make effective use of it. 
The Book ofJob is often seen as a significant discussion of the problem of evil in 
the form of Job's suffering. While he was a righteous person, various afflictions befell on 
him He lost his prosperity, got sick, and so on. He cannot understand why a righteous 
like him suffers. In the dialogue between Job and his three friends Eliphaz, Bildad and 
Zophar, all the classical answers to the problem of evil are expressed by the friends. In 
turn, Job questions each response and denies their possibility. 41 Although Job does not 
curse God at all, he charges God with injustice: "He destroys the blameless and the 
guilty" (Job 9: 20-22). 
40 Bowker, Problems of Suffering in Religions of the World, 17. 
41 Kraemer, Responses to Suffering in Classical Rabbinic Literature, 30. 
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In the final part of the book, God reveals himself in a whirlwind. Neither God 
explains nor Job asks again to God why all those sufferings. Instead, God rebukes Job's 
friends for attempting at justifying Job's suffering. In addition, Job's ignorance and the 
superiority of divine wisdom are emphasised. Consequently, Job accepts his ignorance, 
and repents in dust and ashes in an affirmation of the mystery of evil and suffering. Why 
did Job not say or ask anything to God in the face? Perhaps he was not expecting any 
answer from God since he was not there. Oliver Leaman suggests that "That is hardly 
surprising, since the whole object of his line of complaint was that God would not 
address him with answers to his charges, and any response is a success given Job's 
starting position. "42 In this sense, the vision of God itself was a response to Job. David 
Shapiro, on the other hand, argues that the appearance of God is not a new answer, but "It 
merely reaffirms the Biblical principle of faith-that God cares. Man suffers, but God has 
not forsaken him. '-A3 Whatever the reason is, there is no answer offered for the problem of 
evil at the end of the Book of Job. 
To conclude, as it appears in the experiences of Habakkuk, Jeremiah and Job 
from the first hand, the Hebrew Bible does not provide a concrete solution to the problem 
of evil. Although the Jewish Scriptures discuss the dilemma of suffering extensively, they 
appear to resort to silence at the end. Perhaps it is not for Scriptures to justify the reality 
of evil in the world. Each answer offered in Tanakh may be taken as a comforting 
42 Oliver Leaman, Evil and Suffering in Jewish Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 22. 
43 David S. Shapiro, "The Problem of Evil and the Book of Job, " in Judaism, 5 (1956), 52. 
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response to the individual cases of suffering. However, the lack of an eschatological 
response to suffering in the Bible seems to make the problem more problematic. 
F. The Jewish Theological And Philosophical Theodicies 
Having considered the biblical foundation of the Jewish answers to the problem 
of suffering, I shall explore the major Jewish theological and philosophical responses 
here. A pious person may be convinced with the ideas in Scripture without needing any 
further enquiry. Whereas a theologian and philosopher always try to look for a rational 
explanation of religious beliefs. At least, he or she expects that religious propositions 
should not be irrational to hold. Otherwise, one cannot have any criterion to discern a 
wrong belief from a right one. 
With similar concerns, Jewish theologians and philosophers too approach to the 
problem of suffering. Here I shall focus on some of the principal answers given by Jewish 
theologians and philosophers. Firstly, the traditional theodicies such as the privation of 
good, the Free-Will Explanation, vicarious suffering and eschatological resolution; then, 
the modem answers offered to the problem of evil will be examined. Since the Nazi 
Holocaust posits a serious problem in modem Jewish thought, most of the discussions in 
the last part will turn around the problem of evil within the framework of the Holocaust. 
1. The Traditional Theodicies 
a. The Privation of Good 
The privation theory that evil is nothing else than absence of good, explicitly 
appears in the writings of the medieval Jewish sage Saadia Gaon (882-942) apparently 
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for the first time. He contends that God did not create evil. He is the ultimate good and 
wise God whom cannot be thought to have caused evil. Saadia is aware that God says, "I 
form light and create darkness... " (Isa. 45: 7). Interpreting the passage, Saadia asserts that 
God created air as "the vehicle of light and darkness, according to whether [the former] is 
present or absent [respectively]. "" He explains the source of evil in a similar way. God 
creates things that contain good and evil potentialities together. Through the choice of 
individual, one of these qualities, namely good or evil, becomes manifest. Therefore, evil 
is, to Saadia, absence of good and an inner quality of those things that God created. 
Moses Maimondes (1135-1204) is also an exponent of the privation theory as 
he believes that whatever God creates is "an absolute good. " According to Maimondes, 
what we customarily call evil is the absence of "being. " Since existence is good as the 
creation of a good God, he could not be the Creator of evil. 45 Consequently, no evil can 
be attributed to the good and wise God of Maimonides. He believes that the evils of the 
world originate from corporeal nature of mater and human free-will. The only evil that is 
real in the world is the ones brought about by free beings. 
We see the medieval Jewish philosopher Judah Halevi (1075-1141) in 
opposition to the theory of privation. He refutes the idea that evil is the deprivation of 
goodness or being. According to Halevi, evil is a reality of this life as much as good is. 
Therefore, God who is the "Prime Cause" brings about both good and evil. Every single 
" Saadia Gaon, Book of Beliefs and Opinions, trans. by S. Rosenblatt, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1948), 65-66. 
45 Moses Maimondes, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. by Shlomo Pines, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1963), 440. 
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thing in this world is brought about by divine will either directly or through intermediary 
causes. 
Halevi explains this idea with reference to 1 Samuel 26: 10 which is about 
David's report of the three causes of death. Halevi construes this verse in a way that "The 
Lord will strike him down; " points to divine cause of death; "or his day will come to 
die; " to natural causes; and finally "or he will go down into battle and perish. " to 
accidental causes. Consequently, Halevi affirms that everything, good and evil, life and 
death, and so on is related to God. 46 Since everything is led back to the deity in one way 
or another in Halevi's thinking, the occurrences of evil as well as of good are not 
privation but the actual happenings in the world. 
The kabbalists, the Jewish mystics, like Halevi thought that evil was a real and 
dynamic power within divine emanation called sefirot. They regarded evil as the sitra 
ahara, "the other side" of the divine goodness and grace. Evil is traced in the passages in 
the Zohar, the main text of Jewish Kabbalah, to one of the emanations called the sefirah 
Gevurah also named Din, that is the attribute of "Judgment. " During emanation, a 
conflict ensues between the sefirot Gevurah and Hesed ("Love"), and this brings forth the 
emergence of "the other side. "47 Evil is, thus, regarded as something embedded in the 
actual life of Godhead. 8 Evil is compared in the Zohar to the husk or bark (kelippah in 
46 Judah Halevi, The Kuzari: An Argument for the Faith of Israel, Introduction by Henry Slonimsky, trans. 
by Hartwig Hirscfeld, (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), 279-290. 
47 Fischell Lachower and Isaiah Tishby, The Wisdom of the Zohar: An Anthology of the Texts, trans. by 
David Goldstein, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 2,459. 
48 Tishby, The Wisdom of the Zohar., 2,460. 
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Hebrew) of the tree of emanation. 49 Consequently, evil is regarded by the kabbalists as 
"the other side" of the Godhead or the bark of the sefirotic system, but less real than God. 
In modern times, it seems that the idea that evil is privation of good, has lost its 
popularity among Jewish thinkers. The orthodox Jewish philosopher Eliezer Berkovits 
(1900- ), for instance, disapproves of the privation theory, which was very popular during 
the middle ages. He believes that to deny the reality of evil is against the view of Isaiah 
45: 7 as God is the creator of all reality including darkness and evil. Berkovits contends 
that "There is evil, but no evil principle, in the universe. '°so 
To conclude, the idea that evil is nothing but privation, lack, defection of certain 
perfection in an entity was very popular among the Jewish thinkers. Some of the Jewish 
thinkers such as Saadia and Maimonides could not reconcile the belief in a good God 
with the occurrences of suffering. They have chosen to deny the reality of evil in favour 
of the belief in God who is good and full of wisdom. However, the majority of the Jewish 
philosophers in modem times have compelled to recognise evil as a reality in the world. 
The Nazi Holocaust was in front of them as an undeniable reality. How could one deny 
that the death of millions of people was not evil? Perhaps that is why we do not encounter 
any modem Jewish philosopher explaining evil in terms of privation. 
49 Robert M. Seltzer, Jewish People, Jewish Thought: The Jewish Experience in History, (New York and 
London: Macmillan, 1980), 435. 
50 Eliezer Berkovits, God Man and Hrstory: A Jewish Interpretation, (Middle Village, New York: Jonathan 
David Publishers, Inc., 1979), 77-78. 
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b. The Free-Will Explanation 
The rabbis saw the origin of moral evil in the dual nature of human beings. 
According to this, each human individual has one good impulse or inclination (yetzer hat- 
ov in Hebrew) and one evil impulse or inclination (yetzer ha-ra). While the former urges 
a person to do good, the latter is the source of wickedness. 5' Different from soul-body 
duality, the rabbis believed that human beings are born with these dual inclinations. 
Although the rabbis did not have an idea of original sin as the Christians believed, they 
maintained that human beings were born with the capacity to do evil. In this sense, the 
rabbinic conviction was that human beings had free-will to choose between the two 
inclinations. 
The rabbis seem to be aware of the dilemma of divine predestination and human 
free-will. Some of the rabbis believed that God determined everything in detail before the 
person was born except moral choices. That is to say, God left to human beings to choose 
between good and evil. The second century sage Rabbi Akiva, for instance, is believed to 
have said that "Everything is foreseen by God, but the right to choose is given to man. "52 
However, according to some of the rabbis, God also knows what a person choose in 
which case the question stands why God, then, allowed sufferings. 
In the middle ages, Maimonides was as a fervent defender of the Free-Will 
Explanation. He advocated that human beings were free to choose whatever they wished. 
He writes, "Free will is bestowed on every human being. If one desires to turn toward the 
51 Dan Cohn-Sherbok, The Jewish Faith, the second edition, (London: SPCK, 1995), 76. 
52 Avot 3: 15 as quoted in David S. Ariel, What Do Jews Believe?, 97. 
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good way and be righteous, he has the power to do so. If one wishes to turn toward the 
evil way and be wicked, he is at liberty to do so"33 He saw a close relationship between 
the idea of free-will and the notion of human responsibility for actions. If human beings 
were not free to choose any course of action, it would not make sense to hold them 
accountable for their actions. Instead, Maimonides ascribed the cause of moral evil to 
human body and free-will. Quoting the biblical passages of Deuteronomy 32: 5 and 
Proverb 19: 3, he states that "We suffer because of evils that we have produced ourselves 
of our free will. Asa 
Later in the same chapter of the Guide of the Perplexed, Maimondes categorises 
the evils that befall humankind into three species. The evils of the first species take place 
because of the inherent composition of a person. That is to say, the human body is made 
up of matter, of flesh and bones. The evils of the second species are those that individuals 
cause to others such as killing each other. Finally, the evils of the third species are those 
that individuals inflict upon themselves by his own actions 35 This is, to Maimonides, the 
most common kind of evil in the world. 
Joseph Albo (1380-1444), a medieval Jewish philosopher, also holds that some 
of the suffering human beings endure are due to human free-will. In his analysis of 
possible acts, he categorises human acts into three groups. He asserts that some acts are 
53 Maimondes, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teshuvah 5 as quoted in Ariel, What Do Jews Believe?, 97. 
54 Maimondes, The Guide of the Perplexed, 443. 
55 Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, 444-446. 
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free, some are necessary, and some are composed of freedom and necessity. 56 Concerning 
to human actions, Albo affirms that human beings must be free so that they can be 
responsible for their actions. He relies on the rabbinic literature in his argument: "the 
Rabbis always say that every evil which befalls man is in the nature of punishment "07 
That is to say, God punishes the wicked because he freely chose to commit sin. 
According to Martin Buber (1878-1965), good and evil have special significance 
in individual's relation to God. In this context, evil is the result of the failure on the part 
of human being to enter into a proper relationship with God. Likewise, evil is restored to 
good by establishing this relation. For Buber, good and evil are not mere opposites like 
right and left, but "'Good' is the movement in the direction of home, 'evil' is the aimless 
whirl of human potentialities without which nothing can be achieved and by which, if 
they take no direction but remain trapped in themselves, everything goes awry. "S8 
Therefore, the misuse and abuse of human potentialities produce suffering. The 
employment of human potentialities in the right direction establishes "I-Thou" relation 
between God and human being, which is good. 
The orthodox Jewish theologian Eliezer Berkovits (1900-) in his Faith After the 
Holocaust offers a form of free-will explanation to the problem of the Holocaust. Inspired 
from the biblical concept "hiding of God's face" (Ps. 44: 23-24), Hester Panim in 
Hebrew, Berkovits asserts that the Holocaust is a result of God's hiding his face in human 
' Joseph Albo, Sefer ha-Ikkarim (the Book of Principles), trans. by Isaac Husik, (Philadelphia: Jewish 
Publication Society of America, 1946), 4,38. 
fier ha-Ikkarim, 4,44. 5' A1bo, Se 
58 Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, (London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1961), 103. 
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history. He explains the notion as an attribute of God necessary for humankind to be 
himself or herself. It is not a punishment for the sins of Israel. 
If there is to be "man, " God must grant him freedom of decision. In order that a 
person has freedom and is to be responsible for the actions he or she brings about using 
freedom of choice, "God must absent himself from history. 09 Only through this way, 
human beings can use their freedom, and continue to exist. This gives to individual the 
possibility of creating goodness or evil depending on how they use their free-will. 
Berkovits asserts that without freedom and responsibility one cannot speak of the 
existence of human beings as such. In the case that a person abuses his or her freedom of 
decision and go for the wrong choice, the suffering of the innocent or the prosperity of 
the wicked might emerge. In short, they are inevitable consequences of human freedom. 
It is the contribution of the Free-Will Explanation that human beings make free 
choices. Human beings enjoy the dignity of being human being through the quality of 
freedom. However, the problem with the Free-Will Explanation is that it does not explain 
why God allows the occurrences of evil. Human beings may be free in choosing or not 
choosing a course of action, but a good, merciful and just God is expected to response to 
the prayers of his creatures. Where is God when the wicked inflicts pain on an innocent 
person? Where is God when the sufferer cries for help? The Free-Will Explanation does 
not give answer to these questions. 
59 Eliezer Berkovits, Faith After the Holocaust (New York: Ktav Publishing House, Inc., 1973), 107. 
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c. The Vicarious Suffering 
The rabbis inspired by the passages of Isaiah 40-66 developed a notion of 
vicarious suffering. Rabbinic literature is abundant with accounts of vicarious suffering. 
They thought that as the servant of God suffered for the sins of humankind, any suffering 
endured patiently may be vicarious as well. Rabbi Joshua b. Levi states, "He who accepts 
gladly the sufferings of this world brings salvation to the world. "60 It is even possible to 
find rabbis who praise sufferings and afflictions: 
`Beloved are sufferings, for they appease like offerings; yea, they are more 
beloved than offerings, for guilt and sin offerings atone only for the particular 
sin for which they are brought in each case, but sufferings atone for all sins, as 
it says, `The Lord has chastened me sore, but He has not given me over unto 
death' (Ps. CXVIII, 18)"6' 
The rabbis interpreted the biblical account of Abraham's attempt at sacrificing 
his son, Isaac, in terms of "atonement for Adam's sin in behalf of all the seed of Abraham 
and all who enter into the covenant to the end of time. " In this sense, Abraham "brought 
the children of Israel to His service" by taking the burden of sacrificing his son for God 
upon himself. 62 In what way Abraham's sacrifice expiates the sin of Adam and following 
generations, the suffering of the righteous atones the sins of the Jewish people in a similar 
fashion. 
60 Ta'an. 8a as quoted in C. G. Montefiore and H. Loewe, A Rabbinic Anthology, third printing, (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1978), 542. 
61 Midr. Ps. On CXVIII, 18 (243b, § 16), Montefiore and Loewe, A Rabbinic Anthology, 543. 
Jacob B. Agus, The Evolution Of Jewish Thought From Biblical Times To The Opening Of The Modern 
Era (London And New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1959), 219. 
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The medieval Jewish philosopher Joseph Albo affirmed that Israel's misfortunes 
were momentary and necessary for the process of Messianic redemption. He explains 
with an analogy, 
"For the chick is not generated in the egg until after it has become rotten and 
the seed begins to sprout only when it has turned seemingly to mud. Thus, too, 
the salvation and bliss of the nation will be attained only after the nation had 
descended to the very depths of disintegration, resembling almost complete 
decay. -A3 
As in the example of the egg-and-chick, in order that Messiah come and bring peace to 
the whole world, the suffering of Israel needs to get worse. Considering the joy that 
Messiah will bring, the sorrows of this world loss their significance and fade away. 
Following the rabbinic teaching, Jacob B. Agus (1911-1986), a modem Jewish 
scholar, asserts that the idea of vicarious suffering is a Jewish concept. He argues, "The 
Jewish people of any generation may suffer for the sins of their ancestors, just as they 
generally benefit by the accumulated `merits of the fathers, ' or from the merits of their 
contemporary saints (Sabbath 33b)"M Agus asserts that the idea of vicarious suffering of 
the righteous has been replaced with the ritual of animal sacrifices. According to this, the 
saints of the community offered their sufferings as sacrifice to God so that he could 
forgive them. In support of his argument, Agus refers to some rabbinic accounts. He 
writes, "`The Holy One, blessed be He, inflicted agonies upon the prophet Ezekiel, in 
63 Albo, Sefer ha-Ikkarim, 1: 51. 
64 Jacob B. Agus, The Evolution Of Jewish Thought, 75-6. 
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order to purge the sins of Israel (Sanhedrin 39a). ' We read too that the blood of King 
Josiah, spilled when he was shot at by the Egyptian soldiers, `atoned for all Israel. "65 
The Jewish reform theologian Ignaz Maybaum (1897-1976) offers a classical 
response to the tragedies of the Holocaust in his book The Face of God After Auschwitz. 
Maybaum's response can be described as classical for the reason that his explanation is 
based on the biblical notion of the suffering servant in the Book of Isaiah, particularly 
chapter 53. Maybaum believes that the doctrine of vicarious atonement designates that 
the servant of God suffers for the rest of humankind. Jewish tradition largely maintains 
that Israel is the suffering servant who covenanted with God. Through suffering of the 
servant, stability and endurance of all creation are ensured. 
Maybaum contends that the Holocaust was a part of divine providence, and the 
Jews who died in the concentration camps were the suffering servants of God. "The 
millions who died in Auschwitz, " says Maybaum, "died `because of the sins of others. "'" 
This is not a kind of divine retribution, but it is a divine intervention into human history 
to bring about God's providential plan for the world. Therefore, God, according to 
Maybaum, inflicted suffering in the concentration camps "to cleanse, to purify, to punish 
a sinful world. "67 Maybaum employs the Christian interpretation of the crucifixion of 
Jesus as a model when he accounts for the sufferings of the Holocaust in sacrificial terms. 
65 Agus, The Evolution OfJewish Thought, 64. 
66 Ignaz Maybaum, The Face of God After Auschwitz (Amsterdam, Polak and Van Genpep, 1965), 35 as 
quoted in Steven T. Katz, Post-Holocaust Dialogues (New York and London: New York University Press, 
1983), 156. 
67 Maybaum, The Face of God After Auschwitz, 59 as quoted in Katz, Post-Holocaust Dialogues, 163. 
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According to the Jewish theologian, the death of the Jews under the Nazi oppression is 
analogous to the crucifixion of Jesus through which humankind is liberated. 
Two traditional Hebrew concepts that are important in Maybaum's account for 
the Holocaust are churban (destruction) and gezerah (evil decree). For Maybaum, the 
term churban signifies irreversible cataclysmic events wrought by divine intervention in 
Jewish history. Yet, they have a decisive significance for both the Jewish people and the 
rest of humankind. On the other hand, the term gezerah (p1. gezerot) designates relatively 
less cataclysmic and, at the same time, avoidable tragedies such as the Jewish expulsion 
from Spain in 1492. Moreover, a gezerah, unlike a churbar, does not mark an end to an 
old era and a beginning to a new er68 a. 
Maybaum applies the notion of churban to three major tragedies of Jewish 
history, which each one of them signals the termination of one era and the inauguration of 
another. The first churban was the destruction of the First Temple in Jerusalem, or the 
Temple of Solomon, by Nebuchadnezzar in 586 BCE. As a result of the first churban, the 
Jews went into exile; and, consequently, there they spread the word of God to other 
nations. The eradication of the Second Temple by the Roman army in 70 CE was the . 
second churban. Through the destruction of the Temple of Herod, the institution of the 
synagogue was initiated, and the sacrifice-based religious life was transformed into study 
and litany-based Jewish piety in the synagogue. 
According to Maybaum, the Holocaust during World War 11 is the third churban 
through which religious authoritarianism of the Middle Ages came to an end and a new 
6$ Katz, Post-Holocaust Dialogues, 158. 
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era of modernity initiated. 69 In this sense, the Nazi regime was the last representative of 
the suppressive medieval world view. In short, the Holocaust signifies "progress through 
sacrifice" even though it was achieved by the death of six million Jews in the 
concentration camps. 
Is Maybaum's account of churban as vicarious suffering coherent with the 
traditional Jewish concept of God? In criticising Maybaum's explanation of the 
Holocaust, Cohn-Sherbok points out that the idea of churban contradicts to the traditional 
Jewish faith in an omnipotent and benevolent God. In the face of the extermination of 
Jews in the Holocaust, it becomes difficult to defend God's compassion, justice and 
power. Maybaum's interpretation does not seem to accomplish this requirement. 
Moreover, Cohn-Sherbok criticises Maybaum's application of Christian 
terminology to explain the tragedies of the Holocaust. First, the idea of Jesus' vicarious 
atonement in Christianity stems from the Christian belief in Christ being God incarnate. 
Therefore, it is God who has suffered willingly on the cross for the whole humankind. In 
Maybaum's interpretation, God sacrifices his people, not himself, contrary to their will or 
without taking their consent. Second point is related to Maybaum's concept of churbar. 
Cohn-Sherbok asserts that "the concept of progress achieved through sacrifice is 
essentially a non-Jewish idea. "70 He claims that even when sacrifice was a way of 
worship to God, it was to approach God and to expiate their sins, not for progress further. 
69 Dan Cohn-Sherbok, "God and the Holocaust, " in Dan Cohn-Sherbok (ed. ), Theodicy (Lampeter, UK: 
The Edwin Mellen Press, 1997), 84. 
70 Cohn-Sherbok, God and the Holocaust, 40. 
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In my opinion, even if we suppose that the idea of vicarious suffering is a Jewish 
notion, it is difficult to accept that it offers a solution to the problem of evil. One 
individual suffers for others. It seems to me that it is a way of avoiding the question why 
God allows disasters at the beginning. If he did not let suffering happen, he would not 
choose a person to redeem the sins of others. Moreover, vicarious suffering is a long way 
for a God to redeem the sins of human beings. While he could save countless people with 
no time and effort, why would he want to choose to inflict suffering on another person? 
Even if we assume that vicarious suffering enables further progress, it is not necessarily 
the case. 
d. The Eschatological Resolution 
The rabbis were not completely satisfied with the biblical answers to the 
question of suffering. If God is just and wise, how could he allow the suffering of the 
righteous and the prosperity of the wicked? Troubled with instances of injustices and 
innocent sufferings in the world, the rabbis believed that there must be a day in which 
ultimate justice take place. Rabbi Akiva explains, 
"The Holy One is exact with the righteous as well as with the wicked, 
searching out the very depths of their being. He is exact with the righteous, 
holding them to account for the few wrongs they committed in this world, in 
order to lavish bliss upon them and give them a goodly reward in the world-to- 
come. On the other hand, He lavishes ease upon the wicked and rewards them 
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in this world for the few good deeds they performed in order to requite them 
in the world-to-come. "71 
The hereafter is the abode of exact reward and punishment. If divine justice is 
not realised here, there must be a life after death in which every wrong is to be corrected. 
Saadia is convinced that the ultimate justice will be in the hereafter. No one 
must expect total compensation or punishment for every action conducted in this world. 
The abode of ultimate justice is life after death. Saadia believes that if there were no 
reward and punishment in the afterlife, nothing would compel human beings to behave in 
a certain way. Therefore, the existence of "perpetual sojourn in hellfire" and "perennial 
delight and perpetual reward" in paradise is necessary. 72 This is, for Saadia, in 
accordance with the teaching of the Bible. 
We can find traces of an eschatological response to human suffering in the 
kabbalists as well. It appears that the death of a child posed a serious problem for the 
kabbalists. 73 They could not understand why a child would die since he had no sin. Was 
his or her death a punishment for the sins of the ancestors? The kabbalists believed that 
the premature death of a child was not a punishment, but, in fact, was a blessing of God. 
Because God rewarded the child taking him or her to paradise without the child commits 
any sin in this world. In this sense, reward in the hereafter vindicates the premature death 
of the child. However, they do not explain why God needed to bring a child to the world 
71 Bereshit Rabah 33: 1 as quoted in Ariel, What Do Jews Believe?, 102. 
n Saadia, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, 185. 
7' Mel, What Do Jews Believe?, 103. 
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and then did not let him or her live. If he did not bring the child to life knowing that the 
child will die soon after his or her birth, there would not be any problem. 
Joseph Albo discusses the nature of reward and punishment in the hereafter. He 
argues first for eternal punishment for the wicked, and temporal reward for the righteous. 
Then, he realises that every human individuals commit sin, so everyone is doomed to 
eternal punishment. Then, he changes his position, and affirms that the merciful God will 
forgive the sinner. Consequently, he opts for temporal punishment and reward in life after 
death. Albo writes, "strict justice requires that reward should be temporary, nevertheless 
God in His abundant kindness gives to those who do His will eternal and infinite reward, 
as He is eternal and infinite. "74 It seems that in this way, he to a great extent avoids the 
problem of divine goodness in the face of eternal punishment in hell. 
The contemporary Jewish philosopher Dan Cohn-Sherbok in his book God and 
the Holocaust offers an eschatological response to the problem of the Holocaust. He 
argues that the eschatological response is the only alternative that will "serve as the 
fulcrum of religious belief' in the future. 75 Cohn-Sherbok maintains that many religious 
Jews in the Nazi concentration camps believed that their suffering and death was "a 
prelude to a more glorious future. "76 They knew that there was the world to come in 
which God would reward them for their righteousness in this life. According to Cohn- 
Sherbok, most of the victims of the Nazis celebrated the practice of the tradition of 
" Joseph Albo, Sefer ha-Ikkarim, 4,36. 
75 Dan Cohn-Sherbok, God and the Holocaust (Herefordshire: Gracewing, 1996), 129. 
76 Cohn-Sherbok, God and the Holocaust, 126. 
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Kiddush ha-Shem, "the sanctification of divine name, " in the concentration camps facing 
the death penalty. As the testimonies of the surviving Jews show, by sanctifying God's 
name the Jews in the concentration camps believed that their deaths would bring reward 
for themselves and forgiveness to the rest of the Jewish people. n 
Cohn-Sherbok from here infers that it is obvious that the motive behind the 
practice of the sanctification of the divine name among the Nazi victims was "an absolute 
faith in the life beyond death. "78 The religious Jews were quite certain that there was the 
real life beyond the concentration camps and gas chambers in which the Jewish people 
would attain eternal bliss. Cohn-Sherbok concludes that "the promise of immortality" is 
the only way by which the Jewish people will be able to sustain the belief in God. 
However, Mordecai M. Kaplan (1881-1983), the founder of the 
Reconstructionist movement in modem Judaism, asserts that the belief in life after death 
is no more a viable solution to the problem of evil in modem age. He acknowledges that 
in Jewish tradition the belief in the afterlife was as a solution of the problem. However, 
he contends that today human suffering cannot be explained with resorting to the belief in 
the world-to-come. He explains, 
"Modem men cannot see why we must suffer here in order to be compensated 
hereafter. The atrocities perpetrated against six million Jewish victims by the 
Nazis, and the similar suffering imposed on many other human beings by 
Nazi, Fascist, and Communist persecution, and by the armies of both sides in 
77 Cohn-Sherbok, God and the Holocaust, 125. 
78 Cohn-Sherbok, God and the Holocaust, 126. 
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recent wars, constitute a tragedy of such dimension that no posthumous 
reward can compensate for it, or explain it away. , 79 
The belief that the righteous will be rewarded and the wicked punished in the 
hereafter does not explain the reason for the suffering occurring in this world. For 
Kaplan, the Jewish religious tradition does not offer any satisfactory answer to the 
problem of evil. Therefore, there is an urgent need of a new concept of God in order to 
reconcile the reality of evil in the world with the belief in God. 
One could understand the objection that there is no life after death; but it seems 
to me difficult to understand how the belief in the hereafter cannot be a solution to the 
problem of evil. Kaplan would be justifiable if the reason for suffering in this world 
would be reward or punishment in the afterlife. As far as I am concerned, the Jewish 
theologians and philosophers do not assert that human beings must bear suffering in this 
world in order to be rewarded in life after death. What they seem to say is that this is the 
world of free creatures, and God's justice will be in the hereafter. Anyone with a right 
mind acknowledges that the Nazi destruction is overwhelming. 
However, to say that "no posthumous reward can compensate for it, or explain it 
away" destroys nothing but the hopes of the sufferers and victims of the Holocaust. It 
seems that the majority of the victims of the Holocaust found the eschatological 
resolution satisfactory. In addition, in order to make such a judgement one has to know 
79 M. Kaplan, "The Principles of Reconstructionism and Some Questions Jews Ask, " in N. N. Glatzer (ed. ), 
Modern Jewish Thought, 153. 
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what the compensation is. It is possible that eternal bliss that the faithful is expected to 
find in the afterlife shall erase al the nightmares of this world. 
To conclude, the Jewish theological and philosophical responses offered to the 
problem of evil provide limited help to solve the problem completely. It seems that the 
theory of privation does not help to explain the reality of evil in the face of the Holocaust. 
The Free-Will Defence explains the origin of human actions, but not God's silence 
amidst suffering. It seems that the tragedy of the Holocaust has made it difficult to 
believe that the Jewish people suffer for other nations. In fact, they were subjected to 
suffering against their wish by other nations directly or indirectly. Perhaps the only way 
out of this trouble is to be able to unite with God, who is the ultimate source of the 
existence. 
2. The Modem Theodicies 
So far, I have explored the traditional Jewish responses to the problem of evil. In 
this part of the thesis, I will look into what I call the modern Jewish responses to the 
religious problem of the destruction of the European Jewry by the Nazis during World 
War H. The explanations that will be examined in this section are considered modem in 
the sense that they are distinctively different from the traditional responses to the problem 
of evil. 
a. The Holocaust as a New Revelation 
Emil Ludwig Fackenheim (1916-), a reform rabbi and philosopher, has 
dedicated his life to understand possible meanings of the Holocaust. His ideas on the 
Nazi atrocities show progress through his wide range of books and articles. For about 
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twenty years at the beginning of his career, Fackenheim thought, "the Holocaust was not 
a theological problem for Judaism. "" Eventually he has come to view that the modem 
catastrophe is "the most radical counter-testimony" to Judaism. 81 Facing the religious 
problem of the Holocaust, Fackenheim rejects the idea of renouncing the Jewish belief in 
God as a response to the horrors of the concentration camps. He maintains that the Jewish 
people should keep their faith in order not to make Hitler's victory complete. 
Fackenheirn makes a distinction between the attempts of "seeking a purpose" in 
and of "seeking a response" to the Holocaust. He thinks that while the former is 
blasphemous, the latter is inevitable. 82 Therefore, he rejects the classical response that 
suffering is a punishment; and he also denies the idea that there is a purpose in the 
Holocaust. The biblical epitome of suffering, namely, Job, had already discarded the view 
that human suffering is a punishment of the sins human beings committed. For 
Fackenheim, this is impossible to think in the case of the Holocaust as well. Moreover, 
while recognising a connection between the Holocaust and the rise of the state of Israel, 
Fackenheim repudiates any kind of purpose in the extermination of the European Jewry. 
In his words: "No purpose, religious or non-religious, will ever be found in Auschwitz. s83 
Therefore, he believes that Judaism needs an adequate response to the horrors of the 
Holocaust. 
80 R. L. Rubenstein and J. K. Roth, Approaches to Auschwitz: The Legacy of the Holocaust, (London: SCM 
Press Ltd., 1987), 317. 
'1 Rubenstein and Roth, Approaches to Auschwitz, 317. 
82 Emil L. Fackenheim, The Jewish Return Into History; Re. lections in the Age of Auschwitz and a New 
Jerusalem (New York : Schocken Books, 1978), 29. 
13 Fackenheim, The Jewish Return Into History, 29. 
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Fackenheim in God's Presence in History contends that God has been present, 
or revealed through a series of decisive events in Jewish history. These historical 
occurrences are "root experiences" that made impact on the destiny of Jewish existence. 
The people of Israel experienced God's saving presence at the Red Sea during the Exodus 
from Egypt and His commanding presence at Sinai in the giving of the Torah. 
Fackenheim asserts that "root experiences, " in general, have three peculiar 
characteristics. First, divine presence is instantly affirmed by the witnesses during root 
experiences. Second, events of this sort are open to the public and a momentous one. 
Third, root experiences are "accessible to later generations. 84 In short, "root 
experiences" are not only past occurrences but also present instances of faith in God's 
saving action. 
Further, Fackenheim maintains that there are also some major crises in Jewish 
history which challenges and tests Israel's "root experience. " These are, Fackenheim 
calls, "epoch-making events °'gs Among others the destruction of the First Temple by the 
Babylonians and of the Second one by the Roman s were the "epoch-making events" that 
tested divine presence in history. In response to these challenges, the prophets and the 
talmudic sages who lived through the tragedies, called the people to maintain their faith 
in the presence of redeeming God. 86 After all those catastrophic events through history, 
Israel managed to reaffirm her faith in God's saving and commanding presence. 
84 Dan Cohn-Sherbok, God and the Holocaust, 45. 
as Steven T. Katz, Post-Holocaust Dialogues, 153. 
36 See Fackenheim, God's Presence in History, 25-31 for Fackenheim's detailed exposition of rabbinic 
response to the "epoch-making events. " 
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Fackenheim argues that the Holocaust is an "epoch-making event" with its 
characteristic of challenging God's presence at the concentration camps. Because, in 
Fackenheim's words "Never, within or without Jewish history, have men anywhere had 
such a dreadful, such a horrifying reason for turning their backs on the God of history. "87 
However, he negates the rejection of the belief in God as an answer to the Holocaust. 
Although there was no "redeeming voice" at the concentration camps, Fackenheim insists 
that a "commanding voice" was heard. This "commanding voice" is a new revelation, in 
Fackenheim's words, "6140' commandment. " While there are 613 commandments in the 
Torah, God revealed in the concentration camps a new commandment to the Jews. 
Fackenheim spells out the 614`h commandment as follows: 
"Jews are forbidden to hand posthumous victories. They are commanded to 
survive as Jews, lest the Jewish people perish. They are commanded to 
remember the victims of Auschwitz lest their memory perish. They are 
forbidden to despair of man and his world, and to escape into either cynicism 
or otherworldliness, lest they cooperate in delivering the world over to the 
forces of Auschwitz. Finally, they are forbidden to despair of the God of 
Israel, lest Judaism perish. " 
These are the sacred duties of the Jews in the post-Holocaust era. This passage as 
Fackenheim's interpretation of the Holocaust has been one of the most influential 
response to the Holocaust. 
$' Cohn-Sherbok, God and the Holocaust, 44. 
'ý Emil Fackenheim, "The Voice of Auschwitz, " in Nahum N. Glatzen (ed. ), Modern Jewish Thought, 188. 
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Fackenheim in his book To Mend the World: Foundations of Future Jewish 
Thought writes that the Holocaust created a "rupture" in history. Since the rupture 
occurred in this realm, repair (tikkun) is also required here. 89 According to Fackenheim, 
tikkun entails the involvement of the whole Jewish community including religious Jews 
as well as secular ones. Additionally, the land of Israel is the only place where tikkun can 
take place. It seems to me that Fackenheim left unjustified his response to the Holocaust 
in terms of a new revelation. Was the Holocaust really a new revelation to the Jews? 
Cohn-Sherbok criticises, "he does not attempt to justify his claim that Auschwitz was a 
revelation-event bearing Torah to twentieth-century Jews. s90 While a considerable 
number of Jews negates the belief in God, Fachenheim does not attempt to rationalise his 
view. Cohn-Sherbok contends that the survival instinct of the Jews after the Holocaust is 
not because of God's revelation contrary to Fackenheim's assertions; but it is a basic 
innate human instinct that can be found in every human being. Moreover, Fachenheim's 
urge Jewish people to preserve the belief in God so that Judaism survives cannot be a 
sustainable reason for such a religious belief. 
If we take Fackenheim's view of the Holocaust as a revelation, some problems 
arise. First of all, it is something to say that God creates evil as well as good, something 
another evil is his revelation. Can he not reveal what he needed to reveal in a good 
revelation? Was it necessary that so many people should die? Furthermore, if the 
Holocaust was a revelation, who could testify that it was? Is it rather Fackenheim's 
89 Cohn-Sherbok, God and the Holocaust, 48-9. 
90 Cohn-Sherbok, "God and the Holocaust, " in Dan Cohn-Sherbok (ed. ), Theodicy (Lampeter: UK, The 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1997), 89. 
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wishful thinking? How can one determine that it is a real revelation not wishful thinking? 
Fackenheim does not seem to address these questions. 
b. The Holocaust as The Tremendum 
Another important theological response to the Holocaust comes from the Jewish 
theologian Arthur A. Cohen. In response to the death camps, he in his The Tremendum: A 
Theological Interpretation of the Holocaust (1981) offers a new interpretation of the 
Jewish concept of God coupled with a version of Free-Will Defence. Cohen argues that 
since the Nazi terror is unique in terms of its enormity, the traditional Jewish concept of 
beneficent and providential God must be reconceptualised. 
Inspired by the concept of "mysterium tremendum, " God's holiness, coined by 
the German Protestant theologian Rudolf Otto, Arthur Cohen adopts the term "the 
tremendum" for the Holocaust. According to the phenomenology of the Holy that Otto 
(1869-1937) develops in the Idea of the Holy, mysterium tremendum is the deep and 
impenetrable mystery experienced by the worshipper in contemplation of the divine 
being. 91 In Cohen's argument, on the other hand, the tremendum designates the 
"immensity" of the catastrophe. Cohen writes, "I call the death camps the tremendum, for 
it is the monument of a meaningless inversion of life to an orgiastic celebration of death, 
to a psychosexual and pathological degeneracy unparalleled and unfathomable to any 
91 For further elaboration of Otto's mysterium tremendum, See Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An 
Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, trans. by 
John W. Harvey (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1959), 26-55. 
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person bonded to life. "92 Therefore, the destruction of the European Jewry by the Nazis 
is, to Cohen, the unique "human tremendum" which repudiates meaning. 
According to Cohen, the tremendum is unique and incomparable to the other 
disasters in history. Therefore, the traditional responses to such old catastrophes as the 
destruction of the Temple and the expulsion of the Jews from Spain are not adequate for 
the tremendum any more. This is because "a beneficent and caring God appears to have 
allowed his elected people to be brought to the borders of extinction. 03 If he was a caring 
God, as the traditional view maintains, how it could have been possible that God 
remained silent while the Jews were being killed in the gas chambers. In response, Cohen 
suggests to reconsider the traditional Jewish notion of providential God and to construct a 
new theology. This constructive theology must affirm, first, the presence of God in the 
universe without denying the reality of evil. Second, it must see God's relation to the 
world, including to "demonic structure" in it, as meaningful and significant. Finally, it 
must not separate God's selfhood from His involvement in the world. Cohen asserts that 
if any of these features are denied, creation and God become a mere metaphor for the 
unaccountable. 94 
Cohen tries to formulate his theology featured above bringing together two 
theological traditions, in his own words, "the kabbalistic counter-history of Judaism" and 
"9 "a tradition that runs from Joachim of Fiore through Schelling to Franz Rosenzweig. s 
92 Cohen, The Tremendum, 19. 
93 Cohen, The Tremendum, 50-1. 
94 Cohen, The Tremendum, 86. 
95 Cohen, The Tremendum, 86-88. 
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Cohen describes the kabbalistic doctrine of God (Ein Sof in Hebrew) and of His relation 
to the world in the way that the being of God was passive because of its absoluteness and 
necessity. He had no means to will and no reality to create. Subsequently, God's being 
was activated by "the spark of nonbeing, " that is, the condition of otherhood. 9s 
Additionally, Cohen refers to the Schellingian dipolar idea of God. That is to say that 
within God there are two directions: God's essential "own-ness" and selfhood on the one 
hand, "the abundant and overflowing" direction on the other. Cohen asserts that this is the 
source of "the dialectic between necessity and freedom, ... the sufficient nothing of the 
world and the creation of being. 07 Thus, God is hidden in one aspect, revealing in the 
other. 
As the Jewish theologian Steven Katz points out, 98 Cohen concludes from the 
synthesis of these two notions that, first, God has a necessary passive and hidden side; 
second, God's love produces creation essentially; third, God's overflowing nature 
requires human freedom; and finally, in Cohen's words, "The divine essence is dipolar in 
its nature and in its manifestation. "99 God's nature from His perspective is His abundance 
from ours. The creation, objects and incidents in the universe, is within God's eternal 
nature at the same time. Since creation is necessity within God, it is completed with the 
creation of human beings that have freedom and reason. 
96 Cohen, The Tremendwn, 86. 
97 Cohen, The Tremendum, 89. 
9° Steven T. Katz, "The Shoah, " in Daniel IL Frank, and Oliver Leamen, History Of Jewish Philosophy, 
(London And New York : Routledge, 1997), 2,860. 
" Cohen, The 7)-emenaham, 91. 
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At this point, Cohen introduces his version of Free-Will Defence, which is 
closely connected with his dipolar conception of God. Cohen argues that the existence of 
free human beings is a natural outcome of God's overflowing side. Therefore, human 
beings are free to act in whatever way they choose good or evil. Cohen explains, 
"There is in man an enduring strife and tension, enlarged and made 
threatening by our finitude, in which freedom enhances when it is marked and 
contained by reason, but when reason fails to find language, freedom is 
destructively cut loose or bends toward untruth or succumbs to sheer 
willfulness. "0° 
In this sense, human history with its irregularities and evils is the product of 
human freedom, not of a providential God. If history is, as the Jewish tradition maintains, 
the direct work of God, "How could it be that, " Cohen asks, "God witnessed the holocaust 
and remained silent... "101 Why did he not confute the plans of the Nazis, and save the 
Jews in the concentration camps as he is reported to have done several times in the Jewish 
history? For Cohen, "God is not the strategist of our particularities or of our historical 
condition, but rather the mystery of our futurity, always our posse, never our acts. "°2 
Although the historical is within the domain of human freedom, God is not wholly 
indifferent to the historical. Cohen understands divine life as "filament" within the 
historical "securing the implicative an exponential significance of the historical °'l03 The 
10° Cohen, The Tremendwn, 92. 
101 Cohen, The Tremendwn, 95. 
102 Cohen, The Tremendwn, 97. 
103 Cohen, The Tremendwn, 97-8. 
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tremendum representing the demonic, then, signifies human impediment to the divine 
filament. 
Therefore, in Cohen's conception, the historical events, good as well as evil, are 
the natural outcome of free human beings, not of the God who the Jewish tradition 
thought to be the interferer. Consequently, the misuse of human free-will is the cause of 
the Holocaust. It is not the result of God's providential plan. Hence, it is human beings, 
not God, who are responsible for the crimes of the death camps. 
Is Cohen's explanation and its indispensable part, that is, his conception of God, 
is coherent with the traditional Jewish thinking? According to Cohn"Sherbok, Cohen 
ignored an essential aspect of traditional Judaism; that is, the doctrine of a historical God 
who is in history as well as outside. 104 He is the one who saved the people of Israel from 
Egyptian exile miraculously. The traditional Jewish God creates, sustains and intervenes 
into human realm. It seems that while Cohen tries to avoid the problem of evil by 
replacing the traditional concept of God with a deistic conception, he has caused more 
severe problems than at hand. 
c. A New Voluntary Covenant 
Rabbi Irving Greenberg, an American orthodox Jewish thinker, deals with the 
theological meaning and consequences of the Holocaust in his writings. In his important 
essay "Cloud of Smoke, Pillar of Fire: Judaism, Christianity, and Modernity after the 
Holocaust, " Greenberg argues that the enormity of suffering and the worthlessness of 
104 Cohn-Sherbok, "God and the Holocaust, " 83. 
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human life at the Nazi camps is a radical challenge to both Judaism and Christianity. '0' In 
close resemblance with Emil L. Fackenheim's idea of the Holocaust as a new revelation, 
Greenberg maintains that the Holocaust marks the beginning of a new era in Jewish 
covenantal history. 
Greenberg argues that the Holocaust as a colossal evil requires urgent response 
from humanity. Firstly because the enormity of suffering challenges all the religious 
norms of the world. Secondly, humankind has to confront to the Holocaust so that it will 
never happen again. In Greenberg's words, "Failure to confront it makes repetition all the 
more likely. "106 However, since the challenge of the catastrophe to the religious, political 
and intellectual norms current today is enormous, there is no conclusive answer to the 
Holocaust. "The only morally tenable way for survivors and those guilty of bystanding to 
live" is, Greenberg argues, "dialectical moves and understandings. " 
He describes these dialectical moves and understandings in the sense that they 
"stretch our capacity to the limit and torment us with their irresolvable tensions. "107 Then, 
Greenberg offers a verification principle for answers to the death camps: "No statement, 
theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of the 
burning children. s108 However, it is the essential responsibility of theologians to respond 
credibly to the Holocaust, and to hear further revelation. 
'°5 g Greenberg, "Cloud Of Smoke, Pillar Of Fire: Judaism, Christianity, And Modernity After The 
Holocaust, " In Eva Fleischner (ed), Auschwitz: Beginning Of A New Era? Reflections on the Holocaust, 
(New York: Ktav Publishing House, Inc., 1977), 11. 
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Greenberg asserts that the responses of both classical theism and atheism are 
inadequate and implausible "in the presence of the burning children. " Nevertheless, he 
believes that faith is still possible after Auschwitz in the form of "moment faith. " 
Greenberg borrows the term from Martin Buber, who speaks of "moment gods" in the 
sense that the knowledge of God can be attained only at the moment when divine 
presence is felt by an individual. In a similar fashion, Greenberg describes moment faith 
as "a life response of the whole person to the Presence in life and history. "109 Although 
faith is overcome in the presence of the burning children, it comes back afterwards. 
In the face of the Holocaust, Greenberg suggests four reasons for the persistence 
of what he calls "dialectical" faith. The first reason is that the reality of Exodus and 
liberation are still experienced in this post-Holocaust era. The second reason is that there 
is no worthy alternative to religion. Secularism, which has described itself as the 
alternative to religion, played an essential role in the Holocaust. Therefore, secular 
culture is not an option against God. 
The third reason not to abandon the faith after Auschwitz is the moral urgency 
and necessity to search for religious experience. The last reason is the revelation in the 
redemption of Israel. This revelatory event is, according to Greenberg, the emergence of 
the State of Israel. 110 Despite all these arguments for the possibility of religion after the 
Holocaust, faith remains as "moment faith. " It is because "Faith is a moment truth, but 
109 Greenberg, "Cloud Of Smoke, Pillar Of Fire, " 27. 
110 Greenberg, "Cloud Of Smoke, Pillar Of Fire, " 32. 
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there are moments when it is not true. "' 11 In the moments of catastrophe, sufferers would 
not live in the presence of the Redeemer. 
Greenberg employs three biblical models in describing the relationship between 
God and humankind after Auschwitz. They are the models of Job, the "Suffering 
Servant" in Isaiah 53, and what Greenberg designates as the model of the Lamentations 
3. The model of Job signifies the restoration of the contact with God after the afflictions 
befell on him. In this sense, the emergence of the State of Israel after the Holocaust 
manifests further revelation of God's presence that restores the relationship between 
Israel and God. 
The second theological model is the Suffering Servant in Isaiah 53. It is reported 
in Tanakh that he was subjected to suffering not for his sins but for the sins of 
humankind. Some theologians such as Karl Barth, Roy Eckardt, and Eliezer Berkovits 
suggested that the Jewish people suffer for nations' revolt against God. However, 
Greenberg's model of the Suffering Servant is "a kind of early warning system of the sins 
intrinsic in the culture but often not seen until later. "112 In this sense, the Holocaust was a 
warning of the evils embedded in the potentials of modernity. Therefore, all the 
movements, religious, political, and intellectual, have to be questioned constantly not to 
lead to another catastrophe, which will inevitably embrace the whole world. 
Greenberg's third theological model finds its biblical expression in Chapter 3 of 
the Lamentations. It is the story of a man who was afflicted apparently without any 
111 Greenberg, "Cloud Of Smoke, Pillar Of Fire, " 33. 
112 Greenberg, "Cloud Of Smoke, Pillar Of Fire, " 37. 
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reason with various kinds of evils by God. Because of this, he was angry with God, and 
had lost his hope. When he remembered the past mercies of God, Greenberg explains this 
with the Exodus memory, he started a new relationship with God. In the case of the 
Holocaust, the Lamentations 3 suggests "a total and thoroughgoing self-criticism that 
would purge the emotional dependency and self-abasement of traditional religion and its 
false crutch of certainty and security. "13 Greenberg confesses that in the post-Holocaust 
era these models cannot provide articulate explanations concerning the relationship to 
God now. Therefore, this is the time of silence in theology. During this period, the only 
testimony is the one of human life. That is to say, in Greenberg's words, "The act of 
creating a life or enhancing its dignity is the counter-testimony to Auschwitz. "' 14 
Greenberg in his article "The Third Great Cycle in Jewish History" argues that 
the Holocaust brought about a new era in which the covenant is not compulsory any more 
but voluntary. God cannot command or force anyone to participate into the covenant. He 
divides the Jewish covenantal history into three cycles. The first period is the biblical era. 
He describes this first covenant with reference to Ezekiel 20: 32-33 as follows: "God is 
the initiator, the senior partner, who punishes, rewards and enforces the partnership if the 
Jews slacken. " 5 Accordingly, when the First Temple was destroyed, the Jewish people 
then thought that it was God's punishment for their sins. 
13 Greenberg, "Cloud Of Smoke, Pillar Of Fire, " 40. 
114 Greenberg, "Cloud Of Smoke, Pillar Of Fire, " 41. 
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Greenberg argues that the destruction of the Second Temple in c. 70 CE marks 
the beginning of the second era. This national tragedy transforms the idea of covenant in 
the biblical era. The rabbis responded to the destruction in the way that "The manifest 
divine presence and activity was being reduced but the covenant was actually being 
renewed. "116 The theme of human freedom came to the front along with divine 
punishment. The rabbinic view of the divine self-limitation, the hiding of the Face, gave 
more responsibility to Israel in her covenant with God. 
The third era emerges as a consequence of the Holocaust. Greenberg believes 
that the death camps broke the Sinaic covenant. Thus, the Holocaust has transformed the 
old covenantal relationship between God and Israel into a new form in which the people 
of Israel has the full responsibility. Having seen the flames of the crematorium, in 
Greenberg's words, "God can have no claims on the Jews by dint of the Covenant 417 
Therefore, the covenant with God after Auschwitz is voluntary. Amazingly, the Jewish 
people have chosen to maintain the Jewish identity, and established the State of Israel 
voluntarily in the aftermath of the Holocaust. Accordingly, the existence of the God of 
Israel continues in the post-Holocaust era. 
To sum up, Greenberg argues in a similar fashion with Emil Fackenheim in the 
sense that the Holocaust marks the beginning of a new era in Jewish covenantal history. 
Now the covenant is voluntary. Accordingly, in the new era human beings, not God, are 
fully responsible for the future of the world. It was humankind, not God, who was 
116 Grenberg, "The Third Great Cycle, " 9. 
117 Grenberg, "The Third Great Cycle, " 23. 
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supposed to prevent the Holocaust, and to bring redemption to the world. What is 
incumbent upon us now is not to let anything like the Holocaust happens again. 
As Steven T. Katz argues, "the God of all the traditional omnipredicates does 
not fit easily with a `God' who is a `silent partner. 111118 If God is a silent partner, how are 
such Jewish notions as redemption and covenant to be understood? Greenberg does not 
say anything about it. He only suggests that after the Holocaust the covenant is voluntary. 
God cannot force anyone to participate into covenant. Katz asks, "can this covenant be 
`shattered' by a Hitler? s119 If Hitler is so powerful that he can annul the Jewish covenant, 
then does it not Hitler, not God, become central to the Jewish faith? 
It appears that Greenberg's argument suffers from internal discrepancies within 
the Jewish tradition. That is to say, to change the traditional concept of God, God of 
Abraham, Jacob and Isaac, and to replace it with a silent partner does not solve the 
problem of evil. It changes the metaphysical predicates of a God. The notions such as 
God as silent partner, voluntary covenant, and momentary faith or disbelief seem to be 
alien to and not in accord with the Jewish faith. Most importantly, they do not solve the 
problem of evil completely. 
"' Katz, "The Shoah, " 864. 
119 Katz, "The Shoab, " 865. 
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3. The Anti-Theodicies 
a. The Protest of God's Silence 
In contrast to the positive explanations to the problem of the Holocaust we have 
seen so far, the Jewish intellectual Elie Wiesel negates that there can be found any answer 
to the terrible dilemma which the Holocaust posed. As a witness to and survivor from the 
Nazi terror at Auschwitz and Buchenwald, Wiesel maintains that the experience of the 
Holocaust destroys all ddctrines. 120 He explores and criticises a wide range of theological 
responses to the Holocaust in his numerous novels. As Eugene Borowitz points out, 121 
Wiesel's novels are not mere fictions aimed at entertaining the reader, but they are 
"reflective narrative explorations" written in response to the modem catastrophe. 
In his autobiographical novel Night, Wiesel describes from the first hand the 
Nazi horrors and the suffering of the victims at Auschwitz. From the death camps he was 
dragged into as a pious teenager, he was liberated protesting God's silence during the 
Holocaust. In Night, he describes the dramatic effect of his discovery of the human 
suffering at Auschwitz at his first night as follows: "never shall I forget those flames 
which consumed my faith. "122 As Francois Mauriac pointed out in his "Forward" to 
Night, for Wiesel the notions of the God of love and mercy have disappeared "in the 
smoke of a human holocaust. "1B The horrors of the death camps were so evil that human 
120 See Elie Weisel, "The Holocaust As Literary Inspiration, " in Elie Weisel et aL, Dimensions of the 
Holocaust, Lectures at Northwestern University (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, 1983). 
121 Eugene B. Borowitz, Choices in Modern Jewish Thought: A Partisan Guide (West Orange, New Jersey: 
Behrman House, Inc., 1995), 190. 
iu Elie Wiesel, Night, trans. from French by S. Rodway (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1981), 45. 
V3 Francois Mauriac, "Forward" to Elie Wiesel, Night, 10. 
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beings could not have a proper explanation. In this sense, the Holocaust is, to Wiesel, a 
unique catastrophe in human history transforming Jewish conception of God and the 
world. 
In the face of evils, the traditional Jewish justifications of God such as the 
Messianic redemption or the recompense in the Hereafter are not satisfactory any more in 
the post-Holocaust era. The reason for this is that the classic responses to evil presuppose 
a God who is just, merciful, and almighty, as is formulated in the Jewish tradition. Wiesel 
refuses to praise God with these positive attributes. If there is anything to exalt him for, it 
is his negative aspect. "How could I say to Him: ", asks Wiesel, 
"Blessed art thou, Eternal, Master of the Universe, Who chose us from 
among the races to be tortured day and night, to see our fathers, our mothers, 
our brothers, end in the crematory? Praised be Thy Holy Name, Thou Who 
hast chosen us to be butchered on Thine altar? "i124 
This is not to deny that God exists; but it is a human protest against justifying God since 
it means to legitimise the Holocaust. It is reported that Wiesel have said that "If I told you 
I believed in God, I would be lying; if I told you I did not believe in God, I would be 
lying. "'" After Auschwitz, therefore, one can only hold onto God by protesting his 
silence without justifying the death camps. 
Among others, Night is seen as the most articulate book written by Wiesel on the 
Holocaust. As Richard Rubenstein and John Roth suggest, 126 the majority of Wiesel's 
124 Wiesel, Night, 78 
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writings are not explicitly about the question of the Holocaust in the sense that Night is. 
However, that the horrors of the death camps can be felt in any one of Wiesel's writings. 
The silence of God on Israel's suffering and Israel's protest in response are generally the 
main themes he employs throughout his writings on the Holocaust. 
Wiesel in his novel, the Accident, emphasises the negative aspect of God 
strongly. The protagonist of the novel, Eliezer, reflects upon God in view of evil. He 
believes that it is not human beings but God to be blamed for the evils of the world. 
Humankind is nothing but His favourite toy. Rabbi Dan Cohn-Sherbok points to the 
background of Lurianic kabbalah in Wiesel's view of the negative conception of God. 127 
Perhaps this negative image is nowhere explicit than here in the Accident. He writes, 
"Condemned to eternal solitude, he [God] made man only to use him as a toy, 
to amuse Himself. That's what the philosophers and poets have refused to 
admit: in the beginning there was neither the Word, nor Love, but laughter, the 
roaring, eternal laughter whose echoes are more deceitful than the mirages of 
the desert. "128 
Thus, for Wiesel, the idea of loving and caring God is no more tenable in the face of 
human suffering. 
Perhaps it ought to be noted that the cantata Ani Maamim seems to be an 
exception among his writings. Here Wiesel apparently takes a different stand from his 
other works. God is no more a malevolent deity or unconcerned with Israel's suffering. 
'r' Cohn-Sherbok, God and The Holocaust, 93. 
12" Elie Wiesel, The Accident (New York: Hill and Wang, 1962) as quoted in Cohn-Sherbok, God and the 
Holocaust, 93. 
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He joins His people in their grief weeping. In addition, He is overwhelmed with Israel's 
loyalty to Him even in the face of horrendous evil like the Holocaust. Wiesel does not 
finish Ani Maamim protesting God. Instead, the last verses express the classical Jewish 
longing for the Messiah: 
I believe, 
I believe in the coming of the Messiah 
Even if He delays, 
I will wait for Him on the day that He will come, 
I believe. 129 
The cantata Ani Maamim shows that Elie Wiesel does not contend that atheism 
is an alternative in the post-Holocaust era. On the other hand, Wiesel maintains 
throughout his writings that the flames of Auschwitz made the traditional Jewish concept 
of God, who is believed to love and care the Jewish people, untenable. While there is, to 
Wiesel, no religious explanation for the Holocaust, human being has a right to protest 
God for His silence. 
Wiesel might not be an atheist, but he does not sound like a believer either. As 
Cohn-Sherbok notes, "he repeatedly casts doubts on the traditional Jewish understanding 
of God. "130 Since he cannot be both at the same, unless he shares the view of "momentary 
faith" with Greenberg, he needs to clarify his position. Wiesel's protest can be emotional 
129 Elie Wiesel, Ani Maamim (New York: Random House, 1973) as quoted in Cohn-Sherbok, God and the 
Holocaust, 98-9. 
130 Cohn-Sherbok, "God and the Holocaust, " 77. 
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human reactions to such a horrendous event as the Holocaust. Unless he states that is so, 
his protest can be easily taken as against the existence of God. 
b. The Death Of God 
The Jewish Reform Rabbi Richard L. Rubenstein (1924-) is well known with his 
radical approach to the Holocaust. In his book, After Auschwitz published in 1966, 
Rubenstein writes that "we live in the time of the death of God. s131 That is to say that the 
horrors of the death camps destroyed the traditional Jewish concept of God. Rubestein's 
theological position initially emerges as a result of his interview with Heinrich Gräber, 
the dean of the Evangelical Church in East and West Berlin. In his interview with 
Rubenstein, Gräber advocated the biblical notion of God who constantly acts in history. 
Accordingly, the Holocaust was one of God's doings. Hitler, like Nebuchadrezzar in 
ancient times, was only a "rod of God's anger. s12 The encounter with Gräber had an 
impact on the emergence of Rubenstein's death of God theodicy. 
Later Rubenstein came to believe that the problem of the Holocaust is the most 
crucial challenge to Judaism. In his book After Auschwitz, Rubenstein is convinced that 
Jews cannot believe any more in "an omnipotent, beneficent God" after the Holocaust. 133 
Moreover, the biblical theodicy that suffering is God's punishment because of the sins of 
Israel, cannot be true in view of the murder of innocent people. In Rubenstein's words, 
131 Richard Rubenstein, After Auschwitz:; Radical Theology and Contemporary Judaism (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Ma" 1966), 151 as quoted in Rubenstein and Roth, Approaches to Auschwitz, 309. 
"= Rubenstein and Roth, Approaches to Auschwitz, 309. 
133 Rubenstein and Roth, Approaches to Auschwitz, 310. 
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"The idea is simply too obscene for me to accept. , 134 It is not possible to see a purpose in 
the Holocaust. 
However, Rubenstein has never accepted being an atheist. He writes, "No man 
can really say that God is dead. This is more a statement about man and his culture than 
about God "135 Nietzsche's phrase "God is dead, " was, for Rubenstein, the most 
appropriate term in describing the event of the Holocaust and the post-Holocaust era. In 
another time and culture, there might have been another phrase conveying the brokenness 
of God-humankind relationship. As a "religious existentialist" living after Nietzsche and 
Auschwitz, Rubenstein describes what he means by "the death of God" as follows: "the 
thread uniting God and man, heaven and earth, has been broken. We stand in a cold, 
silent, unfeeling cosmos, unaided by any purposeful power beyond our own resources. 
After Auschwitz, what else can a Jew say about God? "136 It can be safely concluded from 
this assertion that Rubenstein does not affirm the traditional Jewish concept of loving and 
providential God. 
Rubenstein has changed his attitude with the emergence of the State of Israel 
from existentialism to nature paganism. As described in Approaches to Auschwitz (1987), 
written by Richard Rubenstein and the Christian theologian John Roth, cosmos is the 
manifestation of God who is "the single unifying and unified Source and Ground. s137 
Thus, Rubenstein expected that after the Holocaust, the Jews who returned to Israel 
134 Rabenstein and Roth, Approaches to Auschwitz, 311. 
133 Rubenstein and Roth, Approaches to Auschwitz, 311. The italics are the author's. 
136 R th stein and Roth, Approaches to Auschwitz, 311. 
137 Rubenstein and Roth, Approaches to Auschwitz, 313. 
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would revert to the "earth gods of Canaan, " as they did in pre-biblical times. As Dan 
Cohn-Sherbok explains, "This does not imply that Jews will worship Baal and Astarte, 
but rather that earth's fruitfulness, vicissitudes and engendering power will become the 
central spiritual realities of Jewish life in Israel "138 Additionally, Rubenstein's nature 
paganism points to the "demonic side" of God. In Rubenstein's words, "To say that God 
and nature are at one with each other, that they are alive and life-engendering, is to affirm 
the demonic side not alone in us but in divinity as well. "39 After the Holocaust, 
Rubenstein thought that this was the only plausible alternative left for the Jews. 
However, Rubenstein observed that a great number of the Jews in Diaspora did 
not regard Israel as their home. In addition, the Jews in Israel did not turn to nature 
paganism contrary to his expectation. They have mainly become secular Jews. Having 
seen this fact, Rubenstein turned to the mystical view of God that he could subscribe to in 
the post-Holocaust era. 
His new conception of God contains some elements of Buddhism and Hegelian 
philosophy. Accordingly, Rubenstein designates God as the "Holy Nothingness" who is 
the source and ground of all that exists. He is the "Nothing" because he is an infinite God 
who cannot be defined. The reason for that it is called mystical view is that "At times, 
mystics also spoke of God in similar terms as the Urgrund, the primary ground, the dark 
unnameable abyss out of which the empirical world has come. 4° Each existence is, on 
the one hand, detached from, and, on the other hand, attached to divine Ground. While 
138 Cohn-Sherbok, God and the Holocaust, 86 
139 AS qUoted in Cohn-Sherbok, God and the Holocaust, 87 
140 Rubenstein and Roth, Approaches to Auschwitz, 315-6. 
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some sees little Jewish characteristic in this reflection, the mystical view of God is, for 
Rubenstein, the only credible conception of God after Auscwitz. 
To conclude, Rubenstein maintains that the destruction of the Jews by the Nazis 
indicates that the classical Jewish view of providential God is dead. If God had acted in 
history, as it is taught so by the Jewish tradition, he would have had to intervene at the 
death camps to save His chosen people. Since He did not do so, the Jews are not expected 
to affirm a loving and caring God after Auschwitz. As an alternative to the theistic 
concept of God, Rubenstein first predicted that the Jews would return to nature paganism 
in the pre-biblical times. When the Jews became secular rather than pagan, he has 
modified his position and affirmed the mystical view of God. After Auschwitz this is, for 
Rubenstein, the alternative conception of God as the source and ground of existence. 
The rhetoric of Rubenstein does not solve the problem. Although he affirms that 
"there is a conception of God, " his identification of God with divine nothingness has very 
little to do with the traditional Judaism. As Cohn-Sherbok states, "To say that God is 
Divine nothingness merely confuses the issues. "14' Clearly Rubenstein does not subscribe 
to the Jewish faith in God. His conception of God is different from the traditional 
concept. It seems to me that the only sensible answer to the problem of such an excessive 
suffering as the Holocaust is the eschatological answer. One can suggest a theodicy in 
order to explain proportioned evils. However, pointless and excessive evils can only find 
justification when their creator is faced in the hereafter. 
"' Cohn-Sherbok, "God and the Holocaust, " 80-1. 
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III. THE CHRISTIAN THEODICIES 
G. The Major Responses of the New Testament 
The New Testament responses to human suffering in this world throw 
considerable light on the problem of evil. Even though these explanations do not offer, in 
a philosophical sense, a complete solution to the problem, they have been, and still are, 
helpful for Christians in developing a positive attitude towards suffering. In addition, the 
practical aspect of suffering rather than the theoretical is often thought to be the subject 
matter of the New Testament. 
Donald Guthrie, a contemporary theologian, calls attention to this point, "The 
ever present problems involved in God's willing suffering for his people are nowhere 
discussed. "142 This is not because the early Christians were unaware of the problems, but 
because they must have submitted to the perfection of divine wisdom and will. This was 
what their faith required from them. In the First Letter of Peter 4: 19, the Christians who 
suffer "in accordance with God's will" are urged to "entrust themselves to a faithful 
Creator. "143 Therefore, the New Testament seems to suggest that there is no suffering in 
this life contrary to God's will whether this divine will for allowing suffering can be 
determined or not. 
It seems to me that suffering is a more immediate and crucial problem for the 
New Testament than it is for the Jewish Scriptures and the Qur'An. The reason for that is 
142 Donald Guthrie, New Testament Theology, (Illinois and Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1981), 97. 
143 The version of the Christian Bible referred to in this part of the thesis is Holy Bible: New Revised 
Standard Version with Apocrypha, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
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often seen in the nature of this New Covenant. That is, Christians believe that as the Son 
of God Jesus Christ's works, suffering and death on the cross are the bases of the New 
Testament. He had neither home nor family. He travelled exhaustively to spread his 
message and encountered with bitter hostility quite often. Finally, his earthly life, 
according to Christian tradition, ended up on the cross in a dramatic manner. Therefore, 
the New Testament is the first place to look up for an explanation for the suffering and 
death of Jesus. 
Along with the original theme of Jesus' suffering and death, it is possible to find 
some of the classical Jewish responses to evil in the New Testament. The reason for this 
may be seen in the historical facts. That is, Christianity initially emerged as a new Jewish 
sect, and early Christians more or less belonged to the milieu of Jewish culture. 144 
Therefore, one immediate problem the writers of the New Testament most likely faced 
must have been to harmonise the teachings of the Hebrew Bible with the "New 
Covenant. " Additionally, the acceptance of the Jewish sacred writings as the Old 
Testament must have led them to re-interpret the Jewish ideas in general, of suffering in 
particular, from the standpoint of their faith in Jesus Christ. 
Daniel J. Simundson in his Faith under Fire affirms that the major New 
Testament responses to evil have their roots in the Old Covenant. In that sense, the theme 
of the suffering servant in Isaiah 40-55 and the eschatological themes in the last part of 
the Jewish Scriptures seemed to have been the main inspirations for the New Testament 
"` John Bowker, Problems ofSuf erfrag in Religions of the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1970), 44. 
77 
writers on their account of suffering. '45 The prevailing theme in Isaiah 40-55 is often 
seen as redemptive suffering. That is, the servant of God atones the sins of others through 
his suffering. He suffers on behalf of his community. Moreover, the eschatological 
literature promises a future state of happiness in response to suffering in this world. This 
life with its evils is approaching its end, and God's judgement will take place in the 
hereafter. What is distinctively Christian in this is the Christ-centredness of the majority 
of the New Testament answers. 
Apart from these two main responses, suffering is sometimes seen as God's 
punishment for human sins. I shall first look into this retributive explanation making its 
way persistently through the Jewish Scriptures into the New Testament, and later into the 
Qur'än. 
1. Suffering as Retribution 
For centuries Christians believed that this Jewish idea is also reflected in certain 
New Testament passages. Those who follow the literal understanding of the New 
Testament generally advocate the view that human suffering is a punishment for sin. 
However, it appears that some modem Christian scholars tend to deny that the New 
Testament offers a retributive answer to suffering at all. 
For Paul, who was formerly a Pharisee, the justice of God is important. Because 
the work of Jesus can only be explained in terms of divine justice. Since God is just, then 
retribution is, for Paul, an inevitable consequence. The story of Ananias and his wife 
"s Daniel J. Simundson, Faith under Fire: Biblical Interpretations of Suffering, (Minneapolis: Augsburg 
Publishing House, 1980), 123. 
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Sapphira in Acts 5: 1-11 is, for instance, taken to be a typical example of the retributive 
suffering. The sudden death of these people is understood by the author of the Acts as 
punishment for their transgressions. Since Ananias and Sapphira lied to Peter the apostle 
about the proceeds of their land they kept back, they fell down and died in front of Peter 
for violating a principle of the Church. Therefore, their death was considered as divine 
punishment for their lies. Simundson points out" that there is a similarity between the 
death of these two people and the death of Jeremiah's adversary, Hananiah, in the Old 
Testament. Hananiah, too, was struck with death since he "urged disloyalty to the Lord" 
(Jeremiah 28-15-17). It is a traditional conviction that in both instances death was 
inflicted as a punishment for the wickedness of the people in question. 
The theme of the wrath of God in the New Testament is seen as an expression of 
retributive judgement of God. Paul talks about divine wrath manifesting itself in the 
world (Rom. 1: 18-32 and I Thes. 2: 16) as well as in the hereafter (Rom. 2: 5,8 and 1 
Thes. 5: 9). Stephen H. Travis, a British Christian theologian, in his Christ and the 
Judgment of God maintains that Paul uses the term the wrath of God in both a personal 
and impersonal sense, and that divine wrath is manifested for unbelievers, never for 
Christians. 147 On the other hand, Charles Harold Dodd (1884-1973), a Welsh biblical 
scholar, take the view that the term is used in an impersonal sense. Dodd argues that Paul 
"retains the concept of `the wrath of God'... not to describe the attitude of God to man, but 
146 Simundson, Faith under Fire, 125. 
147 S. H. Travis, Christ and the Judgment of God Divine Retribution in the New Testament, (Basingtone, 
Hants: Marshall Morgan and Scott Publications Ltd., 1986), 31. 
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to describe an inevitable process of cause and effect in a moral universe. "148 While Travis 
believes that God reveals the wrath personally as punishment for infidelity, Dodd seems 
to suggest that the universe has moral laws as well as natural laws operating on the 
grounds of cause and effect. Whether the wrath of God is personal or impersonal does not 
make much difference in terms of God's responsibility. Because either way He is 
accountable for His actions, no one else. 
The Jewish idea of sickness as a punishment for sin seems to be echoed also in 
the New Testament. In 1 Corinthians 11: 27-30 Paul attributes the weakness, illness and 
death of the congregation at Corinth to their "unworthy manner" in their observation of 
the Lord's Supper. In addition, Jesus' miracles of healing are occasionally referred to in 
support of the idea that illness is a penalty for sin. Luke 5: 17-26 reports that Jesus heals a 
paralysed man by forgiving his sins as if the sickness is the requital of sin. l49 John 
Ferguson, a contemporary scholar of religion, interprets Jesus' pronouncement of the 
forgiveness here as "the demonstration to the watching scribes and Pharisees on their 
own terms'5° that the Son of Man has power to forgive sins. "151 Simundson, on the other 
hand, suggests that Jesus' saying may be understood in "a symbolic way" in the light of 
Genesis 3.152 That is to say, since suffering and death is thought to have come into this 
world as a result of the original sin, human suffering and death can also be seen as the 
143 C. H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans, (London: Hodder, 1932), 23 as quoted in Travis, Christ 
and the Judgment of God, 32. 
149 cf Mark 2: 1-12 and Matthew 9: 1-8. 
150 Italics belong to Ferguson. 
151 J. Ferguson, The Place of Suf fering, (Cambridge and London: James Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1972), 82. 
'52 Simundson, Faith under Fire, 127. 
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natural consequence of this. In this context, it was the purpose of Jesus to remove the 
guilt and to bring salvation to humankind. Thus, Jesus' forgiveness of the paralytic's sins 
is nothing else than the annulment of the original sin. 
On the other hand, Luke 13: 1-5 appears to renounce the idea of retributive 
suffering, at least in the case of Galileans suffering under Pilate and those who were 
killed under the tower of Siloam. Jesus says, "Do you think that because these Galileans 
suffered in this way they were worse sinners than all the other Galileans? No, I tell you" 
(Luke 13: 2-3). Commenting on the same text, Schmid, however, contends that "when 
Jesus encounters special cases of misfortune he sees in them on the one hand punishment 
that is deserved, on the other a warning to others. "153 While suffering of Galilean and of 
the victims of the tower of Siloam is punishment, these disasters are, on the other hand, 
warning to the rest of the community. Because Jesus finishes the passage with a warning, 
"unless you repent, you will all perish just as they did" (Luke 13: 5). 
Brian Hebblethwaite, a contemporary Christian philosopher, talking of Luke 
13: 4, maintains that Jesus "explicitly" rejected the Jewish view of suffering as a 
punishment for sin. The striking example is that Christ warns the disciples not to assume 
that the people of Siloam were exceptionally sinful. '54 Simundson, too, denies the 
existence of "deserved suffering" in this life. He -writes, "These unfortunate persons who 
got in the way of Pilate or the Siloam tower were not worse sinners than anyone else. "55 
... Josef Schmid, "Suffering: Later Judaism and the New Testament, " Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology, 
ed. by Johannes B. Bauer (London: Sheed and Ward, 1976), 894. 
154 Brian Hebblethwaite, Evil, Suffering and Religion, (London: Sheldon Press, 1976), 49. 
155 Simundson, Faith under Fire, 127. 
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In addition, Simundson takes Jesus' urge to repent in eschatological sense. That is to say, 
humankind will see the result of what they have done in the future. 
John 9: 1-3 is also a significant passage in which Jesus explicitly rejects the idea 
of retributive suffering in the case of a blind man. The disciples of Jesus enquiry about 
the reason for blindness of the man: "Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he 
was born blind? " (John 9: 2). Jesus replies, "Neither this man nor his parents sinned; he 
was born blind so that God's works might be revealed in him" (John 9: 3). 
This passage is important for three reasons. Firstly, it suggests that the disciples 
of Jesus must have held the retributive explanation of suffering previously. They sounded 
certain that blindness was a punishment for sin, but they were not sure whether it was his 
or his ancestors' sins. Secondly, Jesus seems to deny the view that suffering is a 
punishment of sin. However, this does not necessarily mean that he rejected the 
retributive suffering completely. Thirdly, Jesus proclaims that his blindness is "an 
opportunity for God's glory to be seen. " 56 Characteristically, the Gospel of John affirms 
that afflictions including Jesus' suffering and crucifixion are an occasion for glorification 
of God. 
This last point is also reiterated in John 11: 4 concerning the illness of Lazarus. 
When Jesus is informed that Lazarus is ill, he says, "This illness does not lead to death; 
rather it is for God's glory. So that the Son of God may be glorified through it. " As is 
seen here, the New Testament's interest is clearly directed towards suffering as the 
1ý Simundson, Faith under Fire, 128. 
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opportunity of glorifying Godls7 This seems to be a relatively comforting. The reason for 
that is that this account offers consolation only if it is you who are chosen for the 
manifestation of the glory of God. Otherwise, it does not solve the problem if it does not 
make it worse. Why some are worthy of his glorification, the others are not? Does that 
mean that who suffers is more deserved than the one who escapes that fate? Obviously, it 
is not to correct to assume that a good and just God could choose some of His creation 
over others without any reason. 
The majority of modem biblical scholars seem to think that the New Testament 
does not affirm a retributive explanation. How could the God of love inflict pain and 
suffering on his creation even for their sins? Did He not know beforehand that human 
beings would sin if He created them? Why did He, then, create them? In order to punish? 
God cannot be thought as a sadist who enjoys inflicting pain, and human beings as His 
plaything. In addition, even if we assume that the idea of suffering as a punishment 
adopted by the authors of the New Testament, it does not seem to be adequate as an 
overall explanation because not all sinful people are punished and indeed the wicked 
often prosper. Perhaps the only positive side of this explanation may be that the faithful 
conscious of the retributive explanation might evaluate his or her attitudes in the case of 
suffering and then correct them. Although the retributive theory may to a degree make 
sense from human standpoint, it seems not from the viewpoint of God. 
157 Ferguson, The Place of Sgffm ing,. 82. 
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2. Suffering as Discipline and Test 
It is also possible to find in the New Testament the Jewish view of suffering as a 
means of discipline (Heb. 12: 3-13; Rev. 3: 19; Jas. 1: 2-4,12) or test (Rom. 5: 3f; 1 Pet. 
1: 7). The notion of suffering as a test of faith is sometimes seen as a supplement for the 
inadequate explanation of the retributive suffering. 158 The faithful is tried for their 
commitments, and is asked to prove how sincere he or she is. It is believed that this is not 
something to be upset with. On the contrary, the Christians must rejoice over their 
suffering (Jas. 1: 2-4; 1 Pet. 1: 6). 139 It appears that this view helped the early Christian 
martyrs to deal with their suffering particularly in the second century. Paul develops this 
theme further. Suffering is good because "it produces endurance, character, and hope 
(Rom. 5: 3-5). s160 This explanation can also be seen in Peter. He thinks that some 
suffering is a test, "a fiery ordeal" (4: 12). "A faith which has stood the test of suffering is 
like gold which has been refined in the fire (1: 6-7). Peter does not say that God sends 
suffering in order to test us, but that suffering is among the circumstances of life, and 
does in fact provide a testing-ground. "161 In the letter to Hebrews, it is implied that 
human beings need suffering for their well-being. Limited amount of suffering may help 
people to develop good traits such as sympathy for others and endurance (12: 7-11; see 
also 5: 7-9). Its author applies this notion even to Jesus' suffering. He says, "he learned 
obedience in the school of suffering" (2: 10). 
Asa Hebblethwaite, Evil, Suffering and Religion, 49. 
"9 Schmid, "Suffering: Later Judaism and the New Testament, " 895. 
160 Green, "Theodicy, " 436. 
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Moreover, the beatitude passages of New Testament preserved in Matthew 5: 3- 
12 and Luke 6: 20-23 seem to suggest that suffering is a "special comfort" from Jesus to 
the sufferer who is aware of the value of his suffering. According to Guthrie, the 
beatitudes are not general ethical principles, but they are special ethical teachings for 
"who are willing to accept the discipline of discipleship. "162 Therefore, suffering is a 
valuable beatitude. Matthew 5: 3-12 declares that the prosperous, strong, healthy are not 
blessed. The blessed are the poor, the mourners, the meek, the hungry, and those who are 
being persecuted for a righteous cause. Luke 6: 20-26 also pronounces the same point 
even more clearly. If one considers the first centuries of Christianity, this explanation 
makes more sense. That is to say, the first Christians were under constant threat, and were 
subjected to suffering more than anyone else. Therefore, the suffering that the faithful 
endured for his or her faith is blessedness from God testifying to his or her sincerity in 
faith. 
3. Suffering as Redemption 
A weighty answer to human suffering in the New Testament is that the suffering 
of the righteous can redeem the sins of others. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the 
word redemption (redemptio in Latin) as an act of buying back, saving a person's life or 
freedom by ransom. In theological parlance, redemption comes to mean human 
deliverance from sin and damnation. This does not seem to be a prevailing view in the 
Jewish Scriptures even though one can see some allusions to it in Isaiah 40-55. However, 
it is these passages that apparently inspired the writers of the New Testament in 
162 Guthrie, New Testament Theology, 899. 
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understanding the suffering and death of Jesus Christ. Moreover, the redemptive theory is 
also extended to all the suffering redeeming any individual as well as community from 
sin. 
The writers of the New Testament depict that Jesus knew that he would suffer 
and that his suffering is purposeful. We learn from the biblical passages called the 
"Passion predictions" that Jesus was aware of the course of his life taking him to the 
cross. He prophesises that one of the Twelve in the Last Supper would betray him (Mark 
14: 17-21, Matt. 26: 20-4 and Luke 22: 14-22). According to John 13: 18, Jesus himself 
chose Judas in order that his betrayal can fulfil Psalm 41: 9, "The one who ate my bread 
has lifted his heel against me. " Furthermore, Jesus conquered suffering in his life many 
times as he did in his crucifixion with the resurrection. As it is recorded in the New 
Testament, Jesus healed many sick through his power and authority. 163 
The suffering of Jesus Christ and his death on the cross was as perplexing for the 
first Christians as for the Jews. According to the Jewish expectations then, the Messiah 
was supposed to usher a new age and to destroy suffering and injustices forever. In 
contrast to the Jewish expectations, Jesus had come as a humble. person, endured the 
sufferings of many kinds and, finally, died on the cross, apparently without bringing the 
New World promised. With the exception of the Docetics, 'TM the mainstream Christianity 
through the ages has understood the New Testament accounts of Jesus' suffering and 
163 Bowker, Problems of Su, f , 4-ing in Religions of the World, 46-8. 
164 Docetics (Phantomists in English) were an early Gnostic group that believed that Jesus was divine only, 
and that his suffering, death and resun^ection were mere illusion. See, W. L. Reese, Diction y of 
Philosophy and Religion, (New Jersey and London: Humanities Press, 1980), 134. 
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death in the way that they were genuine, not an illusion. 165 Therefore, it was a very 
difficult challenge for the early Christians to face the Jews and others who made mockery 
of Jesus and his crucifixion. This challenge led the followers of the Jesus to develop what 
Simundson calls the "theology of the church. "166 There had to be an explanation for 
Jesus' suffering and death. 
First of all, Jesus corrects the misconception that the Messiah would not suffer. 
In Luke 24: 26, the apparition of Jesus after his crucifixion rebukes the travellers to 
Emmaus with not believing what the prophet said: "Was it not necessary that the Christ 
should suffer these things and enter into his glory? " Peter also has the same view, "In this 
way God fulfilled what he had foretold through all the prophets, that His Messiah would 
suffer" (Acts 3: 18). If the Messiah would suffer as foretold, for what purpose would it be? 
The answer to this question is explicitly given in John 3: 16 as follows: "For God so loved 
the world that he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him may not perish 
but may have eternal life. " 
Commenting on John 3: 16, Marilyn McCord Adams, a contemporary Christian 
philosopher of religion, writes, "God was so eager to win our love that he became 
incarnate and volunteered for martyrdom himself. "167 Therefore, the suffering and death 
of Jesus Christ was no accident, but it was for a purpose. Christ died in order to redeem 
human beings. 
'65 Ferguson, The Place of Suffering, 80. 
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A similar thought finds its expression especially in the writings of Jürgen 
Moltmann. Since it is regarded as closely connected with the biblical teaching, I shall 
briefly mention the idea of the suffering of God here. Moltmann argues that God suffers 
with human beings, and the death of Jesus on the cross is the beginning of "the 
Trinitarian history of the suffering of God. " What happened on the cross was that God 
suffered for the sins and afflictions of humankind. In this sense, the suffering of Christ is 
divine expression of sorrow for the whole human suffering. Moltmann writes, "There is 
no suffering which in this history of God is not God's suffering; no death which has not 
been God's death in the history on Golgotha. "168 
How can the idea of the suffering of God offer a solution to the problem of evil? 
It has been argued that in order to succeed, the Free-Will Explanation needs the 
"affirmation that God suffers. "169 It is not enough to say that God limits himself by 
creating free creatures. "He should also limit himself by sharing that suffering. s170 Only 
by this way it makes sense to talk about the free-will as a cause of suffering. In order to 
give chance to human beings, God has limited himself; as a result he has chosen to suffer 
for the sufferings of humankind. 
The closest parallel to this New Testament conception from the Jewish 
Scriptures is, as mentioned above, the Suffering Servant passages in Isaiah 40-55, 
particularly the Servant Songs, and especially Isaiah 53. As the Suffering Servant in 
'68 Jürgen Moltmann, the Crucified God, 255 as quoted in Paul S. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 6. 
'69 Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God, 33. 
170 Fideles, The Creative Suffering of God, 33. 
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Isaiah 40-55, Jesus, too, suffered for the redemption and salvation of humanity. Mark 
10: 45 and Luke 22: 17 talk about Jesus as the Suffering Servant of God who suffers and 
dies vicariously for the sake of others. Later in Christian history, different theories of 
atonement have been formulated to explain this view intellectually. In essence, Jesus' 
suffering and death on the cross was the redemptive work of God for the sake of human 
beings. 171 God incarnate entered into human dimension, and took suffering and death of 
humanity upon himself in order to show that He cares and loves His children. 
In some other passages in the New Testament, suffering is seen as a prerequisite 
to taking up the responsibility to spread the gospel and following the example of Jesus 
Christ. This is aimed at saving the rest of humankind. Here suffering is not a punishment 
for sins, but it is "a direct consequence of bringing the message of Christ to a sinful 
world. s172 Jesus tells his disciples "If any want to become my followers, let them deny 
themselves and take up their cross and follow me. For those who want to save their life 
will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake will find it" (Matt. 16: 24-25; cf. 
Luke 9: 23-24). In the words of Schmid, "just as suffering belongs to Jesus' own fate, so 
too it belongs to the life of his disciples. "173 
In Matthew 10: 16-23, Jesus also heralds that suffering and persecution may visit 
them during their mission of spreading the Good News. Taking up the cross after Jesus, 
as a result, will bring hatred, suffering or, even in some cases, death (Mark 13: 1-13). 
Therefore, suffering is a natural consequence of spreading Jesus' message, which the 
171 Brian Hebblethwaite, Evil, Suffering and Religion, 39. 
In Simundson, Faith under Fire, 131. 
173 Schmid, "Suffering: Later Judaism and the New Testament, " 894. 
89 
established authority must have seen a threat to its existence. In this sense suffering and 
martyrdom are not something to be shun, but something to be rejoiced (Col. 1: 24). 
In 2 Corinthians 11: 23-12: 10, Paul boasts with the kinds of sufferings he was 
subjected to for the cause of Christ, and urges his followers to do so. He concludes, 
"Therefore, I am content with weakness, insults, hardships, persecutions, and calamities 
for the sake of Christ; for whenever I am weak, then I am strong" (2 Cor. 12: 10). It is, for 
Paul, a privilege to have the opportunity to suffer for Jesus Christ, and others are advised 
to do the same (1: 29-30). In this sense, his sufferings are, Paul believes, "the suffering of 
Christ" (2 Cor. 1: 5; Phil. 3: 10; Col. 1: 24). 174 As Ronald Green points out, "The emphasis 
on Christ's fellow-suffering is a constant theme in Paul's letters. "175 In a similar manner, 
Paul writes in the Letter to the Philippians 1: 12-14 that his experience of suffering in 
prison has been useful in helping others and in spreading the gospel. 
This is the dominant explanation for the meaning of suffering in the New 
Testament. It must have been comforting for the early Christians who were subjected to 
physical and mental torture for what they believed. However, "most of our sufferings, as 
unlike those of first century Christians, " as Simundson rightly points out, "have nothing 
to do with our commitment to the faith. "176 Consequently, the idea of suffering as 
redemption does not seem to offer any convincing answer to the unexpected afflictions 
that shattered the lives of ordinary people. 
17 The same advice is reiterated in 2 Timothy, Hebrew 12, and also 1 Peter 2. 
"S Ronald M. Green, "Theodicy, " The Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. by Mircea Eliade, 14,436. 
176 Simundson, Faith under Fire, 132. 
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4. The Eschatological Resolution 
The Jewish idea of life after death emerged towards the end of the Old 
Testament period when there was a great deal of suffering and death. This form of 
explanation is seen as an extension of the idea of divine retribution. The emphasis here is 
on a future state, not on present. A time will come in which all the injustices and 
sufferings experienced in this life will be recompensed, and there will be no more evil. In 
addition, those who escape God's judgement in this world will be chastened in the life to 
come. 
In Luke 18: 28-9, Peter seeks a confirmation from Jesus that the hardships he and 
the other apostles undergo for the sake of Jesus are not in vain. Jesus responds, "there is 
no one who has left house or wife or brothers or parents or children, for the sake of the 
kingdom of God, who will not get back very much more in this age, and in the age to 
come eternal life. " Here Jesus promises in general terms reward in this life and in the 
hereafter in return for suffering. 
The Book of Revelation, for instance, suggests that God has the right to judge 
human beings in the Judgement Day. "Look! He is coming with the clouds; every eye 
will see him, even those who pierced; and on his account all the tribes of the earth will 
wail" (Rev. 1: 7). Therefore, God is thought to have the rights and the means to reward the 
righteous and to punish the wicked in the life to come. Those who are suffering 
innocently in this world will get their rewards and the prosperous wicked will be 
chastised in the next life. 
In addition, there is the expectation of "face-to-face" encounter with God in the 
hereafter. Those who believe will rejoice in this overwhelming experience. For Paul, this 
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intimacy with the glory of God is so priceless so that suffering loses its significance. He 
writes, "I consider that sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the 
glory about to be revealed to us" (Rom. 8: 18). Therefore, suffering is the price one must 
pay in this world to know and see God in the afterlife. Considering the value he or she 
will get at the end of the day, suffering is worth paying for. 
Simundson suggests that there are basically two slightly different conceptions at 
work in the New Testament. Some passages like Matthew and Revelation emphasise that 
human willingness to obey God's will is the criterion on which individuals will be 
judged. The other texts like Paul and John see that faith in Jesus is the only hope 
humanity has. While the former requires good deeds, the latter focuses on God's grace. ln 
The former passages in the New Testament suggest that there will be a judgement day in 
which people will see the result of what they have done in this world. Among these texts 
are Matthew 5: 17-20,6: 3-4, and 7: 21-24. The book of Revelation in 29: 13-15,22: 12 too 
clearly reiterates the same view. 
The latter view, namely, justification by faith in Jesus, is advocated by Paul 
Romans 2: 1-11; 3: 1-23 and John 3: 36; 12: 44-50. Accordingly, they affirm that salvation 
is not by deeds but by faith in Jesus Christ. Those who believe in Jesus will have no fear 
in the day of judgement. Simundson thinks that the eschatological answers also raise 
many theological questions. For instance, the sufferer may need to be assured that he or 
she is one of those on whom God bestows his grace. In order that life after death can be a 
solution to human suffering, Simundson argues, "We need God's assurance, through his 
11 Simundson, Faith under Fire, 135. 
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Son, that our sins are forgiven and we do not have to fear either death or what comes 
after. "178 
Although this explanation comforts the sufferer in the midst of suffering, the 
possibility of suffering in the hereafter as well as in this world makes it problematic. In 
Simundson's words, "If there is a hell, then someone is probably going to be sent there, 
and since no one is perfect, we are all in danger of burning in an eternal fire. "179 This idea 
can be clearly seen in the book of Revelation 20: 12-15. 
John Hick argues, the warnings of Jesus in the gospels about the danger of 
eternal condemnation are `existential' statements, designed not to propound a theological 
theory but to urge his hearers to change the direction of their lives. Jesus was warning of 
the real danger that anyone who does not repent will come to total misery, "But it does 
not follow from the fact of this danger that you or I or anyone else is in fact never going 
to repent and be saved. "'80 
One eschatological answer that is peculiar to Christian tradition is the 
vindication of suffering by Jesus Christ in his second coming to the world. The early 
Christians expected that Jesus would return immediately after his resurrection and make 
the wrong right in the world. This eschatological anticipation is prevalent in Revelation, 
Matthew 24, Mark 13, and Luke 21. The suffering of the faithful is one of the signs of the 
178 Simundson, Faith under Fire, 137. 
179 Simtmdson, Faith under Fire, 134. 
180 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 250. See the whole chapter, 242-261. 
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Second Coming of Jesus. In the words of Simundson, "the more we suffer the closer we 
are to final deliverance. " 81 
Surely, this must have been comforting to the early Christians in dealing with 
their suffering. However, it is not the case today. Most of the Christians today do not 
think that the Second Coming of Jesus is close, and they also believe that humankind will 
reach the perfect state in the hereafter, not in this world. Simundson's final remarks are, 
"Perhaps if things get bad enough (air pollution, no more oil, terrorism, corrupt 
politicians, declining morality, and so on), we may have more and more people finding 
comfort again in this apocalyptic vision of the final days. "182 
To sum up, the foundation of the New Testament answers to the problem of 
suffering lies in the works, suffering, crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ. As he 
conquered suffering in this world, Christians, too, can defeat suffering and evil forces 
through imitating him. The relationship with Christ is the door to the conquest of evil in 
this world as well as in the hereafter. A Christian in Christ may feel fulfilled and happy 
even in the midst of afflictions. After death, he or she expects to realise the ultimate unity 
with God through Jesus' redemptive work. Considering this whole picture presented in 
the New Testament, the Christian can endure his or her suffering even rejoice with hope. 
From a religious standpoint, the scriptural answers provide a great deal of 
comfort and hope for the believer in the midst of their afflictions. The sufferer knows that 
God is with him or her because he or she believes in Christ. The person compassionately 
181 Simundson, Faith under Fire, 137. 
lu Simundson, Faith under Fire, 138. 
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waits to unite with God. Although the religious account of suffering may be satisfactory 
in practical terms for a Christian, it is difficult for someone outside the Christian tradition 
to find an ultimate solution to the problem of evil in the New Testament. 
In philosophical terms, however, the New Testament responses to human 
suffering do not offer a fully satisfactory explanation. Strictly speaking, neither the 
retributive theory nor the redemptive account of suffering nor the others seems to solve 
the problem of suffering adequately. This is because the New Testament does not seek to 
justify God in the face of evil. The New Testament is not a book of systematic theology. 
That is not the aim of the writers of the New Testament. They appear to have submitted 
God's infinite wisdom and good will. That is the true attitude expected from the faithful. 
H. The Christian Theological And Philosophical Theodicies 
The seeming inconsistency between the belief in God and the reality of evil has 
puzzled the minds of the New Testament writers and subsequent Christian scholars 
throughout ages as their Jewish predecessors did. As we have seen in the previous 
section, the New Testament emphasis like Tanakh is to a great extent on the practical 
aspect of suffering. For the New Testament in general is the story of Christ's life and 
death on the cross. 
The responses to the problem of evil offered by Christian theologians and 
philosophers are often classified in terms of traditional theodicies and modem theodicies. 
John Hick in his influential book Evil and the God of Love traces two major theodicies 
within Christian tradition; namely, the Augustinian Theodicy and the Irenaean Theodicy. 
In modem times, Christian theologians and philosophers have followed one of these two 
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great traditions in essence while putting emphasis usually on particular problems. As a 
result, the responses to evil have come to be known in modern times with the names 
indicating the theoretical explanation offered such as the Soul-Making Theodicy or 
Process Theodicy. 
Since I am exploring here the Christian attempts at a solution to the problem of 
evil, it appears to be more appropriate and convenient to limit myself with the major 
responses traditional as well as modem. The Traditional Christian theodicies to be 
explored in this chapter are the Augustinian Theodicy and the Irenaean Theodicy. Under 
the heading of the Modem Theodicies, I shall focus on four significant theodicies and 
defences: Process Theodicy, the Free-Will Defence, the Natural Law Theodicy, and the 
Soul-Making Theodicy. Let me start with the traditional theodicies, and first of all with 
the Augustinian Theodicy. 
1. The Traditional Theodicies 
a. The Augustinian Theodicy 
Augustine (354-430), the bishop of Hippo in North Africa, is usually regarded as 
the first Christian theologian and philosopher who formulated a fully developed Christian 
theodicy. The Augustinian approach has been one of the most, if not the most, influential 
response to the problem of evil in the entire Christian history. Hence, Charles Journet, a 
contemporary Thomist-Catholic theologian, describes Augustine as "the Doctor of the 
problem of evil. s183 Indeed, the Augustinian Theodicy has been continuously inspiring 
I" Charles Journet, The Meaning of Evil, trans. by Michael Barry, (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1963), 34. 
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the Christian theologians and philosophers, mainly from the Catholic, Thomist and 
Calvinist circles of academia, throughout the Christian era. 
Augustine was persistently concerned with the nature and source of evil from the 
beginning of his intellectual life. Even prior to his conversion to Christianity, he had 
found hard to believe that God was responsible for the evils of the world. Instead 
Augustine the Manachee preferred to believe that there was a cosmic principle of evil in 
fight with the power of good. 184 Manichaean dualism, founded by Mani (217-c. 277), 
held that there was a cosmic struggle between the forces of good and evil, namely, "the 
Father of Light, " God, and "the Principle of Darkness, " the Devil. This conflict brought 
about the creation of the evil material world in which good was trapped by darkness. '85 
Augustine is believed to have followed the Manichaean dualism until he converted to 
Christianity. 
We understand from one of his principal works, namely, Confessions, that 
Augustine's trouble with the question as to the source of evil continued even after he 
became a Christian. Although he preserved his old belief that God would not be a 
malevolent deity, yet he still could not understand "readily and clearly what was the 
cause of evil. "186 Eventually, he came to believe that evil is the privation of good since 
the creation is good as the manifestation of God's goodness. Another notable 
characteristic of the Augustinian Theodicy is the aesthetic concept of evil. That is to say, 
l84 Augustine, Confessions, 5.10. The quotations from the Church Fathers at the rest of the work are taken, 
unless specified, from Maged N. Kamel (ed. ), The Early Church Fathers Series, /, 1996. 
185 Ninian Smart, The World's Religions: Old Traditions and Modern Transformations, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University press, 1995), 223. 
1" Augustine, Confessions, 7.3. 
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evil is a necessary component of the good creation in its totality. Following Augustine's 
order of the investigation, 187 1 shall explore the Augustinian Theodicy starting from the 
nature of evil first, and then the source of evil. 
Augustine describes evil as privation of good, privatio bona if I may cite the 
Latin expression he often uses. Evil is a corruption, a loss, a lack, an absence and the like. 
In his celebrated book the City of God, Augustine describes his theory of privation as 
follows: "evil has no positive nature; but the loss of good has received the name 
`evil'. "188 Hence, evil is and has not independent existence in contrast to good, which the 
latter has alone actual entity, and is only nature. 
In terms of its origin, it is suggested that Augustine's privative theory is either 
"adapted" from Plotinus189 or is adopted from the Christian Platonist theologians such as 
Ambrose, who was the mentor of Augustine. 190 I think it is safe to say for our purposes 
here that whether Augustine borrowed directly from the writings of Plotinus or from the 
Christian Platonists is in a sense irrelevant because the privative theory is Plotinian in 
origin. According to Augustine, nature is good, and good is nature. This is also consistent 
with the biblical doctrine of creation that God himself described what He has made as 
"good" in Genesis 3. On the other hand, evil is corruption, and so corruption is not 
nature; more precisely it is corrupted nature. That is to say, there is no such a substantial 
'87 Augustine, Concerning the Nature of Good, Against the Manichaeans, ch. 4. 
188 Augustine, The City of God, 11.9. 
189 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 52. 
190 Rowan A. Greer, "Augustine's Transformation of the Free Will Defence, " Faith and Philosophy, 13, no. 
4, October 1996,47 1. 
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being or entity as evil, but only "degrees of good". 191 Therefore, a being, however 
imperfect it is, is good, not evil, as long as it remains an entity. 
Augustine affirms that "measure, " "form" and "order" are the three basic 
characteristics of nature or being. Thus, evil consists in the privation or corruption of 
"either of the measure, or the form, or the order, that belong to nature. "192 The 
conventional language of humankind may have different names for different kinds of 
evils in the world; but they are, at the bottom-line, the corruption of good. Augustine 
illustrates this point as follows: "the corruption of health is pain and disease; the 
corruption of strength is exhaustion; the corruption of rest is toil. ""' In other words, 
health is good or nature, sickness of any kind is evil, a corrupted nature. 
If only good is from God, what is the source of evil in the universe then? God 
cannot possibly create an incorruptible being since this means the creation of the second 
deity by God, which is contradictory by definition. According to Augustine, since God 
created the universe out of nothing, nature has tendency towards nothingness. Therefore, 
the possibility for privation or corruption is an innate feature of nature. 194 This is even 
true for the highest level of created beings such as the human souls and angels. As nature 
cannot be supremely and immutably good, it cannot be wholly evil as well. For the 
complete disappearance of goodness signifies the termination of being. 
191 Michael Haren, Medieval Thought: The Western Intellectual Tradition from Antiquity to the Thirteen 
Century, Second Edition, (Hampshire and London: Macmillan, 1992), 51. 
'92 Augustine, Concerning the Nature of Good Against the Manichaeans, ch. 4. 
193 Augustine, Against the Epistle ofManichaeus Called Fundamental, ch. 35. 
194 Augustine, Concerning the Nature of Gooch Against the Manichaeans, ch. 10. 
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Having explained the nature of evil as privation, Augustine focuses on the 
question whence comes evil. What is the cause of the privation or corruption of being? 
Following the biblical teaching, Augustine holds that evil is brought into the world 
through the sin committed by free agents, namely the original sin. Before the original sin, 
there was no evil in the universe. As God's creation is good, evil was initially introduced 
into the universe through the misuse of free-will firstly by rebellious angels and then by 
human ancestors, namely Adam and Eve. In Augustine's words, "the only cause of evil is 
the failing away from the unchangeable good of a being made good but changeable, first 
in the case of an angel, and afterwards in the case of man. "195 
Evil in the world was originated from the "turning away" of the fallen angels 
and then Adam and Eve from God, the highest good, to 196 This brought about 
the "falling away" from God of the angels and human beings in question respectively. 
Augustine contends that the cause of evil willing is not an "efficient cause" in 
Aristotelian terms, but it is a "deficient cause. " That is to say, there is no external cause 
that brings about the evil will in person's mind, but only a deficiency. For Augustine, in 
John Hick's words, 
"evil willing is a self-originating act, and is as such not explicable in terms of 
causes that are distinguishable from the agent himself. Thus the origin of evil 
lies for ever hidden within the mystery of finite freedom; for `what cause of 
willing can there be which is prior to willing? "'197 
1" Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 23. 
"('Augustine, The City of God, 12.6. 
197 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 66-7. 
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In this sense, the first sins were not positive in nature since evil was only privation. What 
constituted the privation of good was the will of turning away from God rather than 
submitting to divine will, which was good. 
As Adam and Eve sinned with their free-will, human beings now have to bear 
the consequences of their sin. Because the original sin corrupted the original perfection of 
human beings prior to the Fall. Consequently, Adam's progeny have inherited the corrupt 
sinful nature from their ancestors, and deserved to be punished in this world and in the 
hereafter. According to Augustine, "there are two kinds of evil, sin and the penalty of 
sin. "198 While the former is brought about by human free-will, the latter pertains to "the 
avenger, " the just God. Therefore, the original sin of Adam and Eve generated the 
suffering and other states of evil affairs in the world affecting the following generations 
of humankind. In short, according to the Augustinian Theodicy, suffering and death of 
humankind are God's punishment for sin. 
Therefore, Augustine does not believe that eternal damnation of some is a threat 
to God's goodness and justice. He says that "the whole human race was condemned in its 
apostate head by a divine judgment so just that not even if a single member of the race 
were ever saved from it (sic), no one could rail against God's justice. "199 He goes as far 
as to content that God's condemnation of infants who dies in infancy is possible as "they 
I" Augustine, Acts or Disputation Against Fortunatus, The Manichaean, 15. 
'"Augustine, Enchiridion, 25. 
101 
are all drawn from a corrupt mass. "20° In this sense, Augustine conception of divine love 
is limited with a part of humankind. The rest is justly condemned to hell forever. 
The last major theme of the Augustinian Theodicy that I shall explore here is the 
aesthetic notion of evil. Augustine asserts that the universe is perfect in its totality when it 
is seen from God's standpoint. Although we describe some parts of the universe as 
imperfect, it is perfect as a whole. Augustine explains, "God, in whom are all things, to 
whom nevertheless neither the vileness of any creature is vile, nor its wickedness 
harmful, nor its error erroneous. "20' What is evil from a limited position is the necessary 
constituent of the perfect and beautiful universe in its totality from God's viewpoint. 
Augustine utilises the aesthetic theme in explaining the place of sin in the 
universe as well. Accordingly, the universe that contains sin and its punishment from 
God's viewpoint is a better universe than the one in which there is neither of them. 
Augustine's states, "Since there is happiness for those who do not sin, the universe is 
perfect; and it is no less perfect because there is misery or sinners. "202 It is because God 
sustains the moral order of the universe with the infliction of just punishment. In 
Augustine's own words, "the penalty of sin corrects the dishonour of sin. "203 This does 
not mean that Augustine sees sin as a necessary component of the perfect universe. In 
fact, it is an undesired by-product of the necessary human quality; that is, free-will. 
200 Thomas Talbot, "The Doctrine of Everlasting Punishment, " Faith and Philosophy, 7, no. 1, January 
1990,22. 
201 Augustine, Two Books Of Soliloquies, 1.2. 
202 Augustine, On Free Will, 3.9.26-27. 
203 Agustin, On Free Will, 3.9.26. 
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The basis of Augustine's aesthetic conception of evil is often seen in the Neo- 
Platonic idea of which the modem American philosopher Arthur Lovejoy (1873-1962) 
calls "the principle of plenitude. 99204 Plotinus originally depicted the creation as a series of 
emanation flowing out from "the First-Good" like light radiating from the sun. The 
unconscious emanation of the One actualises every possibilities of existence until it 
exhausts and comes to the border of non-being. Augustine replaces Plotinus' idea of the 
unconscious emanation of the One, or the First, with the biblical doctrine of creation as 
"conscious divine volition. 9405 
On the other hand, Augustine deploys the Plotinian principle of plenitude in 
explaining the universe with its hierarchical structure from higher nature such as 
archangels to lower nature . 
206 Accordingly, there is no evil being but lesser goods in 
comparison to higher goods. The universe with lesser goods as well as higher goods is a 
better universe from the one that only has the highest nature of creatures. It is because the 
variety and abundance in creation is the manifestation of the perfect Creator. For 
Augustine, the desire to add a quality to a higher being already perfect is tantamount to 
injustice, and to terminate the less good is "wicked and grudging. , 207 Therefore, every 
being, regardless of their lesser or higher nature, is good so long as the order of the 
universe is not disturbed. The Augustinian Theodicy has remained as the most influential 
Christian answer to the problem of evil throughout ages. As John Hick rightly notes, 
204 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 78. 
205 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 82. 
206 See, for Augustine's basic classification of being, Augustine, the City of God, 11.16. 
2W Hick, Evil and the Love of God, 51. 
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"Augustine's theodicy has continued substantially unchanged with the Roman 
Catholic Church to the present day. It was adopted also by the Protestant 
Reformers of the sixteenth century and has been virtually unquestioned as 
Protestant doctrine until within approximately the last 100 years. "20 
Two modern Augustinian theodicists Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) and Brian 
Davies point209 that Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) adopts an Augustinian approach to the 
problem of evil. Aquinas does, as Augustine does, affirm that evil is the deprivation or 
defect of a good. Since only being or nature is good, evil is not being or a property of 
being. 210 However, this does not mean that there is no evil occurrences in the world. It 
exists as a subjective conception, but not as an objective fact. That is, no being is evil in 
itself, but by reason of its relation to other things. For instance, while mental deficiency is 
evil for human beings as the deprivation of rationality; it is not so for subordinal creatures 
such as plants because rationality is not the latter's property. All things are, therefore, in 
themselves good, and evil is a defect of good. Evil in itself is not a cause. It can, 
according to Aquinas, only operate through the good of which it is a deprivation. 211 That 
is to say, evil emerges out of good only incidentally or through some defection in being. 
Therefore, God is not responsible for evil, which is something non-being in origin. 
According to Aquinas, there are two kinds of evil in the universe. One has its 
essential features in "the loss of a form or part required for a thing's integrity. " The other 
208 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 246. 
209 See, for their exposition of Aquinas' treatment of evil, B. Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); and J. Maritain, Saint Thomas and the Problem of Evil, 
(Milwakee: Marquette University Press, 1942). 
2'o Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, p. I, Q. 48, art. 1; Summa Contra Gentiles, 11,9,10. 
211 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Hi. 10. 
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is "the evil of withdrawal in activity that is due, either by its omission or by its 
malfunctioning according to manner and measure. 99212 Brian Davies, a contemporary 
Dominican Friar, translates from Aquinas the first one as "evil suffered, " Jacques 
Maritain prefers to call it "evil of action. "213 In modem discussions of evil, the first one 
is, as Davies points, commonly named "natural evil, " the latter "moral evil. " 
As a response to natural evil, Aquinas, following Augustine, offers the aesthetic 
conception of the universe. He believes that the creation is the manifestation of God's 
goodness. He, further, writes "because His goodness could not be adequately represented 
by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to 
one in the representation of the Divine goodness might be supplied by another. s214 
Therefore, one has to be less good, not evil, than another. According to Aquinas, this 
universe in its totality is a perfect one even though we see some imperfections in 
particular things. He argues, "God could make other things, or add something to the 
present creation; and then there would be another and a better universe. "215 However, that 
would destroy the order and balance in this universe. Therefore, this universe in its 
totality is perfect with its variety and diversity, with its rational and subordinal creatures. 
Another cause of natural evil is that a particular goodness desired might 
accidentally bring about an evil suffered. Since God does not create evil, when he causes 
a good, that may stand in the way of another good resulting with the emergence of evil. 
22 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1.48.5 as quoted in Davies, the Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 92. 
21; Davies, the Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 92 and Maritain, Saint Thomas and the Problem of Evil, 20. 
2" Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1.47.1 as quoted in Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 101. 
215 Aquinas, Summa T heologica, I. 25.6, as quoted in Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 101. 
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In Aquinas' words, "in causing the common good of the ordered universe, he causes loss 
in particular things as a consequence and, as it were, indirectly. "216 For instance, while it 
is good for a lion to hunt and eat a hare, it is certainly evil for the hare. Therefore, God is 
not the cause of evil, but it occurs accidentally from the clash with other goods. 
Concerning to moral evil, Aquinas refers to the idea of evil as absence of good. 
While natural evil arises out of nature, which is good, as its depravation or defect, moral 
evil ensues from, Aquinas writes, "an actually deficient will, that is a will not submitted 
to its rule and measure. s217 In simple terms, human beings cause evil and sin because 
they do not properly use their free-will. Therefore, moral evil is the consequence of either 
a person's ignorance or negligence. 
As far as spiritual beings concerned, evil is, for Aquinas, as for Augustine, either 
sin or the punishment of sin. According to Aquinas, the universe as a whole is "all the 
better and more perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, 
God nor preventing this... s218 If God would have prevented evils happening, a great deal 
of good would disappear. Instead, God balances the corruption and deprivation in the 
universe punishing the guilty and sinners. This is closely related to Aquinas' conception 
of the order of the universe. He states, "the order of justice belongs to the order of the 
universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. "219 In this sense, 
God is not the cause of defect, but he is the author of evil that is punishment. 
216 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1.49.2 as quoted in Davies, the Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 94. 
217 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. 49.1-3 as quoted by Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 95. 
213 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1.48.2 as quoted in Hick, Evil, 103. 
219 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. 49.2 as quoted in Hick, Evil, 103. 
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Like Augustine, Aquinas also affirms that God will consign some human beings 
to hell some to heaven in the Judgement Day. This is a necessary consequence of God's 
being just. Although God, for Aquinas, loves every human being in the sense that He 
bestows "some" good for them in this life, "he does not, " Aquinas writes, "will every 
good for every one, and is said to hate some in so far as he does not will for them the 
good of eternal life. "220 Therefore, for Aquinas as Augustine, God's love seems to 
exclude some of His creatures eternally. 
The theologians of the Reformation such as Calvin revitalised the Augustinian 
theological approach in the sixteenth century. Although the Reformers were not very 
much interested in developing philosophical theodicy at all, they developed the 
theological accounts of Augustine further such as the Fall and predestination. John Hick 
explains its reason as follows, "the theology of the Reformers, faithfully built upon the 
solo Scriptura principle, reminds us by its silence that the Augustinian philosophy of evil 
is a work of human analysis and speculation, and that it should not be accorded the status 
of revealed truth. "221 The philosophical themes of the Augustinian Theodicy are given a 
central place in Gottfried Leibniz's theodicy. 
I shall now examine Augustinian themes in Calvin because of his notable place 
among the Reformers and of his influence on later Calvinist theologians. John Calvin 
(1509-1564), a French Protestant theologian, followed closely Augustine in explaining 
the cause of evil in terms of the Fall from a heavenly condition to an earthly imperfect 
` Aquinas, Summa Theologica, L 23.3 as quoted in Thomas Talbot, "The Doctrine of Everlasting 
Punishment, " Faith and Philosophy, 7, no. 1, January 1990. 
221 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 122. 
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state. Calvin sees the Fall of Adam as a punishment from God as described in Genesis 3 
meted out not only to Adam but also to all humanity. tm Therefore, evil in the world is the - 
legacy of the original sin committed by the first human beings and passed down to their 
offspring. 
Moreover, Calvin goes far beyond what Augustine taught concerning to divine 
predestination. The latter held that God "foresaw" that human beings would choose with 
their free-will good or evil; and he, accordingly, consigned some to hell others to heaven. 
On the other hand, the former develops a rigid doctrine of divine predestination. For 
Calvin, Predestination is God's will and absolute decree that ordains the destiny of every 
single person. Accordingly, some is predestined to "eternal life, " some to "eternal 
damnation. "u3 Calvin's doctrine of predestination, also known as "double 
predestination, " declares that the elected people to salvation by divine mercy will be 
saved, and the others will be condemned. 
This is not Augustine's divine foreknowledge or divine "permission" to human 
beings to choose freely as Aquinas seems to have understood it, but it is God's "will" and 
its execution. Calvin states, "God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, and thereby 
the ruin of all his posterity, but he also willed it "u4 Nevertheless, Calvin believes that 
human beings are free and responsible for their actions. Although God predestined 
everything beforehand, human beings freely and voluntarily follow the course 
222 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, I. 15.8. 
223 Calvin, Institutes, 111.21.5. 
224 Calvin, Institutes, 1H. 23.7. 
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foreordained for them without any coercion from outside. 225 Hence, Calvin affirms that 
human beings are accountable for their sins and that God is justified by punishing them 
for their wrong doings. 
Among others, the Best-Possible-World Theodicy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
(1646-1716) has been one of the most profound and influential Augustinian approach to 
the problem of evil. Leibniz for the first time introduced the term "theodicy" to 
theological and philosophical parlance in the sense of justification of God's ways to 
humankind. Subsequently, theodicy has become the rubric under which attempts at 
solution to the whole problem of evil are offered and discussed along with its literal 
meaning. 
The main argument of Leibniz in his Theodicy is that the good and powerful 
God creates only the best among all possible worlds and events when he wills to do so. 
Divine will to create comes forth naturally out of God's goodness for "the purpose of 
communicating himself. "226 When God willed to create a universe, there must have been 
a great deal of possible worlds in his mind. He could have created any one of these 
options in front of him. God contemplates and compares all the possible universes with 
their perfections and imperfections. ' As God who is omnipotent and good, he must have 
chosen the best among all possible worlds. In Leibniz's words, "this supreme wisdom, 
united to a goodness that is no less infinite, cannot but have chosen any other world than 
225 Calvin, Institutes, H. 3.5. 
226 G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy, sixth printing, ed. by Austin Fanner and trans. by E. M. Huggard, (La Salle, 
Illinois: Open Court, 1997), 269. 
227 Leibniz, Theodicy, 267. 
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the best "u8 For Leibniz, this is because of God's own nature. Otherwise, he would not 
be a powerful and wholly good God. Consequently, this world must be the best of all 
possible worlds, which presents "most reality, most perfection, most significance. "229 
If God elects the best, whence come irregularities in the world? The answer to 
this question lies in Leibniz's classification of evil. He recognises three kinds of evil: 
metaphysical, physical, and moral evil. "Metaphysical evil consists in mere imperfection, 
physical evil in suffering, moral evil in sin. s230 At the last resort, the last two, too, are the 
result of the first one since all evil essentially stems from the limited nature of the 
creation. 
Leibniz argues that "imperfections" and "defects" in the world are due to the 
limited "receptivity" of the creature. That is to say, it is not God but the "original 
limitations" arising from the state of createdness that causes flaw in the universe. The 
creation cannot be possibly thought wholly perfect, "For God could not give the creature 
all without making of it a God. "01 Thus, deficiencies and defects in the created universe 
are, according to Leibniz, the natural outcome of being finite and inferior to God. In this 
sense evil is, when we turn to the question asked at the beginning, nothing but finiteness 
or privation of perfect goodness. 
The Best-Possible-World Theodicy is seen as a teleological as well as aesthetic 
account for evil. God is justified in tolerating evil because every defect has its aesthetic 
223 Leibniz, Theodicy, 128. 
u' Leibniz, Theodicy, 253. 
230 Leiibniz, Theodicy, 136. 
231 Leibniz, Theodicy, 141-2. 
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value within the wholeness of the universe, and because evil is a means to achieve the 
best possible world. "If the smallest evil that comes to pass in the world, " Leibniz writes, 
"were missing in it, it would no longer be this world; which, with nothing omitted and all 
allowance made, was found the best by the Creator who chose it. "232 In addition, some 
human suffering is divine punishment for sins and wicked deeds ? 33 In short, Leibniz 
believes that God is justified as long as evil of any kind contributes to the best possible 
whole. 
John Hick criticises the Best-Possible-World Theodicy because of the dilemma 
it faces: God is either not powerful or not good enough to create a world with less evil. 234 
Surely the omnipotent and the most benevolent God must be able to make a better world 
than the extant one. The contemporary exponent of the Augustinian Theodicy Alvin 
Plantinga joins Hick in charging Leibniz. He calls this dilemma or weakness "Leibniz's 
Lapse. " According to Plantinga, Leibniz is mistaken because "it is not within God's 
power to create a world containing moral good without creating one containing moral 
evil. " 235 This is seen as a serious blow to Leibniz's theodicy of the best possible world. 
The idea of evil as privation or a lack of being can also be traced in the writings 
of modem theologians and philosophers. Martin Heidegger's das Nichts, Paul Tillich's 
"Non-being, " and Karl Barth's das Nichtige ("nothingness") describes the negative 
232 Leibniz, Theodicy, 129. 
233 Leibniz, Theodicy, 190,200. 
234 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 172. 
235 Alvin Plantinga, "God, Evil and the Metaphysics of Freedom, " in M. M. Adams and R. M. Adams, 
(eds. ), The Problem of Evil, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 99-101. 
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aspect of human life. 236 For instance, Barth asserts that evil is das Nichtige, nothingness, 
which inevitably accompanies the creation. 237 
To sum up, the Augustinian approach to evil can be characterised with its 
identification of evil as the privation of good, and with its emphasis on the Fall of human 
beings into the world due to the original sin. As the extension of the first theme, 
Augustinian writers asserted that the created universe is good, evil is a lack of goodness. 
Aesthetic conception of evil is most often employed to explain natural evil in the world. 
In addition to the aesthetic theme, the principle of plenitude is referred to in emphasising 
the goodness of the universe as a whole. However, this goodness is not same with divine 
perfection since the creation is dependent on God for its existence. Later Leibniz calls 
this intrinsic finitude and imperfection of the creation "metaphysical evil. " 
The main Augustinian theme in explaining moral evil is the Fall of Adam and 
Eve in consequence of their disobedience to divine command misusing their free-will. 
Through this original sin and the Fall, evil has entered into the world passing the sin to 
the subsequent generations. Consequently, no one is innocent in regard to the original sin. 
Moreover, all the afflictions that befall on humankind is seen either sin or its penalty. The 
misuse of human free-will is the cause of sin. Therefore, God is not accountable for the 
malfunction of human freedom. On the other hand, God with his grace chooses to save 
some from eternal damnation leaving others outside of his grace since salvation is 
impossibility for sinful humanity. Calvin goes further and formulates a more rigid 
236 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 189. 
23' See, for Barth's discussion of evil, Nicholas Wolterstorf, , "Barth on Evil, " in Faith and Philosophy, 13, 
no. 4 (October 1996), 584-608. 
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doctrine of predestination. According to this, God foreordains the future states of every 
human being in terms of heaven or hell even before their creation. 
A number of objections are raised against the Augustinian type of theodicy. I 
shall suffice to explore the major criticisms here. Friedrich Schleiermacher points to the 
logical impossibility of Augustine's interpretation of the Fall. He believes that it is self- 
contradictory and unintelligible to assume that a person of original righteousness could 
wilfully commit sin. Because a perfect being would not sin even though he or she is free 
to do so. 
It appears that there is a further discrepancy between the Augustinian doctrine of 
the Fall and of predestination. While the Fall is explained in terms of failure of free-will, 
the doctrine of predestination, on the other hand, sees the source of moral evil within the 
purpose of God. If God foreordained everything in detail including the Fall, how is it 
possible that human beings could be accused of committing the original sin? 
Moreover, the traditional Augustinian Theodicy is also charged with causing 
further problems in spite of its initial objective to justify evil.. The best possible world 
explanation of Leibniz is one of them. It is urged that if this is the best of all possible 
worlds, God is either not powerful or not good to make a better world. In addition, 
Augustinian theologians', most strikingly Calvin's, view of divine election of some 
human beings to eternal happiness and of the others to eternal damnation cause further 
problems. If this is true, either God does not wish to save all, in that case He is not all- 
good, or God desires but is not able to do so, in that case He is not all-powerful. 
Finally, the principle of plenitude is also criticised in the way that it gives a 
limited significance to the existence of humankind within the structure of the universe. 
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As Hick points, humankind is not "valued and loved for his own sake as finite personal 
life capable of personal relationship with the infinite divine Person. "238 Instead, humanity 
is considered a being filling the gap in "the great chain of being. " Therefore, the triviality 
of human existence in the Augustinian Theodicy seems to reduce the significance of the 
Augustinian approach to evil. 
To conclude, the Augustinian Theodicy has been, and in certain circles still is, 
an influential approach to evil in Christian tradition. Today one can see the defenders of 
the Free-Will Defence and, to a lesser degree, of the Best-Possible-World Theodicy in the 
face of evil in the world. The employment of free-will theme in explaining moral evil can 
be seen a positive contribution of the Augustinian Theodicy. On the other hand, the views 
of predestination and of the original sin particularly seem to overshadow this contribution 
causing some problems. I shall explore the major Augustinian approaches to evil in 
modem literature later in the chapter on the Modem Theodicies. 
The reason for its persistence through ages is not because the Augustinian 
Theodicy offers an adequate and satisfying account for evil. This is, as Hick suggests, 
"because the Christian mind was for so long content to ref ain from examining it 
critically. , 239 Perhaps with Hick's formulation of the Irenaean Theodicy, namely, the 
Soul-Making Theodicy, the Augustinian approach to evil has been called into question. I 
shall now explore the other traditional Christian response, the Irenaean Theodicy. 
11 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 200. 
239 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 61. 
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b. The Irenaean Theodicy 
The second type of traditional Christian theodicy has its origin in the writings of 
Irenaeus of Lyons (c. 130-c. 200), a 2nd century Greek father. Although Irenaeus, unlike 
Augustine, did not develop a full-blown theodicy, John Hick asserts that he laid the 
foundations of a distinct Christian theodicy. In contrast to the Augustinian view of Adam 
and Eve as perfect before and sinful after the Fall, Irenaeus considered them as infants 
growing towards maturity. In this context, evil was a necessary element of this process so 
that human beings could develop high moral and spiritual qualities. 
At the centre of Irenaeus' explanation lies the biblical description of "man" as 
"the image of God" and "the likeness of God" (e. g. Genesis 1: 26)240 According to 
Irenaeus, the "image" symbolises human intellectual potentiality of entering into a 
personal relationship with the Creator. In this sense, the creation of human beings in the 
image of God suggests that free beings have the capacity in essence to unite in God. 
Moreover, the "likeness" of God characterises the perfection of human beings by the 
Holy Spirit and "the fulfilment of God's purpose for humanity. "241 Therefore, the 
likeness of God is the ultimate point in human spiritual development. 
In Hick's words, "whilst the image of God is man's nature as personal, the 
divine likeness will be a quality of personal existence which reflects finitely the life of 
the Creator Himselfs242 This likeness is, Irenaeus contends, achieved through the 
2'0 "Then God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our liiceness;... (126). 
Z" Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 290. 
242 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 218. 
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struggle of humankind in the world. 243 In this sense, the Fall is nothing else than a 
deception of God's little ones whose "discretion" is still under development. 244 
Accordingly, in order to develop this primordial discretion, the world, as it was, is a 
necessary instrument for God's purpose so that humankind attains the likeness of God. 
Why did God, then, not bestow upon humankind His likeness from the 
beginning? Having affirmed that God is powerful to do anything possible, Irenaeus' 
answer to this question is that "man could not receive this, being as yet an infant. 045 He 
explains this view referring to a mother's attitude towards her baby. While the mother is 
capable of giving solid food to the new-born immediately after the birth, the infant is not 
able to take it in and to digest it. 
As all creatures have to be subordinate to the perfect Creator by definition, 
human beings, too, have to be imperfect and lacking perfect knowledge to prevent them 
from deception. Therefore, since Adam and Eve were the infants in heaven "calling forth 
God's compassion on account of their weakness and vulnerability, " the deceiver easily 
deceived them. 246 According to Irenaeus, the purpose of Jesus' suffering also lies here. 
"In order that man might be able to receive Him, "247 Christ struggled and suffered like 
any other person even though he was perfect. 
243 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 290. 
244 Irenaeus, Proof of the Apostelft Preaching, ch. 12. See Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 218, n. 4. 
241 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 3.20.1. 
246 Irenaeus, Proofs of the Apostolic Preaching, ch. 12 as quoted in Hick, Evil and the Love of God, 218. 
247 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 4.38.2. 
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In another passage, Irenaeus describes the spiritual growth of humankind in this 
world in Trinitarian terms. The Father arranges everything and gives the commands, the 
Son executes the plans, and the Spirit elaborates what is created. The responsibility of 
human person here is to seek perfection so that he or she may come closer to God and 
become immortal. Irenaeus elaborates, 
"Now it was necessary that man should in the first instance be created; and 
having been created, should receive growth; and having received growth, 
should be strengthened; and having been strengthened, should abound; and 
having abounded, should recover [from the disease of sin]; and having 
recovered, should be glorified; and being glorified, should see his Lord. s248 
Therefore, human beings are expected to make right choices between good and 
evil, right and wrong, righteousness and wickedness in order to receive the likeness of 
God. To fulfil this divine purpose, Irenaeus believed that the world with its evils and 
goods was a divinely arranged environment providing the means for human spiritual 
maturity. In addition, human beings were equipped with the faculty of knowing good and 
evil 249 However we distinguish sweet from bitter with our sense of taste, in the same way 
the mind recognises good and evil. If this recognition leads the person to accept the 
former and renounce the latter, that individual is in the right direction towards the 
likeness of God. In order to make correct choices, human beings must have faith in God 
244 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 4.38.3. 
249 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 4.39.1. 
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offering to Him their hearts in pure state. In Irenaeus' words, "by preserving the 
framework thou shalt ascend to that which is perfect "u° 
Thus, Irenaeus' account of evil is original in the sense that it is different from 
Augustine's approach, and that it was, as Hick remarks, "the first great Christian 
theologian to think at all systematically along these lines. s251 Although it has not been so 
comprehensive and popular as the latter has, Irenaeus' approach represents another type 
of justification of God in the face of evil within Christian tradition. While Augustine 
views that the first human beings were created in a perfect fashion and then they sinned 
and fallen into the world as their punishment, Irenaeus holds that God purposefully made 
human beings in his "image, " immature like infants so that they can grow into His 
likeness. Accordingly, adversities, afflictions and sufferings in the world are not 
punishment for the Original Sin committed by Adam and Eve, but divinely arranged 
means for the fulfilment of God's plan for humankind. 
Following his predecessor Irenaeus, 252 Clement of Alexandria (150? -215? ), too, 
thinks of human being as the `image' and `likeness' of God. The latter thought that Adam 
was created in the image of God since he was bestowed with the intellectual and physical 
faculties. However, he was not the likeness of God since he was short of virtue u3 In fact, 
he was a child of God, a divine creation. Accordingly, Adam's sin was "a childish 
2-10 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 4.39.2. 
231 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 221. 
uZ W. E. G. Floyd notes that Clement drew this interpretation from religious and philosophical speculations 
before himself. Irenaeus was one of them. See, Floyd, Clement ofAlexandria's Treatment of the Problem of 
Evil, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 51. 
253 Clement, Str. 6.96 in Floyd, Clement ofAlexandria's Treatment of the Problem of Evil, 45-6. 
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blunder" because of his imperfection and infancy rather than "an adult crime" caused by 
ill will. Clement, further, held that the Original Sin and the Fall made the child-Adam 
abandon his immature ways and attain adulthood. 2M However, Clement does not go 
further than that and does not offer any new answer to the problem of evil. 
The Irenaean Theodicy could not find a fertile soil to develop even in the 
Eastern Orthodox thought in contrast to the Augustinian Theodicy until the nineteenth 
century. The influence of Augustine was overwhelming in the Western Christianity. The 
Irenaean themes made a comeback in the writings of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768- 
1834), the father of modem theology. F. R Tennant (1866-1957), and, most importantly, 
John Hick are, among others, the theologians and philosophers that Irenaean approach is 
traceable. I shall explore Schleiermacher's and Tennant's treatment of evil here. John 
Hick's Soul-Making Theodicy will be explored in the chapter on the modem Christian 
theodicies because of Hick's comprehensive and unique formulation of the Irenaean 
approach to evil. Let us now turn to Schleiermacher's approach to the problem of evil. 
Schleiermacher's treatment of the problem of evil stems out of his views on the 
nature of religion, particularly Christianity, God, and redemption. In his influential book 
the Christian Faith Schleiermacher describes religion as "the pious self-consciousness. " 
The basis of this religious consciousness is neither reason nor morality, but of "the 
feeling of absolute dependence. "235 This is a feeling in relation to outward as well as 
inward world of individuals. 
254 Protr. 111.1, Floyd, Clement ofAlexandria's Treatment of the Problem of Evil, 51. 
255 Keith W. Clements, F. Schleiermacher: Pioneer of Modern Theology, Selected Texts (London: Collins, 
1987), 103-4. 
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This is because "the entire system of nature, comprehending all times and 
spaces, is, " according to Schleiermacher, "grounded in the divine causality. "256 
Therefore, the consciousness of absolute dependence means the consciousness of 
everything actual in nature including evil as well as good. In this sense, all things are 
valuable for a Christian as long as they contribute to his or her feeling of absolute 
dependence on God. In Schleiermacher's words, "To a pious mind, religion makes 
everything holy and valuable, even unholiness and commonness itself. "257 
According to Schleiermacher, sin is the only intrinsically evil phenomenon for it 
obstructs human development of the God-consciousness. Sin is regarded as the cause 
behind all evils, natural as well as moral. Although Schleiermacher adapts the 
Augustinian theme of evil as limitation of good, 258 he believes that it is not a conclusive 
solution to the problem of evil. Because he is well aware that "the limitation as well as 
impartation can be grounded in the same divine will. "259 Moreover, Schleiermacher 
ascribes sin to God "only as related to redemption. , 260 That is to say, God has ordained 
sin to play its part in the process of human redemption. 
Schleiermacher, in contrast to Augustine, does not consider human history in 
terms of fall into and then rise from sin. Historical character of humanity from religious 
standpoint is one of gradual growth from very limited self-consciousness to the 
2M F. Schleiermacher, the Christian Faith, 54,211 quoted in Adams, "Schleiermacher on Evil, " Faith and 
Philosophy, 13, no. 4 October 1994,577. 
17 Schleiermacher, On Religion, as quoted in Adams, "Schleiermacher on Evil, " Faith and Philosophy, 13, 
no. 4, October 1996,577. 
23' He says, "in relation to God evil is not" as quoted in Adams, "Schleiermacher on Evil, 569. 
219 Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 81.1,332; Adams, "Schleiermacher on Evil, " 569. 
20 Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 802,328; Adams, "Schleiermacher on Evil, " 570. 
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continuous consciousness of God. Connected with this Irenaean theme, Schleiermacher, 
as John Hick points'261 appears to follow Irenaeus' theory of two-stage creation of human 
beings. While Irenaeus sees humankind growing from the "image of God" towards the 
"likeness of God, " Schleiermacher uses the terminology of "the first" and "the second 
Adam. " The latter maintains that the perfect God-consciousness that potentially existed in 
the first Adam has reached actuality in the second Adam, namely, Jesus Christ. 
Schleiermacher connects this theme with Jesus' salvific mission. Christ brings 
humankind into a state of God-consciousness with himself through his redemptive work. 
Furthermore, Schleiermacher rejects the Augustinian idea, which later appears in 
Calvin's theology as well, of divine predestination of some to heavenly bliss, some to 
eternal damnation. It is his strong feeling that Christ's redeeming work will eventually 
save all human beings without exception. In his own words, "through the power of 
redemption there will one day be a universal restoration of all souls. "262 Consequently, 
Schleiermacher's theology contains the main features of the Irenaean Theodicy. That is 
the gradual human growth from an undeveloped state towards a perfect God- 
consciousness regardless whether the individual is a Christian or not. 
F. R. Tennant, a modem natural theologian, offers a nineteenth-century version 
of the Irenaean Theodicy to the problem of evil. He offers a teleological theodicy for 
moral evil as well as for natural evils of the world. Ninian Smart, a contemporary British 
scholar of religion, sees Tennant's treatment of the problem of evil as an attempt to 
Z6' John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 240. 
262 Schleiermacher, the Christian Faith, 722; Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 241. 
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defend Christian faith in the face of the evolutionary theory. 263 Tennant's beginning point 
of the problem of moral evil is his conception of human being still in the process of 
creation. He rejects Augustine's interpretation of Adam ad Eve, who were created finitely 
perfect and then fell into a sinful state disobeying God's prohibition. Tennant's reason for 
the rejection is that moral goodness is not something that can be created by God; but it is 
the acquisition of human free-will. Tennant writes, "We cannot imagine a living world, in 
which truly ethical values are to be actualized, save as an evolutionary cosmos in which 
free agents live and learn, make choices and build characters. t9264 
Therefore, freedom to choose is, to Tennant, an essential character of the 
ongoing process of human creation. This is also the basis of Tennant's attempt at a 
theodicy in respect of moral evil. The hypothetical case of lack of free-will reduces 
human beings into sentient robots ripping them of their moral quality. 265 This is not a 
better world than we live in now. Tennant writes, "To preclude moral evil would be to 
preclude moral goodness, to do evil, to prefer a worse to a better world. i266 He believes 
that good will eventually prevail over evil even though the latter may not vanish 
permanently. For Tennant the last point, that is, the extinction of moral evil finally, is 
"irrelevant to theodicy. "267 Hick criticises Tennant "with a lack of thoroughness and 
263 N. Smart, Philosophers and Religious Truth, second edition (London: SCM Press, 1969), 139. 
264 F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 130), 2,185. 
265 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, 2,188. 
266 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, 2,191. 
267 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, 2,197. 
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consistency in working out the basic principle of teleological theodicy. "268 According to 
this principle, good will be eventually brought out of evil. 
The teleological thinking of the nineteenth-century is reflected in Tennant's 
treatment of the problem of natural evil as well. Following Irenaean approach to evil, 
Tennant argues that human suffering in the world is "a necessary by-product of an order 
of things requisite for the emergence of the higher goods, " and animal pain is "an 
essential instrument to organic evolution, or both. 99269 If the purpose of the evolutionary 
process is the moral goodness of humankind, then, Tennant states, "the reign of law is 
sine qua non. "270 Since natural evils arise out of the law and regularity of the world, that 
does not mean that they are absolute evils, but "they are good for good. s271 Therefore, 
natural evils are "accompaniments or by-product of the world order"272 designed to 
develop moral character of human beings. In spite of its tentativeness, Tennant points out 
the possibility of life after death. Even though this idea is not so important for his 
theodicy, Tennant, nevertheless, contends that the earthly life "cannot safely be regarded 
as realising a divine purpose unless man's life continues after death. s273 John Hick 
charges Tennant with ignoring the idea of life after death, which is, for Hick, "absolutely 
essential for the theodicy that he has offered. 99274 Furthermore, Hick does not regard 
269 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 252-3. 
269 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, 2,198. 
270 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, 2,199-200. 
271 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, 2,201-202. 
m Tennant, Philosophical Theology, 2,204. 
273 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, 2,272. 
274 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 255. 
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Tennant's answer to evil as "a distinctively Christian theodicy" for he does not mention 
the significance of Christ's life and death in respect of the problem of evil. 
To sum up, the Irenaean approach regards the Augustinian interpretation of the 
human Fall as a myth. That is to say, there was no human being in "original 
righteousness" before the so-called "original sin. " In fact, the first humans were infants 
developing into maturity. The biblical story of the Fall, for Irenaean theodicists, signifies 
a spiritual estrangement of the first human beings, who were in a childlike situation 
standing at the beginning of their long development. It was not considered as a dramatic 
event ruining the whole humankind; but it was a stage in the long process of human 
spiritual growth. In that sense, the Fall is thought to be a human stumble in the way to 
divine likeness. 
The Irenaean approach considers the evils of the world as necessary means of 
the growing process through which human beings can develop high moral and spiritual 
qualities. In order to receive the likeness of God, human beings must choose good against 
evil, right against wrong, and so on. As the world has been designed with the necessary 
means for that purpose, humankind, too, has been provided with the faculty of 
distinguishing good from evil. In addition, God's grace has been manifested to human 
race in Jesus' suffering and death "in order that man might be able to receive Him. "275 
This is the meaning of redemption. Consequently, the Irenaean Theodicy affirms that evil 
is a necessary instrument for human spiritual development from the image of God to the 
275 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 4.38.2. 
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likeness. From Schleiermacher onwards, Irenaean theologians seem to be tending towards 
a universal salvation of humankind eventually. 
On the other hand, some Irenaean thinkers have been criticised for their 
contention that evil has a positive role in human spiritual development. Among the critics 
is the Swiss theologian Karl Barth (1886-1968). Barth protests against Schleiermacher's 
what he calls "positive" conception of sin. Barth writes, "When sin is understood 
positively, ... 
it is not real sin. For real sin cannot be vindicated in this way. We cannot say 
of it that it is in any sense necessary to a stage of human existence and therefore willed 
and posited by God. "276 Hick responds to Barth's criticism arguing that sin is evil; but 
that should not be exaggerated so as to create a "final dualism, " on the one hand God, on 
the other a negative power. He writes, "Ultimately God alone is sovereign, and evil can 
exist only by his permission. "277 Then the only option left is that God allowed evil for a 
good purpose since God cannot be thought to be evil. 
The Irenaean approach to evil and suffering seems to be more realistic than the 
Augustinian Theodicy. It is urged that the Irenaean Theodicy, in contrast to the 
Augustinian one, does not fall into the dilemmas of predestination and free-will, God's 
goodness and eternal damnation. Moreover, the former is a future oriented theodicy while 
the latter is relying into the past. In that sense, the Augustinian approach to evil has not 
showed much difference from Augustine's formulation down to its modern types. On the 
other hand, the Irenaean position appears to be dynamic and taking on board of recent 
276 Karl Barth, Types of Modern Theology, (London: Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1937), 84 as quoted in Hick, Evil 
and the God of Love, 239. 
21 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 239. 
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developments in science such as Tenant's use of the evolutionary theory. Therefore, the 
Irenaean Theodicy seems to have a lot to say in the future. 
To sum up, the main characteristics of the Augustinian Theodicy are its 
description or identification of evil as the privation or defection of good, and its emphasis 
on the human Fall into the world due to the original sin they committed. The natural 
imperfections in the universe are explained in terms of aesthetic conception of evil and 
the principle of plenitude. The creation is good with its variety and gradation. However, 
this goodness cannot reach divine perfection since the creation is dependent on God. 
Later Leibniz calls this intrinsic finitude of the creation "metaphysical evil, " which will 
cause serious problems. The cause of sin is seen in the misuse of human free-will. 
Therefore, God is not responsible for the consequences of human freedom. God adjusts 
this imbalance by inflicting punishment on the sinner. On the other hand, God consigns 
some human beings to eternal damnation, some to heaven with His grace. According to 
Calvin's doctrine of predestination, God foreordains the eternal destiny of every human 
individual in terms of heaven or hell even before their creation. 
The Augustinian Theodicy has been an influential approach to evil in Christian 
tradition. Today it is common mainly among the defenders of the Free-Will Defence and 
of the Best-Possible-World Theodicy. Perhaps the employment of free-will theme in 
explaining moral evil can be seen to a certain extent a positive contribution of the 
Augustinian Theodicy. On the other hand, the views of predestination and of the original 
sin particularly seem to overshadow this contribution and damage its significance causing 
weighty problems. Additionally, its nature of past-centredness seems to be a stumbling 
block in front of the future of the Augustinian Theodicy. In the chapter of modern 
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Christian theodicies and defences, I shall explore the contemporary state of the 
Augustinian Theodicy. 
The Irenaean Theodicy affirms that this is a purposeful world designed by God 
so that human beings can build spiritual qualities towards the "likeness of God. " In this 
context, evil is the means of this process. To achieve this aim, human beings must find 
their way making good and right choices. However, God does not leave humankind alone 
in their struggle. God's grace has been manifested to humanity in the suffering and death 
of Jesus so that human beings could receive Him. Furthermore, Irenaean theologians 
from Schleiermacher onwards tend to believe that humanity as a whole will eventually be 
Saved. 
2. The Modern Theodicies 
a. Process Theodicy 
Process Theodicy, along with The Soul-Making Theodicy, has emerged in 
modern times as an important alternative to the Augustinian approach to the problem of 
evil. It is essentially grounded on the writings of the British process philosopher A. N. 
Whitehead (1861-1947) and his follower Charles Hartshorne (1897-). Although they did 
not construct a full-fledged theodicy, their writings inspired the subsequent process 
thinkers such as David Griffin (1939-), John Cobb, and Lewis S. Ford. The distinctive 
assertion of Process Theodicy is that God has no "coercive" power to prevent evil. 
Therefore, he cannot be blamed for something over which he has no power. 
Process theologians and philosophers argue that the reality of evil in the world is 
not a threat to the existence of God at all. Evil is a problem only for traditional or 
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classical theism. Charles Hartshorne, a fervent defender of the ontological argument, 
asserts that a posteriori and contingent truth "evil exists" does not disprove of a priori 
and necessary truth "God exists. " God's existence of is a logical problem. His existence is 
either logically necessary or logically impossible. In either case, the problem of evil is, 
for Hartshorne, "a mistake, a pseudoproblem. "278 For process philosophers, the problem 
of evil arises out of the so-called inadequate traditional concept of God. When it is 
replaced with dipolar deity of process theology, the problem of evil will then be evaded. 
Process notion of bipolar deity indicates that God has two natures; one is the 
"primordial nature, " the other is the "consequent nature; " or as Hartshorne prefers to call, 
the "abstract side" and the "concrete side" respectively. According to this "dual 
transcendence, " if we may use Hartshorne's phrase, the former is God's constant and 
unchanging side, which includes all the possibilities that the creation could possibly 
shape. The latter, on the other hand, is his changeable side, which is within the actualised 
creation. Hartshorne argues that this is not illogical "for its a logical truism that S is P and 
P is not S can be consistent if they apply to A in different respects or aspects. i279 
Therefore, God in one of His nature is in process in accordance with the happenings in 
the world. In a similar fashion, the creation is in the process of "becoming" rather than of 
278 C. Hartshorne, "A New Look at the Problem of Evil, " in F. C. Dommeyer, (ed. ), Current Philosophical 
Issues: Essays in Honour of C. J. Ducasse (Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1966), 202. See also Hartshorne, 
Creative Synthesis and Philosophical Method (London: SCM, 1970), 258. 
279 Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Revolutionary Concept of Prehension, " in International Philosophical 
Quarterly, 19 (1979), 261-2. 
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"being. " Because the creation of finite creatures is not complete, but is still changing and 
developing. 280 
David Griffin, one of the foremost and influential process theodicists, argues 
that Process Theodicy "dissolves the problem of evil by denying the doctrine of 
omnipotence. 99291 To deny divine omnipotence, the process theologian denies the creation 
ex nihilo, the creation out of nothing. He did not create the universe out of nothing; but he 
did, as the theory of evolution suggests, mould the creation from a "pre-existing chaos, " 
and the creation is still continuing. As Griffin points out, the process God is very similar 
to Plato's Demiurge in the Timaeus who works with "elements of necessity" and creates 
as good a world as possible out of the chaos282 The existence of pre-existing chaos 
suggests that God worked with limited pre-existing actualities in bringing about the 
world. In this sense, process theologians, as distinct from some traditional theists, affirm 
that God did not give up his power for a purpose, but he is "essentially" limited. That is 
to say, the essential limitation is, contrary to the traditional theist's claim, not a 
consequence of God's will, but it is in God's nature. In Griffin's own words, "there might 
be some eternal, uncreated, necessary principles (beyond purely logical truths) about the 
way these actualities can be ordered which limit the sorts of situations that are really 
280 Michael Peterson et al., Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 109-10. 
281 David R. Griffin, "Creation Out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil, " in Stephen T. Davis (ed. ), 
Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994), 105. 
2U David R Griffin, "Creation Out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil, " 101-2. 
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possible. "283 Therefore, God does not hold the whole power but shares it with eternal 
actualities. Consequently, he cannot be responsible for the way things are in the universe. 
The limitedness of God's power is not confined to the creation of the world out 
of chaos only. The process theologian contends that God is not in complete control of 
what is going on in the world as well. He has no "monopoly on power. " Finite creatures 
share power with God in bringing about some state of affairs themselves and in 
influencing other creatures in the same way. 284 In order to explain this, process 
theologians often make distinction between "coercive" and "persuasive" power. While 
divine coercive power suggests that God can do anything he wishes, his persuasive power 
seeks to bring about desired end states by persuading free agents. In this sense, God's 
creative power is not coercive but persuasive. He actualises possibilities by persuading 
actualities through a long evolutionary process. This is also the basis of process version 
of the Free-Will Defence. 
The solution of process theology to the problems of both moral evil and natural 
evil is based on the same principle. That is, all creatures, human and non-human or 
animate and non-animate, have certain degree of "creative power" along with God's 
power. As Michael Peterson points out, * "Process thinkers typically speak of this 
creaturely power in terms of 'freedom. m285 In addition, they extend this creative power or 
the power of self-determination to all creatures. In Griffin's words, "the beings making 
up our world, including the most primitive ones (such as quarks and electrons) are 
283 Griffin, "Creation Out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil, " 104-5. 
2` Griffin, "Creation Out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil, " 105. 
215 Michael Peterson et al., Reason and Religious Belief 110. 
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contingent. "286 Although the present form of the world is the product of God's "creative 
providential activity, " every single creature, non-human as well as human, has a certain 
degree of power independent of God to cause some state of affairs. 
In Process Theodicy, as perhaps different from other Free-Will Defences, God 
does not concern with promoting freedom. Instead, "creatures with more and more 
freedom are evoked because increased freedom is part and parcel of the increased 
enjoyment. "287 This is a metaphysical principle intrinsic to the nature of the creation. The 
greater freedom brings along the possibility of greater enjoyments. On the other hand, 
greater enjoyments become possible only with the possibility of greater evils. Griffm 
explains, "A world with creatures such as Moses, Jeremiah, Jesus... is simply not possible 
without the possibility of... beings who would seek to destroy the entire Jewish population 
in Europe. "288 God is not able to coerce creatures to prevent such evils occur. He could 
only try to persuade creatures not to commit evil actions. The creature is free to follow or 
not to follow divine persuasion. Therefore, the relation between God's persuasive power 
and other creatures' power is one of mutual dependence. For God's power is not 
"coercive" as he is not able to force anything from outside. 
God has only "persuasive" power to urge his creatures to choose good and avoid 
evil. Either creatures are persuaded and follow God's wish or they bring about what they 
desire. "Accordingly, " John Cobb and David Griffin write, "the divine creative activity 
2ý Griffin, "Creation Out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil, " 105. 
2E7 David R. Griffin, "Process Theodicy, Christology, and the Imitatio Dei, " in Sandra B. Lubarsky and 
David Ray Griffin (eds. ), Jewish Theology and Process Thought (Albany, New York: State University of 
New York Press, 1996), 102. 
283 Griffin, "Process Theodicy, Christology, and the Imitatio Dei, " 103. 
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involves risk. The obvious point is that, since God is not in complete control of the events 
of the world, the occurrence of genuine evil is not incompatible with God's beneficence 
towards all his creatures. "289 What is "genuine evil"? Griffin describes "genuine evil" as 
"anything that makes the world worse than it could have otherwise been. s290 
Griffin affirms that God is responsible for evil in the world in the sense that if 
His persuasive power had not created animate as well as inanimate organisms, there 
would not be any suffering in the world. However, Griffin believes that this does not 
mean that God is blameworthy for the evils in the world. Both good and evil exists 
intrinsically in every state of affairs. God always seeks persuasively the best possible 
good in each state of affair, but cannot force it. 
If a lesser good or an evil state of affair emerges as a result, it is the failure of the 
creature's misuse or inadequate use of power. God is morally good because he seeks to 
bring about less evil and greater good. God would have been blameworthy if he had 
"failed to bring forth beings capable of experiencing significant value when this was 
possible. "291 Since God is not able to intervene in human history, he cannot be indicted 
for the evils occurring in the world. 
To sum up, Process Theodicy is largely based on the denial of divine 
omnipotence of classical theism. God has no monopoly on power. Other creatures, non- 
humans as well as humans, share power with God. They are able to bring about states of 
289 John Cobb and David Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition (Belfast: Christian 
Journals Ltd., 1977), 53. 
290 Griffin, "Creation Out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil, " 103. 
ý' Griffin, "Creation Out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil, " 110. 
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affairs independently from God and to influence other creatures to do so. God has only 
persuasive power by which he seeks to persuade creatures to adopt certain course of 
actions, which is purely good. However, he is not able to bring about a state of affairs by 
forcing a creature against its wish. In this context, natural as well as moral evil, then, are 
negative actions of creatures, which are beyond God's control. Therefore, he is not to be 
blamed for the evils of the world. 
Process Theodicy has been one of the most discussed responses to the problem 
of evil in recent years. These discussions have turned around and brought about a 
considerable number of objections to process approach to evil. I shall discuss here some 
of what I consider the significant ones. John Hick, for instance, denies that Process 
Theodicy offers a solution to the problem of evil. He asserts that the problem is no more 
the discrepancy between the existence of omnipotent, omniscient and good God and the 
occurrence of evil. It is the limitedness of God with "eternal material. " God, then, Hick 
writes, "exists in ultimate duality with an alien realm which partially thwarts the divine 
goodness. 9)292 Consequently, the process conception of God, who is limited in power and 
goodness, becomes the problem itself. 
Griffin, in response, says that the process God is "limited" and "finite in the 
sense that he is not the only reality. There are other beings possessing creative power that 
God cannot totally control. However, "My God is, " Griffin writes, "not finite or limited if 
m john Hick, "Critique by John Hick, " in Stephen T. Davis (ed. ), Encountering Evil, 122. 
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this means that God's power is imperfect in comparison with that of some other 
conceivable deity. "293 In this sense, God has all the power possible for a deity. 
Therefore, for the process theologian God is more powerful than any other 
creature, but he is not the only powerful being. Is the process God really more powerful 
than other creatures? We observe in our life that human beings prevent many evils to 
occur, heal a great deal of suffering, of animal as well as human, and so on. Most 
strikingly perhaps, it was human beings who managed to stop Hitler from exterminating 
the European Jews. Does this not mean that human creative power surpasses God's 
power? 
The objections to Process Theodicy is largely associated with the process 
conception of God. Christian theologians and philosophers object that God is limited in 
power. 294 For example, Mark W. Worthing, a Christian theologian, criticises the process 
conception of God saying that "God... is maintained by Christian theology to be the 
conductor of the final act (if indeed our universe has a final act), not just a spectator with 
better than average chances of finding a way to survive the consummation of the 
universe °'295 Similar charges against Process Theodicy are not rare in the literature of the 
philosophy of religion. 
In the light of modem biblical scholarship, and with the authority of being a 
Christian theologian by profession, Griffin responds to these kinds of criticisms saying 
293 Griffin, "Response to Critics, " in Davis (ed. ), Encountering Evil, 133. 
'94 See, for instance, J. Hick, "Critique, " F. Sontag, "Critique, " and S. T. Davis, "Critique, " in S. T. Davis 
(ed. ), Encountering Evil, 122-8. 
2" Mark W. Worthing, Worthing, Goa Creation, and Contemporary Physics, 196. 
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that the Bible is not the word of God in the sense that he revealed it to certain human 
beings word by word. It is an account of human conception of God within certain 
historical context. Therefore, that biblical account of God is not conclusive, but 
"ambiguous. "2% 
In support of this claim, Griffin argues that the Christian creeds, including the 
belief in the Trinity, formulated in subsequent years are nothing but a "fallible" human 
endeavour. In this sense, a process theologian is not compelled to follow his or her 
predecessors' interpretation. The theologian, too, must attempt to understand God in the 
light of modem developments in knowledge. This is what process theology and theodicy 
is all about. Therefore, this charge brought about against process God is not a viable 
charge. 
Furthermore, Process Theodicy has been criticised for lacking an eschatological 
dimension as well. The suffering of the innocent and the prosperity of the wicked in this 
life seem to require some sort of life after death in which good will prevail. That is a 
future hope providing a personal meaning in one's life and a certain amount of assurance 
that the future will be far better than this life. Yet, as Nancy Frankenberry states, in 
process thinking, "the basis for hope seems to amount to nothing more than the notion 
that new possibilities are always being offered and that sheer drift is avoided. v)297 
Although process theology affirms a weak sense of immortality, that is, everything will 
live in God's mind, this does not seem to provide the future hope that the sufferer needs. 
296 Griffin, "Creation Out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil, " 102. 
297 Nancy Frankernberry, "Some Problems in Process Theodicy, " Religious Studies, 17 (1981), 194. 
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The last criticism to bring up, it has been argued that the process God is not 
worthy of worship since he is not powerful and good enough to prevent evils. Classical 
theist philosophers and theologians generally see a close relationship between 
worshipworthiness of God and divine omnipotence. If God lacks power to bring about 
what he wishes best or to prevent evil, then he is not worshipworthy. Reichenbach 
maintains, "A being which is finite in power cannot merit worship. " He also writes, "A 
being which merits worship must be omnipotent"298 Therefore, if there is such a God 
with limited power and there is no afterlife, then what is the purpose in worshipping him? 
In conclusion, I believe that Process Theodicy does not succeed solving the 
problem of evil. Although the process theologian's conception of the world as an arena of 
struggle, challenge and human role in determining the future of the world is novel, the 
same novelty cannot be shown in dealing with the problem of evil. The process 
theologians only jettison omnipotence to get rid of the atheistic argument from evil. 
However, this leads us to a more serious problem such as duality of God and pre-existent 
element, God's limitedness in power and goodness, and annihilation of humankind. 
b. The Free-Will Defence 
The Free-Will Defence is one of the enduring and effective answers to the 
problem of evil. It still enjoys a substantial support in contemporary Christian theology as 
well as philosophy. The writings of Augustine are often seen as the philosophical origin 
of Free-Will Explanation in Christian tradition. Among the contemporary defenders of 
the Free-Will Defence are Stephen T. Davis, G. Stanley Kane, and Alvin Plantinga 
2" Reichenbach, Evil and A Good God, 188. 
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(1932-). In addition, most of the theistic theodicies today such as The Soul-Making 
Theodicy and The Natural Law Theodicy seem to resort to a version of Free-Will 
Explanation especially as a response to the problem of moral evil. Barry L. Whitney 
states, "There is, as far as I can ascertain, no explanation for moral evil other than that of 
the misuse of human free will "299 However, it would be wrong to talk about a single 
form of Free-Will Defence since it shows some differences from philosopher to 
philosopher and theologian to theologian. Here I shall mainly focus on Plantinga's 
formulation of Free-Will Defence as one of the most widely discussed version. 
Plantinga's objective is to develop a "defence" from free-will in order to rebut 
the atheist's logical argument from evil against the existence of God. H. J. McCloskey 
(1925-), for instance, states the atheological argument from evil in a logical form. He 
argues, "Evil is a problem for the theist in that a contradiction is involved in the fact of 
evil, on the one hand, and the belief in the omnipotence and perfection of God on the 
other. "300 J. L. Mackie (1917-1981) also argues for the logical inconsistency in theistic 
doctrines. Mackie writes, "religious beliefs lack rational support.. the several parts of the 
essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another. 001 Therefore, the 
problem of evil is a crucial argument in pointing to the inconsistency of the belief in God. 
Plantinga attempts to demonstrate that the two propositions that there is 
omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good God and that there is evil, are logically 
consistent. He contends that a third proposition is required for the purpose that these two 
299 Barry L. Whitney, Theodicy (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1993), 16. 
300 H. J. McCloskey, "God and Evil, " Philosophical Quarterly, 10 (1960), 97. 
301 J. L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence, " Mind, 64 (1955), 200. 
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propositions are in fact consistent with each other. It does not need to be that the third 
proposition must be "true" or "plausible. 9002 Because this is the responsibility of the 
theodicist, not of the defender. The latter's task is only to find a logically possible third 
proposition that is consistent with God's existence and entailing the reality of evil. The 
third proposition and the backbone of Free-Will Defence Plantings offers, is that it is 
logically impossible for God to create a world with free creatures that contains moral 
good without at least one moral evil. 303 Therefore, moral evil is necessary if there are to 
be free moral beings and moral good. 
Plantinga first attempts to show that that some creatures have free-will is a 
logical possibility. Following this line of logical possibility, he seems to seek to avoid the 
objection whether humans are free in its full sense. Hence, he does not embark on 
proving that human beings are free agents; but he points that human freedom is logically 
possible. He explains, 
"If a person S is free with respect to a given actions, then he is free to perform 
that action and free to refrain; no causal laws and antecedent conditions 
determine either that he will perform the action, or that he will not. It is within 
his power, at the same time in question, to perform the action, and within his 
power to refrain. s304 
302 Alvin Plantinga, God Freedom and Evil (London: Goerge Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975), 28; and 
Plantinga, The Nature ofNecessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 165 
303 Plantinga, God Freedom and Evil, 29; The Nature of Necessity, 167; God and Other Minds, second 
printing (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1969), 132. 
304 Plantings, The Nature ofNecessity, 165-6. 
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Therefore, it is logically possible that a free agent is able to decide between right and 
wrong, good and bad, beneficial and harmful and so on. 
The Free-Will Defence takes two forms in accordance with the kind of evil it is 
dealing with. The first form of the argument offers a solution to the problem of moral 
305 
evil, which designates ill human behaviours such as Hitler's execution of the Jews. 
Plantings argues that moral evils such as adultery, theft, murder are human actions 
brought about by human free decisions. A person has a choice to steal or not; but he or 
she opts for stealing. God who foreknows with certainty what humans will choose and 
bring about or refrain in the future, and who is omnipotent, would have determined the 
person not to steal before the creation, or intervened and prevented him or her from 
stealing. This would rupture the human condition of free-will. Human beings would not 
be meaningfully free. They would not have a choice to do moral evil, but to obey God. In 
any possible world, that is, in any "state of affairs" God could have actualised, 306 he 
could not bring about something logically impossible. Although, God's omniscience has 
foreknowledge of future human choices, he is not able to create free creatures and, at the 
same time, determine their choices and actions. 
Moreover, Plantinga contends, "A world containing creatures who are 
sometimes significantly free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more 
valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. 99307 
Consequently, the creation of free agents capable of moral good necessarily involves free 
305 pInting , The Nature ofNecessity, 166. 
3°6 Plantinga, God Freedom and Evil, 34. 
307 plantings, The Nature of Necessity, 166. 
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agents' being capable of doing moral evil as well. In order to make room for free-will, 
God limits his power despite his knowledge as to what a person will choose. Therefore, it 
is logically impossible for God to create free beings that always choose good. 
The second form of Plantinga's defence is offered to explain natural evils in the 
world. Human free-will cannot be the cause of such natural calamities as earthquakes, 
droughts, and floods. Our knowledge is that these kinds of phenomena occur 
independently from human involvement. Plantinga extends the Free-Will Defence against 
moral evil to natural evil. Inspired from the Christian story of the Fall of the rebellious 
angels, which is pursued by Augustine as well, Plantinga, along with some others, 308 
attributes the source of natural evils to the fallen angels, namely, Satan and his cohorts. 
According to the traditional Christian doctrine, long before the creation of human beings, 
God created angels, which Satan was one of them. He revolted against God causing a 
great deal of natural disasters on earth such as earthquakes, fires and floods. Plantinga in 
his God, Freedom and Evil writes that it is possible that 
"natural evil is due to the free actions of nonhuman persons; there is a balance 
of good over evils with respect to the actions of these nonhuman persons; and 
it was not within the power of God to create a world that contains a more 
favourable balance of good over evil with respect to the actions of the 
nonhuman persons it contains. "" 
308 See, for instance, Stephen T. Davis, "Free Will and Evil, " 79, and C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain 
(London: Fount, 1977), 107. 
309 Plantings, God Freedom and Evil, 58. 
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The non-human persons that are responsible for natural evils are, following the 
Christian tradition, called "Satan and his cohorts. s9310 Consequently, Plantiga's Free-Will 
Defence affirms that free-will of humans and non-humans is the source of moral and 
natural evils. The philosopher reduces natural evil into a form of moral evil; and he calls 
both kinds of evil "broadly moral evil. 311 What is called natural evil from the 
perspective of destruction in nature is moral evil from the standpoint of the source of 
these evils. They are, it is argued, the ill actions of the devil. It ought to be noted here that 
Plantinga points out that "the Satan hypothesis" does not have to be true. "The Free Will 
Defender... need not assert that this is true; he says only that it is possible. 95312 
Consequently, it suffices to be logically possible that such demonic creatures cause 
natural evils. 
However, would not God have created a better possible world with less evil than 
this one? Would not he create less evil non-human creatures? According to Plantinga, it 
is logically possible that God could not have actualised a world with less evil or non- 
human creatures with less evil actions. "It is possible that, " Plantinga writes, "there is no 
world God could have created which contains a more favourable balance of good over 
evil with respect to the free activity of the non-human persons it contains. "313 
Moreover, a possible world containing free creatures that bring about good and 
evil, perhaps more good than evil, is more valuable than a possible world with non-free 
310 Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, 192; God and Other Minds, 149. 
311 plantings, The Nature ofNecessity, 193. 
32 plantinga, The Nature ofNecessity, 192. 
313 plantings, The Nature ofNecessity, 192. 
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creatures who are programmed to act properly only. In addition, God cannot create free 
beings that always do good. In order that there exist free creatures that bring about good, 
he must allow or not prevent the possibility of evil. Therefore, Pantinga concludes, "The 
fact that free creatures sometimes err, however, in no way tells against God's 
omnipotence or against His goodness; for He could forestall the occurrence of moral evil 
only by removing the possibility of moral good. "314 
Furthermore, Plantinga initially contends that "there is no good atheological 
argument from evil. 015 Later in his article "Epistemic Probability and Evil" he looks at 
the problem of evil from the major probabilistic perspectives and concludes, "we find 
little hope for the atheologian; on each of the current views of probability, the prospectus 
for an atheological argument from evil are at best bleak. "316 The Free-Will Defence 
shows that the reality of evil in the world does not constitute any logical problem against 
God's existence. In other words, the existence of God is compatible with evil. If there is 
any problem at all, it is not of philosophical but of religious or pastoral problem of evil. 
Plantinga concurs that the believer may have a "religious" problem in the face of personal 
suffering and disaster resulting with the failure to maintain belief in God. However, "this 
is a problem of a different dimension. Such a problem calls for pastoral rather than 
philosophical counsel. 9017 
314 Plantinga, God and Other Minds, 132. 
3u Plantings, The Nature ofNecessity, 195. 
316 Alvin Planfinga, "Epistemic Probability and Evil, " in Daniel Howard-Synder (ed. ), The Evidential 
Argument from Evil (Bloomington and Indianapolis, USA: Indiana University press, 1996), 93. 
317 plantings, The Nature ofNecessity, 195. 
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There have been several objections to Plantinga's Free-Will Defence in recent 
years. The atheist philosophers Antony Flew (1923-) and J. L. Mackie are among the 
foremost critics of Plantinga's Free-Will Defence. They argue that the omnipotent God 
must be able to actualise a possible world in which free agents always choose good with 
their free-will. According to this "compatibilist" critic, God, if he exists and if he is 
omnipotent, must be able to create a possible world containing free creatures who always 
choose right avoiding evil. John Mackie writes, "if there is no logical impossibility in a 
man's freely choosing the good on one, or on several, occasions, there cannot be a logical 
impossibility in his freely doing the good on every occasion. i318 Antony Flew adds, 
"if it is really logically possible for an action to be both freely chosen and yet 
fully determined by caused causes, then the keystone argument of the Free 
Will Defence, that there is contradiction in speaking of God so arranging the 
laws of nature that all men always as a matter of fact freely choose to do right, 
cannot hold. "319 
As a response to Flew and Mackie's charge, Plantinga appeals to the idea of 
what he calls "transworld depravity. " Accordingly, it is possible that every person is 
subject to some sort of depravity of doing freely wrong on at least one occasion in any 
possible world. Hence, free creatures are depraved in every possible world they exist. 
Plantinga concludes, "Under these conditions, God could have created a world containing 
38 John L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence, " Mind, 64, no. 254, (April 1955), 209. See also John L. 
Mackie, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1982), 164. 
31 Antony Flew, "Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom, " in A. Flew and A. Maclntyre (eds. ), New 
Essays in Philosophical Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955), 153. 
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no moral evil only by creating one without significantly free persons. "320 Since 
transworld depravity is logically coherent, then God, although he is omnipotent and 
omniscient, cannot possibly actualise a possible world containing free beings without 
evil. it seems that Kenneth Surin concurs with Plantings at this point. Surin writes, 
"Plantinga, it would seem, has succeeded in showing that an omnipotent, omniscient and 
morally perfect God will not necessarily prevent all evil. 9021 
On the other hand, John Hick questions the truth of Plantinga's response to the 
compatibilist objection, and he finds it unsuccessful. Contrary to Plantinga, Hick argues 
that "human freedom... does not occur in vacuum; it is always the freedom of a particular 
person endowed with a particular nature. "322 That is to say, "causal laws" and 
"antecedent conditions" play an important role in the formation of the person to be and of 
the use of his or her freedom. God could have created human beings with wholly good 
nature within a good environment so that they would always choose the good freely. In 
such a condition, humans would not suffer from transworld depravity; they would not 
choose evil. Hick further suggests that the proper response to the objection raised by the 
atheist such as Mackie and Flew is proposed by the Irenaean Theodicy. According to the 
Irenaean approach, moral evil is "an inevitable result of God's creation of man as an 
immature creature, at the beginning of a long process of moral and spiritual 
"3 development. 23 
320 Plantinga, The Nature ofNecessity, 189. 
321 Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, 73. 
322 John Hick, Evil and the God ofLove, second edition, 368. 
323 Hick, Evil and the God ofLove, second edition, 369. 
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I believe Hick has a point here. Although what Plantinga argues appears to be 
logically possible, it is not necessarily true. If God conditions human free-will with 
causal laws and antecedent conditions shaping the human action to proceed in this world, 
God could have equally created good human nature within a setting leading him or her 
always to choose right freely. However, it is not the case. Consequently, there are two 
possibilities. Either God, without any reason, wants human beings to commit evil and 
suffer the consequences or he has a purpose in creating humans in such a fashion and in 
designing the conditions in this way. Since a good God would not possibly want the 
former, Hick's theodicy seems to be more reasonable. 
Another significant criticism against Plantinga's Free-Will Defence, as against 
other theodicies and defences, is that the vast amount and diversity of evil in the world is 
inconsistent with the existence of a good and omnipotent God. The question simply is 
whether God could have created a possible world in which less evil than the existing one 
occurs. Plantings asserts that what is usually called the irregular distribution of evil and 
its enormity do not disprove theism, "provided there is no possible world God could have - 
created that contains a better balance of broadly moral good with respect to broadly moral 
evil. 
024 
If God wants to give significant freedom to humankind, they must be capable of 
bringing about the great goods along with the severe evils. In any possible world, the 
elimination of a bad state of affairs leads to the limitation of a greater good. Plantinga 
states, "an omnipotent and omniscient being could permit as much evil as he pleased, 
324 Plantinga, God Freedom and Evil, 63. 
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without... forfeiting his claim to omnibenevolence, so long as for every evil state of affairs 
he permits, there is a greater good. "325 Consequently, this world is such a possible world 
that there is a balance of good over evil as a whole. 
Moreover, the Free-Will Defence appears to lead to a series of problems. One is 
the possibility of the mass destruction of the whole creation by evil actions of free 
creatures. Surin states this view as follows, "It is logically possible... for human agents to 
exercise their freedom in ways that will ultimately frustrate God's design for his 
creation. 026 That will certainly result with outweighing of evil over good, which is, 
according to the free-will defender, a threat to the existence of God. If it is said that God 
would not allow that happen, has God a purpose in allowing or directing certain amount 
of evil in the world? Then he is responsible for the evil states of the world. 
As we have seen, excessive evil, both moral and natural, is, for Plantinga, not a 
threat to God's existence because evil does not outweigh good at the bottom of the line. 
The atheist presses on criticising this line of argumentation. Referring to Ivan 
Karamazov's protest to his brother Alyosha in Fyodor Dostoyevsky's (1821-1881) the 
Brothers Karamazov, Kenneth Surin writes, "it was (morally) unacceptable that any 
alleged good should be seen as recompense for a single tear of the innocent child who 
had been tortured. 9027 How could one weigh the total amount of good with the total 
amount of evil in the face of the suffering of an innocent child? 
323 Plantinga, God and Other Minds, 120. 
326 Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, 75-6. 
327 Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, 75. 
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Plantinga's response to this sort of objection can be seen in his dealing with the 
atheological proposition that "No case of severe, protracted, involuntary human pain is 
ever outweighed by any good state of affairs. "328 Plantinga takes this proposition as a 
value judgement and concludes that it is a matter of opinion, not an argument. While that 
proposition may provide the atheologian a reason not to believe that God exists, he 
cannot expect that the theist must follow his or her moral judgement. A distinctive 
characteristic of moral judgements such as this one is that "reasonable persons can and 
sometimes do disagree about them . 
029 Hence, this, according to Plantinga, is an 
"impasse" for both the atheist and the theist. 
Some Christian thinkers have criticised Plantinga's minimisation of evil, his 
overemphasis of human freedom and the remoteness of the free-will God to the Christian 
God. Robert Ackermann, a free-will defender himself, writes, "on Plantinga's creation 
account, evil has already been minimized in the actual world, and so the wholly good 
God would never have any reason to act again in the course of the actual world. "330 If evil 
is not so much significant as Plantinga argues, why did then God intervene in human 
history? The traditional Christian doctrine of the Incarnation of God in Jesus and the 
following events seem to lose its significance to a great extent. 
Kenneth Surin also criticises Plantinga with minimalism. Surin writes, 
"Plantinga's deity, in contrast [to the God of salvation], seems to have detached himself 
from the world and left its inhabitants to work out their own moral and spiritual 
328 Plantinga, God and Other Minds, 130. 
" Plantinga, God and Other Minds, 130. See, for a similar position, Hick, "An Irenaean Theodicy, " 44. 
330 RobertAcker "An Alternative Free Will Defence, " Religious Studies, 18 (1982), 369. 
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destinies. "331 Because there is no place in the Free-Will Defence to God who sustains 
human needs, concerns about their state of sinfulness and intervenes to reconcile them 
into himself. This appears to be a sound objection to Plantinga's Free-Will Defence. 
In conclusion, Plantinga argues that God is not responsible for the evils of the 
world. It is logically possible that God allows and does not prevent evil, moral as well 
natural, in order that there be free moral beings. He could not have actualised a world 
with less evil or free creatures, human as well non-human, with less evil actions. It is 
possible that a possible world containing free creatures that bring about good and evil, 
perhaps more good than evil, is more valuable than a possible world with non-free 
creatures who are programmed to act rightly. Therefore, the failure of free creatures at 
times cannot possibly be an argument against the existence of God. 
Overall, I think that Plantings seems to succeed showing that despite the claim 
of the atheological argument, there is no logical inconsistency between the reality of evil 
and the existence of God. As pointed out, this is only a logical solution to the problem of 
evil; that is, it is logically possible. However, he does not go further and explore whether 
what he argues is true, probable or plausible. Therefore, although "the logical problem 
has been laid to rest"332 the Free-Will Defence does not have much to say about the truth 
of what is argued. For instance, Plantinga cannot prove that there are such non-human 
creatures as Satan and his hosts, and they are responsible for the devastation in nature. 
331 Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, 76. 
332 Michael L. Peterson, "The Problem of Evil, " in Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro (eds. ), A 
Companion to Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 395. 
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He cannot substantiate his claim that human beings are completely free because 
the free-will defender is under no obligation to show the truth of what is logically 
possible. They are all logically possible. As Hick points out, "to establish this logical 
possibility is to leave the substantial problem as it was. 033 Consequently, I believe that it 
is a shortcoming of the Free-Will Defence to avoid from the attempts of explaining the 
facts of evil in the world, namely, the evidential problem of evil. Perhaps in this way the 
free-will defender thinks he or she avoids further criticisms, but the problems do not go 
away. he evidential problem of evil continues to challenge the existence of God. 
c. The Natural Law Theodicy 
The existence of natural evils such as earthquakes, floods, famine, and diseases 
has been a subject to a serious argument against the theistic concept of God. The theist 
argues that if there is an all-powerful and all-good God as the theistic faiths, Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam, proclaim, why are there natural evils as well as moral evil in the 
world causing a great deal of pain and suffering to humans and animals? Even if we 
assume that not God but humans are responsible for moral evil, is God not supposed to 
prevent or eliminate natural evils, at least some of them? In this context, the chief task of 
a theodicist is often seen as to give adequate reason to the questions "why a God might 
bring about some natural evil" and "why a God might bring about natural evil of the 
quantity and intensity which this world contains. s9334 
333 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, second edition, 371. 
334 Richard Swiburne, "Knowledge from Experience, and the Problem of Evil, " in W. J. Abraham and S. 
W. Holtzer (eds. ), The Rationality of Religious Belief (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 165. 
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The British philosopher of religion Richard Swinburne (1934-) and his 
American counterpart Bruce R. Reichenbach have separately developed two forms of The 
Natural Law Theodicy in order to justify physical or natural evils in the world. However, 
they are not the only responses to the problem of natural evil. For instance, process and 
soul-making theodicies along with Plantinga's Free-Will Defence include responses to 
the problem of natural evil. 
Nevertheless, the theodicies of Swinburne and Reichenbach have achieved a 
great prominence in recent discussions of the problem of natural evil. Both philosophers, 
as being the defenders of free-will, base their justification of natural evil on the concept 
of human freedom and of natural law. Swinburne's theodicy335 emphasises the need for 
natural evil in order to have "the choice of whether to acquire knowledge of the good and 
bad effects our actions, and indeed in order to allow us to have very well justified 
knowledge at all. "336 Reichenbach, on the other hand, contends that the possibility of 
natural evil is inherent in a natural world, which provides the conditions for human 
beings to become moral agents. 
To start with, Swinburne in his recent book Providence and the Problem of Evil 
argues that natural evil is needed in order for human beings to acquire "very well- 
justified knowledge. " This is the knowledge of the nature and consequences of human 
actions such as suffering leading to compassion and sorrow for others and so on. Without 
"s Swinburne's conception of "theodicy" is closer to what Plantinga calls "defence. " While the latter 
means by "theodicy" an account of God's "actual" reasons for allowing or not preventing evil, Swinburne 
understands it as "an account of his [God's] possible reasons. " See R Swinburne, Providence and the 
Problem of Evil (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 15, n. 8. 
336 Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 178, n. 1. 
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the existence of natural processes, which are strictly deterministic in terms of cause- 
effect relationship, humans could not possibly know the results of their actions. If there 
were no suffering in the world, one would not have any idea about compassion towards 
sufferers or a need for solidarity at times of disasters. Therefore, natural processes are 
needed to produce bad as well as good states of affairs so that human beings can learn to 
make meaningful choices. Swinburne explains,. 
"while God might be able to give moderately well justified knowledge of the 
effects of our actions, good and bad, without too great a cost, he could not 
allow us to learn what the effects are, let alone to choose to seek such 
knowledge, without providing natural processes (in which humans are not 
involved) whereby those effects (good and bad) are produced in a regular 
way. 
»337 
Consequently, if human beings are to have the knowledge of the results of their actions, 
to make proper choices between good and evil, and to form character and improve the 
conditions in the world accordingly, natural evil is inevitable. God could not do it 
otherwise without impairing human freedom. 
Swinburne postulates certain criteria for a hypothesis to become a very well- 
justified knowledge. These are what Swinburne calls "true criteria" that determines what 
is evidential or probable hypothesis. He summarises some of these true criteria as 
follows: 
I" Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 179. 
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"First, a hypothesis is more likely to be true, in so far as it renders probable 
what we observe... Secondly, the probability given to a hypothesis by the fact 
that it makes it probable that we will observe what we do is diminished in so 
far as those observations are ones which are fairly probable anyway... Thirdly, 
a hypothesis is more likely to be true in so far as it is simple... Other important 
evidential criteria which I believe to be a priori include criteria for inferring to 
people's thoughts and feelings from the way they behave, and to their beliefs 
from what they say; and a criterion to the effect that ... we should believe what 
people tell us about what they themselves believe. "338 
Swinburne extends the scope of Free-Will Defence to the extent that it can also explain 
some natural evil as well as moral evil . 
339 Here comes to mind Plantinga's proposal of the 
actions of Satan and his hosts as the cause of natural evils. 340 
However, Swinburne rejects Plantinga's solution on theological, evidential and 
logical grounds. He, firstly, asserts that Plantinga's proposal is not theologically correct 
because the Christian tradition has not granted to "bad angels" any direct power to cause 
evil, but a limited influence to tempt human beings to wickedness. Secondly, it is 
evidentially objectionable for "there is not enough independent evidence" to support this 
claim. Finally, it is logically inconsistent because the bad choice and action of Satan 
presupposes the pre-existence of bad desires and options prior to Satan's temptation. 
I's Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 59-61. 
33' Richard Swinburne, Is There A God? (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 98. 
30 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature ofNecessity, 192. 
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Thus, the theory of Satan cannot explain the cause of natural evi1341 Instead, Swinburne 
maintains, "For humans to have a choice between doing good and doing bad, we need to 
have true beliefs about the effects of our actions, for the goodness or badness of an action 
"3 is so often a matter of it having good and bad effects. 42 
However, it is questionable that Swinburne is right in arguing that Christian 
theology does not ascribe to the devils a power to cause suffering. As I have pointed out 
in the Major Responses of the New Testament of the study, evils of the world, and 
especially illnesses, were attributed to demonic forces such as Satan. For a remedy from 
these so-called demonic possessions, exorcism has been one of the important occupations 
of the priests throughout Christian history. It is often argued that the healing miracles of 
Jesus in the New Testament suggest that he also shared this belief. 
Nevertheless, Swinburne is right in holding that the theory of Satan does not 
solve the question of evil, but raises other problems that are more important. If God is a 
sovereign deity, why does he allow the devil to operate against himself and his children? 
One could ask, for instance, what would stop one to call these forces gods as well if they 
are so independent? 
How could God disclose these true beliefs or knowledge of the nature and 
consequences of their actions to human beings? Swinburne, like Reichenbach, 343 argues 
that this knowledge could be passed from God either directly to humans or inductively 
341 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 108. See also Swinbume, "Knowledge from 
Experience, and the Problem of Evil, " 148-9. 
342 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 176. 
343 Bnice R. Reichenbach, Evil and A Good God (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 103-6. 
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from "past experiences. " God could "whisper in our ears" or write on the screen the 
consequences of our actions. If God had disclosed this knowledge to humans directly, the 
belief in God would be no more a matter of belief, but it would be the knowledge of God 
"with real certainty. "344 In addition, the presence of God would have overwhelmed 
human consciousness so much so that "That... would make the choice between good and 
bad impossible. "345 God would not choose to create such a world. 
Therefore, in order that humans can be free and bring about good or evil, 
Swinburne contends, "God must implant in nature a system of natural causal processes 
and let us learn what they are. "346 Swinburne's world of natural processes or of natural 
laws is, as is very similar to Reichenbach's conception of the world, 347 a deterministic 
system in which a cause either necessarily or probably brings about an effect regularly. 
When this cause-effect relationship is established, natural processes provide human 
beings the ability to predict future states of affairs, good or bad. Observing and studying 
natural processes and learning from past experiences of others as well as from personal 
experiences, humans come to know how to bring about good or evil. For example, a 
study and experience of earthquake produces knowledge regarding to its nature and 
consequences. This knowledge provides people with the opportunity either to cause 
suffering by building houses within the earthquake line or to prevent possible pain and 
death by deterring people from settling around the volcano. Consequently, Swinburne 
3" Swinburne, Is There A God?, 108. 
345 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 185. 
' Swinbutne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 185. 
17 Reichenbach, Evil and A Good God, 106. 
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writes, "These opportunities would not have been available without the knowledge; 
observation of natural processes producing pain provides that knowledge. "348 
In addition, one's proximity to experience, according to Swinburne, determines 
the power of the knowledge. The closer one is to an experience of a natural process the 
surer knowledge he or she could get from an experience. Although the experience of 
others, too, provides strong knowledge, "One knows best just what it feels like to be 
burnt by having been burnt oneself in the past. 9049 In short, the world of natural laws 
provides free agents with opportunities to seek and learn knowledge and to develop 
personality. 
Moreover, Swinburne contends that natural evils provide humans opportunities 
to acquire "high order goods. " He writes, "It is good... that we should have the 
opportunity over time freely to form our characters, to determine the kind of people we 
are to be. "35° In this sense, suffering is necessary in order to have endurance; plagues in 
order to learn to help one another and so on. Swinburne fords a support from the spiritual 
writings of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, namely the Philokalia. He quotes a passage 
from St Peter of Damascus, "Through what we are regarded as hardships we attain a state 
of patience, humility and hope of blessings in the age to be... Indeed, not only in the age 
to be, but even in this present age these things are a source of great blessing to us: '351 
348 Suburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 187; see also Swinbume, The Existence of God, 202-3. 
349 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 188. 
350 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 167-8. 
351 G. E. H. Palmer, P. Sheaard, and K. Ware (ed. and trans. ), Philokalia, ill (Faber & Faber, 1984), 172-7 
quoted in Swinbume, Providence, 160. 
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Therefore, through natural evils human beings freely achieve higher goods otherwise not 
possible to do so. 
However, Swinburne denies that this is the best of all possible worlds. In fact, he 
believes that the idea of best possible world is logically impossible352 and conceptually 
absurd. 353 It is wrong to say that God has to create the best possible world. God may have 
had reason to bring about some possible worlds and not to bring about other possible 
worlds. Swinburne further argues that even if we assume that there is a single best 
possible world, "it is highly dubious to suppose that God is under any moral obligation to 
create such a world . "3m Because God has no moral obligation to non-existent 
possibilities. Instead, God would bring about the sort of world which he had reason to 
bring about. Swinburne believes that this world is of that kind. The question why this 
world, not another one of similar kind, was brought about, cannot be known. 
Furthermore, a world with less pain and suffering would be less good than the 
present one. In Swinburne's words, "A world in which humans (and animals) lacked 
much natural affection for parents, children, neighbours, etc. would be a horrible 
place. "355 Without a significant amount of natural evil such as danger, pain and death, 
"Many of us would then have such an easy life that we simply would not have much 
3SZ Swinbume, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 8. 
... Swinburne, the Existence of God, 113. 
354 Swinburne, The Existence of God, 114. 
ass Swinbume, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 167. 
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opportunity to show courage or, indeed, manifest much in the way of great goodness at 
ali. "ßs6 
However, this does not mean for Swinburne that to acquire more opportunity to 
show courage God must multiply disasters. There is a limit to natural evils, which God 
allows to occur. This limit is human condition. That is to say, humans can bear certain 
amount and intensity of pain. When this amount is exceeded, human life with pain ends 
at death. "' In this sense, death is not a bad state of affairs; but it is only a limit to the 
suffering endured and the end of a good state of human life. "A natural death after a 
certain small finite number of years provides the limit to the period of suffering. "358 It is, 
for Swinburne, logically not possible and morally wrong that a good God leaves human 
beings in the hands of other fellow humans who may inflict pain on them more than a 
limited time. Because limitless suffering in the world would annul God's purpose of 
greater good. 
If God, if he exists, seeks to bring about greater good out of natural evil through 
meaningful human choices, how could the natural law theodicist explain the instances of 
animal suffering? Is it not right that the world would be better off without animal 
sufferings at least? Swinburne firstly asserts that animal suffering is not as serious a 
problem as that of human suffering. Therefore, "One only needs reasons adequate to 
account for God allowing an amount of suffering much less than that of humans. "359 
356 Swinbtune, Is There A God?, 110; see also Swinburne, The Existence of God, 219. 
357 Swinbutne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 213; The Existence of God, 219. 
ass Swinbutne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 213-4. 
359 Swinbume, Is There A God?, 102. 
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Although animals do not have free-will, animal life involves "many serious significant 
intentional actions" such as looking for a mate, building nests, exploring and preying 
upon others and so on. All these necessarily bring about animal pain and suffering out of 
natural processes. Swinburne concludes that it is worthwhile that animals feed their 
offsprings, fight for other members of the flock despite the sufferings they have to 
endure. 
Moreover, Swinburne maintains that animal suffering provides humankind with 
very important information. Through observing animals in natural and artificial 
conditions, humans come to know and benefit from many natural phenomena. This 
knowledge covers a wide range of information ranging from knowing the nature of other 
animals to discovering "very long-term consequences of changes of circumstances, 
environment, or climate. " Consequently, Swinburne writes, "All past and present human 
and animal natural evils of which we know thus contribute to the widening of human 
choice when we learn about them. And (except at an undesirable cost) we could not learn, 
and especially choose to learn, without them. 9060 
Having outlined Swinburne's theodicy, I ought to note that there seems to be a 
slight change in Swinbume's account of evil in terms of certain religious notions from his 
previous position. Swinburne previously held in The Existence of God that there was no 
need in a theodicy for religious doctrines such as "redemptive incarnation" and life after 
death. The reason for such a position is not that they are unreasonable, but that they are 
11 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 192. 
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"to complicate theism so that it needs more in the way of confirming evidence. "361 It 
seems now he modified his position regarding to the Christian doctrines in question. In 
his most recent book Providence and the Problem of Evil, Swinburne states, "In any case 
most other contemporary humans are a lot more likely to be convinced if theodicy does 
bring in such doctrines °062 Accordingly, he reinforces his theodicy with such Christian 
doctrines as life after death and incarnation. 
Swinburne offers what he calls in his book Is There A God? a "fall-back" 
position for those who find his theodicy unconvincing. He asserts that his argument may 
be accepted as convincing "if and only if God also provided compensation in the form of 
happiness after death to the victims whose sufferings make possible the goods. 99363 
Swinburne maintains that the notion of eschatology is not crucial for his theodicy 
although he believes that God provides post-mortem existence for many human beings. 
However, he is sympathetic towards a person who thinks in the face of the "worst evils" 
that human survival from death is necessary. 
The mainstream religious traditions teaches that there is, on the one hand, 
Heaven, the abode of the blessed, who are in pursuit and adoration of good there. On the 
other hand, there is Hell for those who choose no to repent for their sins and reform their 
attitude. Swinburne writes, "A good God... will respect a considered choice of destiny. "3M 
The inhabitants of Hell are punished for their bad actions and are deprived of the Beatific 
361 Swinburne, The Existence of God, 222. 
362 Swinbume, Providence and the Problem of Evil, xi. 
363 Swinburne, Is There A God?, 113. 
364 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 198. 
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Vision of God. In between these two, there is the intermediate state, Catholics call 
Purgatory, for the wrongdoers who inadequately repented. The temporal punishment of 
the intermediate state "would provide the opportunity for the sinner to choose to 
"3 reform. 
63 
Furthermore, Swinburne takes on board the Christian doctrines of the atonement 
and the incarnation in justifying the evils of the world. The life and death of God in 
Christ on the cross is seen as an atonement for human wickedness and sins. Human 
beings must be grateful to God for this and turn to him "in baptism and the Eucharist and 
other church ceremonies we can plead in atonement for our sins, the sacrifice of Christ's 
life and death. 061S In addition, Swinburne finds the doctrine of the Incarnation, Jesus 
Christ as God incarnate, relevant for the problem of human suffering. This is because he 
argues that God allows pain and suffering for the sake of high order goods. Swinburne 
states, "If God shares the pain and other suffering to which he subjects us for the sake of 
greater goods, that indeed reduces the badness of the suffering. "367 Therefore, the 
doctrine of the Incarnation, in a sense, becomes an expression of God's sorrow for human 
suffering. 
The other proponent of The Natural Law Theodicy Reichenbach argues that God 
does not will natural evils, but they are "the consequences of the outworking upon 
sentient creatures of the natural laws according to which God's creation operates. "368 
365 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 202. 
366 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 215. 
367 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 216. 
3" Reichenbach, Evil and A Good God, 10 1. 
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Reichenbach asserts that a natural world governed by natural laws is necessary for the 
creation of moral beings. He explains, 
"Since a world with free persons making choices between moral good and evil 
and choosing a significant amount of moral good is better than a world 
without free persons and moral good and evil, God in creating had to create a 
world which operated according to natural laws to achieve this higher good. 
Thus, his action of creation of a natural world and a natural order, along with 
the resulting pain and pleasure which we experience, is justifed. "369 
Therefore, for Reichenbach as well as Swinburne natural evils are brought about by a 
natural world, which accommodates necessary conditions for the greater good. 
In formulating his argument, Reichenbach in a very similar fashion with 
Swinburne asserts that God could have created two different kinds of possible worlds. A 
possible world would have been operated either by "natural laws" or by "divine 
miraculous intervention. " Reichenbach argues that the latter is not a "viable alternative 
for God" for three reasons 370 Firstly, there would be no regular and natural cause-effect 
relation in a world of miracles. It would make human rational action impossible, which is 
essential for becoming a moral being. Secondly, to develop a moral nature human 
freedom is necessary. In such a world God would not allow people to choose evil 
preventing them being fully free agents. Thirdly, although it sounds paradisical, a 
miracle-operated world would have led to conflicting situations. "The very thing which 
would be good for or bring pleasure to one person might not be good for or bring 
369 Reichenbach, Evil and A Good God, 101-2. 
370 Reichenbach, Evil and A Good God, 103. 
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pleasure to another. 071 Consequently, a miraculous world is incompatible with the 
existence of moral agents. 
Then, Reichenbach asserts that it is necessary for God to create a world 
functioning according to natural laws. Here the phrase natural law is a generic term 
describing how nature, its objects and as a whole, works under certain circumstances. In 
such a world, natural evils such as diseases, hungers and other disorders in nature are the 
operations of natural objects and conditions causing "sentient" creatures suffering and 
death. Hence, the existence of world of natural laws and the presence of animate life on 
earth makes possible the occurrence of natural evils. 
However, a world of natural law is necessary for the existence of moral beings, 
which is "greater good. " Besides, a person cannot be "blameworthy" for something he or 
she could not have done otherwise. Consequently, "God, " Reichenbach argues, "cannot 
be held morally accountable or blameworthy for natural evils. Thus we have a morally 
sufficient reason for the existence of natural evil . "372 God has a sufficient reason to create 
human beings, and he cannot do it in any other way than he has done. Therefore, he is not 
responsible for natural evils in the world. 
To sum up, Swinburne and Reichenbach attempt to justify natural evils in the 
world resorting to the phenomenon of natural law and human free-will. The former seems 
to put a considerable emphasis also on the greater good explanation in addition. Both 
seem to approach to the problem of natural evil from different angles. Swinburne finds 
371 Reichenbach, Evil and .4 Good God, 103-6. 
372 Reichenbach, Evil and A Good God, 106-7. 
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the existence of natural evils necessary in order that human beings may know them and 
use their free-will properly. The latter holds that the possibility of natural evil is inherent 
in a natural system, " and is necessary for human moral development 373 
Moreover, Swinburne appears to base his theodicy on the grounds of probability. 
That is, high order goods or greater goods overweigh the evils of the world with a tiny 
bit. Therefore, on the basis of probability The Natural Law Theodicy justifies natural 
evils. In addition, Swinburne, contrary to Reichenbach, seems to claim that his version of 
The Natural Law Theodicy explains not all but some of natural evils. The former takes on 
board the Christian doctrines such as life after death, the atonement and the incarnation as 
God's intervention to human suffering. Overall, Swinburne and Reichenbach have 
offered a significant answer to the question why God allow or not prevent natural evil 
occur. Both have argued that God is not responsible for natural evils as well as moral 
evils in the world. However, there are objections against both theodicies to be met. 
One of the most crucial objections raised against the Natural Law Theodicy is 
that there are a lot more suffering in the world than normally needed in order to use free- 
will and to have moral beings. If the suffering in the world were proportioned, then the 
theist would be right in his claim that suffering is necessary for being free and moral. 
Eleonore Stump, the Christian philosopher of religion, contends, "countless injuries and 
deaths are still unjustified on his account, namely, all those which men could not have 
prevented and whose occurrence is not necessary to produce or stimulate new 
373 Michael L. Peterson, "Recent Work on the Problem of Evil, " American Philosophical Quarterly 20, no. 
4, (October 1983), 330. 
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knowledge. "374 Is it not the existence of pain too much and meaningless to justify God in 
permitting natural evil? Would it not be better if God had not allowed the destruction of 
Pompeii, the Lisbon earthquake and the Black Death? According to Swinburne, God set a 
limit to pain and suffering in the world, which are death and the limited construction of 
human brain. If it is still objected saying that the limit set is too wide, then, what is asked 
is incompatible with human freedom and responsibility. Swinburne writes, 
"What in effect the objection is asking is that a God should make a toy-world, 
a world where things matter, but not very much; where we can choose and our 
choices remain God's. For he simply would not allow us the choice of doing 
real harm, or through our negligence allowing real harm to occur. He would 
be like the over-protective parent who will not let his child out of his sight for 
a moment. ""' 
Swinburne's response to this objection is based on the correlation between natural evils 
and the opportunity they provide for humans to know and to act responsibly. 
However, Stump objects this correlation because "there is something 
frustratingly circular in such an explanation. "376 It does not make much sense to say that 
natural evils are good because they provide us knowledge so that we may avoid from 
evils. It is true that they provide knowledge; but if there were no natural evils, we would 
not need to know and avoid from them. She concludes, "the value of knowledge gained 
from natural evils cannot be used as a justification of God's actions in allowing natural 
37 Eleonore Stump, "Knowledge, Freedom and the Problem of Evil, " International Journal for Philosophy 
of Religion 14 (1983), 54. 
375 Swinburne, The Existence of God, 219-20. 
376 Stamp, "Knowledge, Freedom and the Problem of Evil, " 56. 
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evils to occur. 377 Although Stump describes the relation between natural evils and 
knowledge as circular, she seems to ignore the part human freedom plays in the 
argument, which depends on the knowledge about the consequences of our actions. 
However, for Swinburne, the real problem is that "the fewer natural evils a God provides, 
the less opportunity he provides for man to exercise responsibility. "378 For the 
elimination of some natural evils would have meant less knowledge and less serious 
choices. 
Reichenbach, on the other hand, contends that the theodicist is under no 
obligation to show that there is a better or the best world. Since he or she objects the 
conditions of this world, it is the atheologian's task, first, to make a list of other possible 
worlds governed by natural laws. Secondly, the atheologian must show that one of these 
possible worlds would have less evil than this world has. For Reichenbach, this is an 
impossible thing to do because it is "a task suited only for an omniscient mind. "379 I agree 
with Reichenbach so far. Human mind can not possibly know at present every single 
initial condition causing the world and how it would have resulted if each and/or every 
one of these conditions were different from the actual ones. However, Reichenbach goes 
as far as to say that 
"Given a change in initial conditions, it is possible that this world would not 
have any less natural evil while not preserving moral activity. Therefore, this 
M Stump, "Knowledge, Freedom and the Problem of Evil, " 57. 
373 Swinburne, The Existence of God, 219. 
379 Reichenbach, Evil and A Good God, 116. 
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argument, which appeals to the unknown as evidence against the theist's 
argument, cannot be successful. ""' 
It seems to me that Reichenbach swiftly jumps to the conclusion disregarding the other 
side of the possibility. It must have escaped from his notice that it is also logically 
possible that the world would have had less natural evils than the present ones. 
The involuntary and innocent pain and death resulted from natural disasters, too, 
raises serious problems against The Natural Law Theodicy. Kenneth Surin criticises 
Swinburne with the charge of reducing the pressing reality of human death and suffering 
to an abstract problem. Whatever the reason may be, how a just God permits suffering 
and death of the innocent so that other fellow human beings might have knowledge as to 
what evil is? "For this reason, " Surin contends, "the `natural law' theodicy will almost 
certainly be rejected by the `protest' atheist. 091 Why should I be a "victim of the system" 
so that others may know and bring about good and evil freely? 382 At least, should I not be 
asked whether I want to sacrifice my life or to endure pain for a good purpose? 
Swinburne and Reichenbach both might say that to get the consent of the person to suffer 
involves the violation of natural processes and of the meaningful use of free-will. It is 
because not certain people only but every human being has to be warned out of God's 
goodness before every single instance of natural evils. That would amount to the 
cancellation of natural laws and consequently of free-will. 
380 Reichenbach, Evil and A Good God, 114. 
361 Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, 81. 
312 Swinburne, The Existence of God, 210. 
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However, this does not seem to provide a solution to the problem of individual 
instances of involuntary suffering. It is because if I am not willing to accept any kind of 
pain or death, but I am inflicted with it anyway, then I am done wrong, which is 
something that one does not expect from a good God. Swinburne assumes that to endure 
pain for the sake of others to come "will make your own life the best life for you to have 
led. s9383 I am not sure if it will be the best thing to do; but one might object saying that 
such behaviour is meaningful as long as it is brought about by my moral choice. 
Otherwise, there is little, if any, meaning in such attitude. 
For those who are unconvinced for this sort of answer, Swinburne appeals to 
what he calls the "fall-back position. "394 That is, God will compensate the sufferers who 
endured pain for the sake of the goods in life after death. However, Swinburne contends 
that only those who seek good in - this world are to be rewarded in the afterlife. 
Concerning the destiny of non-believers who reject good, he is committed to the view 
that some will freely choose not to be with God. Swinburne writes, "firm and continued 
wrong acts and lack of any regret for them will get us into the condition of incorrigibly 
rejecting the good, " which is the Beatific Vision. 385 However, this is not an eternal 
punishment in the flames of hell as the traditional teaching claims it. "[F)or God to 
subject them to literally endless physical pain (poena sensus in medieval terminology) 
does seem to me to be incompatible with the goodness of God . 
086 It is simply the 
383 Swinburne, If There A God?, 112. 
394 Swinburne, Is There A God?, 112-3. 
aas Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 197. 
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depravation of eternal happiness, which might be in various forms. It could be 
annihilation after death or eternal pursuit of trivial things. This is not a bad thing so long 
as the people in this condition have no desire to have eternal happiness. 
To conclude, the theodicies of Swinburne and Reichenbach offer a partial and 
limited response to natural evils. Such a world as ours may be necessary for human 
freedom and moral growth. We cannot be sure of this since we are not able to know what 
other possibilities we would have. However, it appears to be wrong to argue that The 
Natural Law Theodicy justifies God in allowing or not preventing all natural evils. The 
biggest obstacle in front of this sort of theodicy is, as is with other theistic theodicies, the 
excessive and pointless suffering occurring in the world. All-wise God must be able to 
produce a world in which human beings could be free with significantly less natural evil 
and less suffering. 
d. The Soul-Making Theodicy 
The Soul-Making Theodicy387 of John Hick (1922-) is one of the most 
comprehensive theodicies of contemporary Christian thought. In his celebrated book Evil 
and the God of Love he inquires, "Can the presence of evil in the world be reconciled 
with the existence of a God who is unlimited both in goodness and in power? "388 Hick 
seeks a rational answer to this question within the framework of Christian theology. The 
writings of the second century Greek father Irenaeus, as opposed to Augustine, and of 
387 It is also called "Person-Malring" Theodicy, and an "Irenaean Theodicy" with reference to Irenaeus, by 
whom Hick was inspired a great deal. 
'8' John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, first edition, 3. 
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Friedrich Schleiermacher have been the essential sources of Hick's inspiration within 
Christian tradition. 
The Soul-Making Theodicy389 is a "metaphysical" hypothesis drawing on the 
data of Christian tradition and the world. For the project of theodicy is, for Hick, "an 
exercise in metaphysical construction, in the sense that it consists in the formation and 
criticism of large-scale hypotheses concerning the nature and process of the universe. 090 
Thus, Hick's Irenaean Theodicy is set to give a consistent account of the Christian God 
with the reality of evil in the world. However, he does not claim that his hypothesis 
explains every instance of evil in the world. His aim is, he states, "to point to certain 
considerations that prevent the fact of evil (largely incomprehensible though it remains) 
from constituting a final and insuperable bar to rational belief in God. 9091 Consequently, 
The Soul-Making Theodicy has a negative function in the sense that it claims not to 
formulate a new faith but to "preserve" Christian faith in the face of evil. 
The Soul-Making Theodicy briefly argues that the world governed by physical 
laws provides a suitable environment for free beings to develop perfect morality and 
spirituality in their journey towards God. Only in such an environment with real 
challenges, threats and sufferings, people could freely enrich their personality with such 
ethical characteristics as fortitude, generosity, prudence and love. However, Hick denies 
389 Hick adopts the phrase "soul-malting" from a letter of the British poet John Keats who describes the 
world as "the vale of soul-making. " See M. B. Forman, The Letters of John Keats, fourth edition (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1952), 334-5 in Hick, Evil and the God of Love, first ed., 295. 
39° John Hick, "An Irenaean Theodicy, " in S. T. Davis (ed. ), Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994), 39. 
391 John Hick, Philosophy of Religion, second edition (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1973), 38. See also Hick, Evil and the God of Love, first ed., 280-1. 
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that there is a rigid cause-effect relation between suffering and person-making. Because 
the evidence from the world shows that afflictions do not always bring about the desired 
consequences. Hick explains, 
"What was necessary was a world which contains real contingencies, real 
dangers, real problems and tasks and real possibilities of failure and tragedy as 
well as of triumph and success, because only in a world having this general 
character could human animals begin their free development into `children of 
God'. 9s392 
In exploring the Soul-Making Theodicy further, I shall follow the traditional 
division of the problem of evil. Accordingly, there is, on the one hand, the problem of 
moral evil, human wickedness. On the other hand, there is the problem of natural, or 
physical, evil arising out of earthquakes, floods, famines, and diseases in the world. Why 
has an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God caused and permitted human vices 
and natural disasters? To justify God, the theist must show that the supreme being has a 
purpose for doing so. 
Hick offers a version of Free-Will Defence as an answer to the problem of moral 
evil. The core of this defence is the condition of "human freedom and responsibility, " 
which is the bases of decision-making process. That is to say, human beings are free and 
responsible for their decisions and actions. They can decide and execute whatever they 
choose. Therefore, human misuse or abuse of freedom is the origin of human vices. Hick 
States, 
32 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, second edition (London: Macmillan, 1977), 375. 
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"an enormous amount of human pain arises either from the inhumanity or the 
culpable incompetence of mankind. This includes such major scourges as 
poverty, oppression and persecution, war, all the injustice, indignity that occur 
even in the most advanced societies. "393 
As Hick points out, both the Irenaean Theodicy and the Augustinian Theodicy 
share a similar view in terms of human freedom as the origin of moral evil. 394 However, 
Hick criticises the original sin and the Fall as the origin of evil, which has a central place 
in Augustinian version of Free-Will Defence, with the charge that it is "open to 
insuperable scientific, moral, and logical objections. "393 Firstly, scientific data points that 
the disorder and waste in nature precede the emergence of humankind on earth. 
Therefore, as Holmes Rolston states, "Suffering in an harsh world did not enter 
chronologically after sin and on account of it s396 Secondly, it is morally repugnant that a 
good and just God could punish the whole human race for the sin of Adam and Eve. 
Finally, there is logical incoherency in the conception of "wholly good beings in a wholly 
good world becoming sinful. "397 
Instead of the Augustinian creation-Fall "myth, " Hick argues for gradual human 
creation from infant-like state, or from the "image" as Irenaeus called it, to the "likeness" 
of God in an epistemic distance from God. With the help of modem anthropological 
393 Hick, Philosophy of Religion, second edition, 38-9. 
394 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, first edition, 301. 
393 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, first edition, 285. 
396 Hohnes Rolston, III, "Does Nature Need to Be Redeemed? " Zygon 29, no. 2 (June 1994), 205 as quoted 
in Nancy Murphy and George F. R. Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe: Theology, Cosmology, and 
Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 245. 
397 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, first edition, 286. 
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findings, particularly the theory of evolution, Hick asserts that the creation of humanity 
has been taking place in two stages. The first stage of the creation of humanity was 
resulted out of the evolutionary process with the emergence of homo sapiens as 
"intelligent ethical and religious animals. " Human "self-centredness" is thought to have 
played a crucial role at this stage in human survival. In the second stage, which we are in, 
free human beings have been transforming into the state of divine likeness or of "children 
of God . -098 Here the condition of "self-transcendence" as opposed to "self-centredness" 
is the source of human spiritual development to perfection. The latter is, on the other 
hand, the cause of moral evil. 99 The second stage of human creation is not a finished 
state; but it is an ongoing process. 
Hick argues that the creation of human beings in an "epistemic distance" from 
God is an essential requirement for the defence of human free-will. He states, "In order to 
be a person, exercising some measure of genuine freedom, the creature must be brought 
into existence, not in the immediate divine presence, but a `distance' from God. "40° This 
is not a spatial distance since God is omnipresent; but it is a "cognitive" distance in 
relation to God. He hides himself behind the immediate reality of the universe leaving 
room for human freedom to act autonomously. Hick explains, "The world must be to 
man, to some extent at least, etsi deus non daretur, `as if there were no God'... Thus the 
398 hiCIC, "An Irenaean Theodicy, " 41-2. 
399 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Response to the Transcendent (London: Macmillan, 
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world, as the environment of man's life, will be religiously ambiguous, both veiling God 
and revealing him. "40' 
It appears that some have misunderstood Hick's notion of epistemic distance. G. 
Stanley Kane, for instance, assumes that the "soul-making theodicy seeks to justify the 
existence of evil... by holding that the existence of evil is logically necessary to the 
establishment of epistemic distance between men and God. "402 He contends that there is 
no logical necessity between epistemic distance and evil since the omnipotent God could 
have created human beings in an epistemic distance without any evil at all. Hick responds 
that Kane's objection rests on the misconception of Hick's idea of epistemic distance. He 
writes, "both natural and moral evil does, contingently, reinforce man's epistemic 
distance from God even though it is not logically necessary to it s403 If human beings had 
constantly felt the immediate presence of God, they would have no choice but know and 
love their Maker. Therefore, this environment in which human beings are located will 
necessarily include evils and threats to human life since God wishes that human beings 
must freely develop into a perfect being. In the words of Hick, "for some forms of 
environmental challenge and danger are needed if the world is to function as a place of 
person-making for morally and spiritually immature creatures. 004 
`01 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, first ed., 317-8, and also Hick, "An Irenaean Theodicy, " 43. As Hick 
notes, the phrase etsi dens non daretur originally belong to the German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
(1906-1945). 
402 G. Stanley Kane, "The Failure of Soul-Making Theodicy, " International Journal for Philosophy of 
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Hick's solution for natural evils such as floods, droughts, plagues, and 
earthquakes is that they provide an ideal environment for the development of human 
moral qualities such as goodness, righteousness, and generosity. In the words of A. R. 
Peacocke, a physical chemist and theologian, "death, pain, and the risk of suffering are 
intimately connected with the possibilities of new life, in general, and of the emergence 
of conscious, and especially human, life, in particular. 005 This is what Hick calls "soul- 
making" or "person-making. " He believes that without challenges, dangers and evils one 
cannot possibly talk about soul-making. 
In this sense, natural evil serves for a purpose. Therefore, one can safely say that 
there is a close relation between Hick's theodicy and God's ultimate aim in creating 
humankind, which is to bring "many children to glory" (Hebrews 2: 10) 406 He believes 
that this purpose can only be realised through the process of soul-making. "God's 
purpose for man is, " Hick writes, "to lead him from human Bios, or the biological life of 
man, to that quality of Zoe, or the personal life of eternal worth, which we see in 
Christ. "407 The nature of Jesus represents the end sought for and by all human beings. 
It is here, too, that the justification of animal pain finds its place in Hick's 
theodicy. He argues that "The justification of animal pain is identical with the 
justification of animal existence. "408 In order that soul-making process worked there had 
to be human life. Since human life emerged out of animal life through evolutionary 
405 A. R Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 166. 
" Hick, Evil and the God of Love, first edition, 292. 
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process, it was necessary that animals existed and were subjected to dangers and evils in 
a harsh environment. Therefore, animal suffering indirectly contributed to the emergence 
of humankind and the realisation of soul-making process, which will lead to know God. 
In this sense, suffering and pain is a means to survive for animals as well as human 
beings. Hick writes, "The pain mechanism is necessary to the survival of organisms 
inhabiting a world with a fixed structure. "409 By this mechanism, animals has managed to 
survive and led to the evolution of human beings, and in the same way human beings 
survive. 
However, Hick is very well aware of the fact that the process of soul-making is 
not fully completed during human life span on earth. "Instead of ennobling, affliction 
may crush the character and wrest from it whatever virtues it possesses. "410 That is to say, 
each evil does not bring about the expected positive results in every person all the time. 
Hence, it is necessary that the process of person-making must continue in another 
possible world after death. In Hick's words, "it would seem that any divine purpose of 
soul-making that is at work in earthly history must continue beyond this life if it is ever to 
achieve more than a very partial and fragmentary success. "411 Therefore, life after death 
has an important place in Hick's soul-making process. 
Hick's theodicy concludes with "a triumphant resolution in the eventual perfect 
fulfilment of God's good purpose. '412 That is, every man and woman without exception 
409 Hick, "An Irenaean Theodicy, " 68. 
410 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, first edition, 367. 
411 Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 43. 
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will eventually come to know and worship God. They will enjoy eternal rest, peace and 
happiness in God. However, it ought to be noted that this end-state is not a result of 
retributive judgement. Hick writes, "The `good eschaton' will not be a reward or a 
compensation proportioned to each individual's trials, but an infinite good that would 
render worth while any finite suffering endured in the course of attaining to it. s413 
Therefore, Hick, as distinct from Augustine, rejects the idea of eschatological retribution 
as a compensation for the sufferings endured. 
Even if we accept Hick's eschatological resolution, we could still ask: Does 
eternal joy justify God in the face of evil? Hick asserts that God is justified allowing for 
evil and suffering in the light of the end-state, eternal joy, of human beings. He writes, "it 
is an ethically reasonable judgement... that human goodness slowly built up through 
personal histories of moral effort has a value in the eyes of the Creator which justifies 
even the long travail of the soul-making process. "414 Therefore, the final joyous state 
achieved after death will, for Hick, prevail over the afflictions people endured on the way 
to the "likeness" of God. 
There has been a few objections raised against the Soul-Making Theodicy in 
recent years. I shall discuss some of the significant ones here. Some critics ask why God 
did not create human beings from the start in "divine likeness" in which they are 
supposed to achieve eventually. For instance, C. Robert Mesle, a process philosopher of 
religion, argues that "a good and omnipotent God should have created us with such a 
413 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, first edition, 377. 
414 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, first edition, 292. 
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nature and in such an environment that we were free only to choose between goods. "415 
That is what is expected from an all-powerful and all-good God. 
Hick's response is that we are not automata like robots that have to do whatever 
they are pre-programmed to do. Neither this world is a hedonist's paradise in which 
pleasure is the main aim of human life. Instead, human beings are free rational beings on 
the becoming of "children of God" by their own choices in a harsh environment. 416 In 
addition, Hick writes, "only in such an unparadisal world can moral distinctions have any 
meaning and moral life develop. "417 In a world in which there is no evil and no suffering, 
there would be no such thing as good because people would not have such concepts. If 
we were programmed to behave always rightly, it would not be possible to talk about any 
kind of moral and spiritual development of humankind. 
In response, it is said that if there were no evil, there would be no need to the 
process of soul-making. God could have created us all with the desired moral 
characteristics, and people would only choose between goods. Hick's response to this 
objection is that an environment providing a real situation to grow from immaturity to 
moral perfection is "far greater moral value than doing an objectively right act which we 
are programmed to do. "418 To develop righteousness autonomously is more valuable than 
being created and sustained as righteous. On what authority does Hick base this 
415 C. Robert Mesle, John Hick's Theodicy: A Process Humanist Critique (London: Macmillan, 1991), 31. 
A similar objection has been raised by the atheist philosophers E. H. Madden and P. H. Hare in Evil and the 
Concept of God (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1968), 70. 
416 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, first edition, 291. 
417 Hick, "Response to Mesle, " in C. R. Mesle, John Hick's Theodicy, 126. 
418 Hick, "Response to Mesle, " in C. R. Mesle, John Hick's Theodicy, 125-6. 
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judgement? He admits that this principle is only a "value judgement, " which cannot be 
verified by argument. He hopes that it will be "more plausible" and "compelling" when 
many others adhere to it. 419 If one can manage to isolate himself or herself from the 
pressing reality of practical instances of suffering, he, then, may concur with Hick that a 
moral character acquired through struggle has a greater value than ready-given qualities. 
Moreover, even if one accepts that hard-earned morality is better than ready- 
given character, the failure of many people in the world to acquire moral character 
appears to raise a strong objection. The contemporary Augustinian theodicist Stephen T. 
Davis asserts that "the evidence of how people behave here and now does not give me 
much hope that the human race will gradually improve till all are the God-conscious 
`persons' God intended . s420 Davis 
believes that God will intervene and show His favour 
to the faithful in the future. In response, Hick contends that "the hypothesis of an ascent 
towards God through many lives in many worlds does not entail that successive 
generations in this world should show a moral and spiritual advance. "421 Instead, the 
development occurs on the personal level through "many worlds, " not only in this world. 
To illustrate this point Hick appeals to the evolution of humankind from moral 
immaturity with "inadequate conceptions of God" to a creature with "higher moral values 
and higher understandings of deity. s422 Therefore, the process of soul-making is for Hick 
419 Hick, "An Irenaean Theodicy, " 44. See also Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds, 130. 
42° Stephen T. Davis, "Critique, " in Stephen T. Davis (ed. ), Encountering Evil, 59. See also, for a similar 
critique, Kenneth Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 94; G. Stanley 
Kane, "The Failure of Soul-Making Theodicy, " 7. 
421 Hick, "Response, " in Davis (ed. ), Encountering Evil, 66. 
422 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, second edition, 381. 
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more "probable" than Davis' idea of a dramatic divine intervention because God does not 
have to delay to perfect human beings until they are dead. 
It seems to me that both Davis and Hick are missing an important point here. It 
is the possible impact that awakening into a new life will leave on a person. That is, both 
philosophers believe that personal survival from death involves getting back the person's 
whole memory and personality. Then, life after death will be a partial justification or 
divine glimpse that contributes to the person's soul-making process. Judging from our 
present condition, today we regret many decisions and actions we favoured in the past, 
and say that "I wish I had (not) done that. " 
Analogously, it is not unreasonable to imagine that the person who gain his or 
her memory of this life back after death, will most likely avoid the mistakes that he or she 
committed in this life. I believe that this could provide to the person the impetus 
necessary for the completion, or at least considerable progression, of soul-making process 
in post-mortem without any need of divine intervention; that is, if God permits. 
One of the most, if not the most, incisive objections raised against Hick's 
Irenaean Theodicy is of excessive, pointless, and random suffering in the world. Kenneth 
Surin, a British theologian, argues that the variety and amount of suffering that is present 
in the world cannot be justified even if there is eternal bliss 423 In this context, Surin 
quotes Dorothee Soelle saying, "The God who causes suffering is not to be justified even 
"3 Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, 95. See, for a similar objection, W. Rowe, "Paradox and 
Promise: Hick's Solution to the Problem of Evil, " in H. Hewitt (ed. ), Problems in the Philosophy of 
Religion: Critical Studies of the Work of John Hick (London: Macmillan, 1991), 117-8. 
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by lifting the suffering later. No heaven can rectify Auschwitz. s424 The horrible tragedy 
of the holocaust seems to make this problem more serious than ever. Hick is aware of the 
problem that what he calls "dysteleological, " or pointless, excessive, and random 
sufferings are perhaps the most threatening challenge to any kind of theodicy. For such 
afflictions, he admits that he has no rational theory to offer. Hence, he appeals to the 
concept of "mystery. " Although Hick's mystery signifies that he has no theory to explain 
such evils, it may well be the case that the mysteriousness itself is another dimension of 
the soul-making process. That is to say, even dysteleological suffering may have a 
"positive value" in the sense that it may contribute to the soul-making process. In Hick's 
words, 
"Such suffering remains unjust and inexplicable, haphazard and cruelly 
excessive. The mystery of dysteleological suffering is a real mystery ... And yet 
at the same time, detached theological reflection can note that this very 
irrationality and this lack of ethical meaning contribute to the character of the 
world as a place in which true human goodness can occur and in which loving 
sympathy and compassionate self-sacrifice can take place. s" 
Hick attempts to reconcile the two horns of the problem of excessive suffering; 
the intensity of excessive human suffering on the one hand, the ambiguity of the world 
and the role of this ambiguity in soul-making on the other. As he confirms in his An 
Interpretation of Religion, "A theodicy is an abstract scheme of thought, and as such it 
424 Dorothee Soelle, Suffering (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1975), 149 as quoted in Surin, Theology 
and the Problem of Evil, 95. 
425 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, fast edition, 371-2. 
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can never match the felt intensity of the problem. "426 I believe Hick's approach to what 
he calls "dysteleological" suffering is one of the most constructive and reasonable 
explanation despite its limited nature. 
Furthermore, Hick's exclusion of natural theology has been a matter of 
objection. R. Douglas Geivett, a fervent exponent of natural theology as a "prolegomenon 
to theodicy"427 criticises Hick as follows, 
"We cannot rely on Hick's anthropocentric category of the personal for a full 
determination of the divine purposes for humans, for in doing so the best that 
we could hope to construct is an anthropodicy (a defense of human autonomy 
with respect to God) rather than a theodicy.. "428 
I agree with Geivett that Hick needs to show with the help of natural theology 
that this is a purposeful universe and that God has a plan in creating humankind and the 
universe. The Soul-Making Theodicy lacks the support of theological interpretation of 
nature. The recent developments in physics and cosmology meet this need. They indicate 
that the Soul-Making Theodicy is better off with taking on board the theological 
explanations of scientific data. 
The physical chemist Ilya Prigogine, for instance, appears to illustrate this point 
very well. He maintains that irreversibility of time in thermodynamics in relation to 
human existence suggests that there is "an evolutionary, and teleological paradigm" 
116 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 120. 
427 R Douglas Geivett, Evil and the Evidence for God: The Challenge of John Hick's Theodicy 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 67. 
428 Geivett, Evil and the Evidence for God, 169. 
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working in the universe. Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers write, "the perception of 
oriented time increases as the level of biological organization increases and probably 
reaches its culminating point in human consciousness. "429 Perhaps this is the point that 
the process of soul-making reaches its consummation. Along with Prigogine and 
Stengers, it is possible to see other scientists as well as theologians in the line with the 
Irenaean Theodicy. Therefore, it seems to me that The Soul-Making Theodicy would be 
more intelligible and reasonable with the support of natural theology. 
Some philosophers and theologians, chiefly conservative Christians, criticise 
Hick's view of universal salvation. Geivett objects, "Perhaps Hick realizes that a loving 
God could justifiably allow an unrepentant person to descend to a hellish state of eternal 
duration. "430 Hick views the traditional doctrine of hell as "one aspect of conservative 
Christianity. " He believes that "It seems morally incredible that a perfectly loving 
Creator should devise a situation in which millions of men and women suffer eternally. " 
The alternative to hell, according to Hick, "may be that God has initially formed us as 
"religious animals, " our hearts set, in Augustine's famous phrase, ad to domine, "towards 
you, Lord. 91431 Since the responsibility for evil, according to Hick, lies with God, he must 
give to human beings further opportunities to develop and purify themselves. Otherwise, 
the problem of suffering in this world changes its nature and becomes a problem of 
suffering in the afterlife. 
4" Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order out of Caos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature (Boulder, 
Colorado: New Science Library, 1984), 297f. as quoted in Worthing, God Creation, and Contemporary 
Physics, 151. 
430 Geivett, Evil and the Evidence for God, 215. 
431 John Hick, "Afterword, " in Geivett, Evil and the Evidence for God, 236. 
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However, it is still logically possible that there may be some individuals who 
will continue doing wrong. Since salvation is not wrought by divine intervention but 
contingently, it is possible that some people will remain in epistemic distance from God 
throughout their lives. The only realistic hope for the salvation of all might be perhaps the 
survival of human beings from death, which will make them realise human condition 
more clearly, and accelerate and complete the soul-making process. 
Accordingly, some critics find Hick's universalism inconsistent with his 
affirmation that a theodicy must be consistent with the data of Christian tradition. 
Stephen T. Davis, for instance, writes, "I do not believe universalism is consistent with 
the data of the Christian tradition. s432 He then supports his argument with some biblical 
passages that apparently teach eternal condemnation such as Matthew 7: 32; 25: 41; 2 
Corinthians 5: 10; and 2 Thessalonians 1: 8-9. However, Hick acknowledges, "there are 
both universalist and non-universalist strands within the diverse literature of the New 
Testament. -A33 In this sense, it is not right to treat these different passages as if a single 
author wrote them and to impose a non-universalist interpretation on universalist 
passages 434 
In addition, Hick is not the first universalist theologian. As Paul Badham pointed 
out, the early church father Origen (c. 185-c. 254) and his followers such as the 
Cappadocian father Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335-c. 395) hoped that all humankind would 
432 Stephen T. Davis, "Critique, " in Stephen T. Davis (ed. ), Encountering Evil, 59. 
433 Hick, "Response to Critiques, " in Stephen T. Davis (ed. ), Encountering Evil, 67. 
41 Hick is talking about such biblical passages of universalist nature as 1 Corinthians 15: 22; Ephesians 
1: 10; and Timothy 2: 3-4. See, for Hick's exposition of universal salvation in the New Testament, Hick, 
Death and Eternal Life (London: Macmillan, 1994), 243-250. 
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come to know and worship God eventually after they purified themselves in the world 
and in the afterlife. 433 Therefore, Hick does not invent the notion of universalism himself 
or import it into Christian faith; but he supports and clarifies a stream of thought within 
Christian tradition although it has never been a dominant one. Therefore, Davis' charge 
of The Soul-Making Theodicy with inconsistency in terms of the Christian tradition does 
not seem to do justice to Hick. 
To conclude, Hick's Soul-Making Theodicy maintains that human beings live in 
an "epistemic distance" from God so that they can autonomously build a perfect 
spirituality through which the true knowledge and love of God are realised. It is a long 
and travail process from moral immaturity to a spiritual perfection in God. Eventually, 
every human being will complete the process of soul-making, and they will know and 
worship God. Could we say that Hick's Irenaean Theodicy solves to the problem of evil 
once and for all? It is difficult to answer this question affirmatively. 
As the exponent of the Soul-Making Theodicy Paul Badham affirms, "Hick's 
argument does not `solve' the problem of evil" completely. 
436 This is not because the 
Soul-Making Theodicy is inconsistent with Christian tradition and evil, but because it 
does not, first, offer any conclusive response to the problem of dysteleological and 
excessive suffering in the world. In addition, the need for the support of natural theology 
is felt throughout the Soul-Making Theodicy. 
435 Paul Badham, Christian Beliefs About Life After Death (London: SPCK, 1978), 63-4. See also John 
Hick, Death and Eternal L fe, 200; and Hans Kung, Eternal Life? (London: SCM Press, 1984), 136. 
436 Pa Badham, "Philosophical Theology of John Hick, " in Paul Badham (ed. ), A John Hick Reader 
(London: Macmillan, 1990), 7. 
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On the other hand, it has to be noted that Hick's theodicy is to a great degree 
successful overall in demonstrating that belief in God is still rational in the face of evil. 
Its emphasis on the positive meaning of human life has to be credited particularly. 
Perhaps most importantly, Hick's eschatological resolution provides a powerful answer 
to the problem of evil. Moreover, as Paul Badham shows in his "global" approach to The 
Soul-Making Theodicy, 437 Hick's theodicy contains certain common features of major 
world religions. With this characteristic, The Soul-Making Theodicy, in practical terms, 
seems to be a strong candidate to bring together major religions and their followers in 
creating a better world in the future. 
437 Paul Badham, "Towards A Global Theodicy, " in William Ceukner (ed. ), Evil and the Response of World 
Religion (St. Paul, Minnesota: Paragon House, 1997), 250. 
185 
IV. THE MUSLIM THEODICIES 
The significance of the problem of evil and theodicy in Islamic tradition has 
been a matter of controversy especially in Western writings. It is often argued that 
theodicy has little significance in Islam in contrast to Jewish and Christian traditions. It is 
alleged that Muslim theologians have not dealt with the problem of evil and offered 
convincing responses as their Christian counterparts have. For instance, Kenneth Cragg 
(1913-), an English scholar of religion, argues, "It [Islam] does not find a theodicy 
necessary either for its theology or its worship. "438 The contemporary British Orientalist 
W. Montgomery Watt concurs with this view. Further, he asserts that if there is any 
attempt at theodicy in Islamic tradition, it can be found not among Sunnite Muslims, the 
majority group of Muslims, but among what Watt calls "heretical Muslims" such as the 
Mu`tazilites, the rational theologians 439 
On the other hand, some Muslim thinkers argue that there has been extensive 
discussions amongst Muslim theologians and philosophers of the issues involved in what 
Western scholars tackle under the rubric of the problem of evil. For instance, the ShI'T 
Muslim theologian Murtazä Mutahhari (1921-1979) discussing divine justice and evil 
("shay"), advocates this view enthusiastically. He writes, "Although western and eastern 
philosophers have dealt with this question and attempted to explain evil, as far as I can 
see western philosophers could not solve the problem. It is Muslim philosophers and 
433 Kenneth Cragg, The House of Islam, second edition, (Encino, California: Dickenson Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1975), 16. 
439 W. Montgomery Watt, "Suffering in Sunnite Islam, " Studia Islamica 50 (1979), 5-6. 
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sages that have overcome this difficulty and solved one of the most important 
mysteries. 'Mo 
I cannot be so sure as Mutahhari is about this. I believe that, as the contemporary 
Turkish philosopher of religion Cafer S. Yaran (1964-) notes, 441 the problem of evil has 
not been so serious a problem in Islamic faith and theology as it has been in her Christian 
and Jewish counterparts. To put it bluntly, the existence of the God of Islam has never 
come under a severe attack in the face of suffering and death to the extent that Jewish and 
Christian traditions faced. 
In my opinion, the reason for this may be seen in two facts. One is that there is 
not such a catastrophic event in Islamic tradition as the crucifixion of Jesus in Christian 
tradition. Neither was the Muslim sanctuary, the Ka'ba, destroyed by non-Muslims in 
contrast to the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem twice and the enormous pogroms 
in Jewish history. If Muhammad had been put to death as Christians believe that Jesus 
was, Muslim theologians, too, would have, I suspect, developed a defence similar to that 
of their Christian counterparts. The other reason may be seen in the fact that the core of 
Islamic faith is thought to be a total submission to God's will in any circumstances. The 
term Islam itself is often defined as "voluntary subordination of human discretion to the 
will of God. "A42 In this sense, Muslims have been advised through the ages humbly to 
"0 Murtaza Mutahhar Adl-i fläht, translated from Persian to Turkish by Hüseyin Hatemi, (Istanbul: I$aret 
Yayinlan, 1988), 107. 
I'll Cafer S. Yaran, Kötalak ve Theodise (Konya: Vadi Yayinlan, 1997), 111. 
442 Muhammad al-Ghazali, "The Problem of Evil: An Islamic Approach, " William Cenkner (ed. ), Evil and 
the Response of World Religion (St. Paul, Minnesota: Paragon House, 1997), 70. 
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accept whatever happens as divine providence. This has been seen as a true, or more 
accurately, a pious Muslim attitude to afflictions and sufferings from within the faith. 
However, this does not mean that the occurrences of evil in this world do not 
pose any problem to Islamic conception of God. Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) from 
Pakistan affirms that the existence of physical and moral evil in the world raise a 
significant problem since "the Qur'an conceives God as `holding all goodness in His 
hand. 99043 Being aware of this, Muslim theologians have discussed the crucial questions 
such as those of divine justice and wisdom embedded in the problem of evil. Even though 
it is in a lesser degree than Christian and Jewish theologies, the problems of evil have 
been to some extent discussed in Islamic theology and philosophy. The basic human 
instinct of curiosity and some external criticism of the Islamic faith must have led 
Muslim theologians to discuss and offer answers to the issues involved. In fact, the 
problems of evil such as divine justice and goodness, and free-will and determination 
played an important part in the formation of the dialectic Islamic theology called the 
Kaläm with such schools as Mu'tazila, Ash `ariyya, MaturTdiyya and ShT `a. 
Moreover, the problem of evil seems to have attracted various Muslim 
theologians and philosophers in modem times as well. The influence of Western 
theological and philosophical discussions on this cannot be ignored. A characteristic of 
these discussions is that the Qur'fn, as the divine word revealing God's ways to 
humankind, has been at the centre of the whole endeavour. The theologians have 
43 Muhammad Igbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore, Pakistan: SH. 
Muhammad Ashraf, 1988), 80. 
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explained the verses of the Qur'An from the perspective of their schools to reconcile 
God's justice and goodness with the occurrences of evil. This is true for both the two 
major schools of Islamic thought, namely, Sunni and Shia. John Bowker, a professor of 
religious studies, observes, "in both expressions of Islam, the far more general response 
to suffering has been to reiterate the Quran and apply it to whatever new circumstances of 
suffering arise, and that has remained true down to the present day. "4« 
The contemporary Muslim scholar Mahmoud Ayoub, who is trying to bring 
closer Sunni and Shl'T schools in Muslim tradition as well as Muslims, Christians and 
Jews, presents a striking example of a Qur'An based approach towards the problem of 
evil. For Ayoub the Qur'än is "crucial to the Islamic understanding of human 
suffering, , 445 because Muslim Scripture is seen as God's account of human situation. In 
addition, as most Islamic writings on the problem of evil revolves around the Qur'anic 
view of suffering and evil, it is inevitable to start with what the Qur'än says on evil and 
how Muslims read it. 
44 John Bowker, Problems of Suffering in Religions of the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1970), 133. 
445 Mahmoud M. Ayoub, "The Problem of Suffering in Islam, " Journal of Dharma, 2, no. 3, (July 1977), 
267. 
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I. The Major Responses of the Qur'An 
The Qur'än affirms that Allah is the ultimate creator of everything in the world, 
evil as well as good. The cause of the whole creation is none but Allah. Hence, Muslim 
Scripture realises the reality of evil in the world whether it is taken in real or figurative 
sense. Some of the terms designating evil in the Qur'an are shar (evil), munkar 
(abominable), and alam (suffering and pain). Only the first term shar occurs twenty five 
times. For instance, there are some things that people consider evil, but, in fact, they are 
good (al Nur, "the Light, " 24: 11) and that people consider good, but, in fact, they are evil 
(Äl-i `Imrkn, "the Family of `Imrän, " 3: 180); that the worst evil being are those who do 
not understand (al Anfäl, "the Spoils, " 8: 22); and that the evil whispers of Satan, jinn and 
human beings are something from which one must seek refuge in God (al Nks, "the 
People, " 114: 1-6). Many more examples similar to these indicate that the Qur'än 
recognises the reality of evil as well as good in the world. 
It must be noted at the outset that there is no explicit theodicy in the Qur'an. 
There are some answers that may shed some light on the issues involved in the problem 
of evil. As Muslim Scripture is not a book of systematic theology, it does not give a 
formulated theodicy in response to the enigma of evil. The Qur'än, like any other 
Scripture, gives more importance to the practical relationship between God and human 
beings rather than to explanations of theological puzzles in logical format. Ayoub 
summarises this feature as follows: "The Qur'An is not interested in theodicy, but in 
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human attitudes or responses to God's acts in nature and history. The Qur'än is not 
interested in logic and justification, but in the dynamic relationship between man and 
God. "4" Consequently, the phrase "the Qur'anic theodicy" could be used loosely only in 
the sense of the answers of the Qur'än to evil. 
What are the answers of the Qur'än to the question of suffering? Different 
scholars of religion have arranged these answers under different rubrics. Although these 
responses to evil are to a great extent similar in substance, their arrangement shows 
difference from one scholar to another. The contemporary Turkish scholar of the Qur'än 
Lütfullah Cebeci categorises the Qur'anic answers to evil in three groups. Suffering is 
either a test and education, or a result of the failure of human free-will, or a punishment 
for human moral evils committed. According to Mahmoud Ayoub, suffering is either a 
result of human wrong choice, or a lesson to following generations, or a test of faith, or a 
source of good human qualities such as patience and gratitude, or redemptive through 
which one's sins are expiated. The other answer of the Qur'än is, to Ayoub, that there is a 
life after death in which every iniquity will be recompensed. According to Cafer Yaran, 
the Qur'anic answers to suffering are four: "Test and education, the failure of human free 
will, discipline and punishment, and the hereafter as a real justice abode" 7 
446 Ayoub, "Tbe Problem of Suffering in Islam, " 276. 
447 Yaran, Köt91Uk ve Theodise, 114. 
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I believe that it is possible to categorise the answers under four main headings 
although the responses of the Qur'An to suffering are interconnected. Firstly, suffering is 
a punishment for sin. Secondly, suffering is an outcome of the failure of human free-will. 
Thirdly, suffering in the Qur'An is described as a test and a discipline. The fourth one is 
the eschatological resolution. That is to say, the iniquities and sufferings of this world 
will be recompensed in life after death. Let us see briefly now the answers of the Qur'an 
to human suffering and death. 
1. Suffering as Retribution 
The Qur'dn, like Jewish and Christian Scriptures, suggests that some natural 
evils such as flood, earthquake and drought are punishment for human sins. The failure to 
become a righteous person, and to follow God's commandments sometimes bring about 
suffering and disasters in this life. Although ultimate reward and punishment is in the 
hereafter ("al-akhira"), there are also references in the Qur'an to suffering as a 
punishment for sin in this world. This notion is concisely expressed in the following 
verse, `But as for those who disbelieved, I will sternly punish them in this world and the 
Hereafter, and they shall have no supporters" (ÄI-i `Imrän 3: 55). The reason for the 
punishment of this kind is seen in terms of human failure in adopting a right attitude in 
the face of test. The Qur'an expresses this notion as follows, "And We have not wronged 
them, but they wronged themselves... " (ud, 11: 100). 
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Perhaps the most striking example of this kind of explanation comes in the 
Qur'än's account of the destruction of people of old. The Qur'än. narrates that some past 
nations to whom such prophets as Nah (Noah), Hüd, $älih, and Lot (Lot) were sent, had 
been destroyed because of their immoral acts and disbelief. Hence, the Qur'än warns the 
unbeliever reminding them of the fate of the past nations, and calls them to "the true 
path. " A half of the chapter al- Ankabüt describes the destruction of some ancient people 
as divine punishment for their wickedness (29: 11-40). For instance, "We sent Noah to his 
own people and he tarried among them a thousand years minus fifty years. Then the 
Deluge overtook them; for they were wrongdoers" (29: 13). God punished the people to 
whom Noah was sent for they mocked and denied Noah and the divine message he 
conveyed. 
An intriguing approach to the punishment of the unbelievers in this world comes 
from Sheikh Muhammad al-Sha'rawi. He contends that "Allah intervened to punish the 
unbelievers until the Message of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, 
came and then the Divine punishment of unbelievers in this world ceased. " 448 It is true 
that the Qur'fin reports that God intervened occasionally into human history and punished 
the unbeliever and the wicked for their sins and immoralities in the past (29: 40). 
However, with the advent of Islam, al-Sha'rawi contends, divine intervention to punish 
the unbelievers in this world has been postponed until the Hereafter. He has no Qur'anic 
441 Sheikh Mohammad M. al-Sha'rawi, Good and Evil (London: Dar Al Taqwa Ltd., 1995), 20. 
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proof to support the last claim. It must be noted that his is an exceptionally novel idea in 
Islamic tradition. 
Having affirmed the Qur'anic account of the destruction of people of old, 
Mahmoud Ayoub asserts that the Qur'anic examples of the stem punishments of the past 
generations are not strictly retributive but they are "corrective" and disciplinary. Because 
"History is God's court of justice and the instrument of His discipline. " 9 Therefore, the 
stories of the destruction of certain ancient people for their non-belief must be understood 
in the light of chapter 11 verse 100-1 of the Qur'än. That is to say that God did not punish 
those people out of "frustration or capricious wrath; " but the people brought the 
punishments on themselves with the wrongs they committed. In addition, one must also 
bear in mind that God wills no injustice to human beings (Äl-i `Imrän 3: 182). Sometimes 
this punishment ends with death. In this case, the fate of the ancient people is made an 
example, and serves as a lesson to the following generations not to repeat the same 
mistakes, and accordingly not to be punished. 450 
How is one to explain the suffering of the innocent then? If God is omnipotent, 
omniscient, just and merciful, which the Qur'än affirms, why does he allow the innocent 
suffer along with the wicked? More seriously, why does he let the innocent suffer and the 
wicked prosper at times? Perhaps a believer can manage to hold on to his or her faith 
with a pious manner. However, this is not something that an unbeliever would appreciate 
449 Ayoub, "The Problem of Suffering in Islam, " 275. 
430 Ayoub, "The Problem of Suffering in Islam, " 275. 
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at all. As the Turkish philosopher of religion Mehmet Aydin states, "it cannot be 
defended from the standpoint of the objector that God punishes a community because of 
the wickedness of some other people in order that `let that be a lesson' or that `let me to 
thank God'. "451 Ayoub does not see a serious problem in "the question of undeserved 
suffering" as the real test. 052 1 believe that while it makes sense to say that suffering is a 
test for someone who is alive after the test, but it is difficult to maintain the same position 
when that person's suffering ends with death. In such a case, the sufferer is not alive to 
take a lesson from a situation. Here comes the significance of the eschatological response 
to human suffering. 
There is one important point that must be made clear here. That is, the Qur'an 
does not attribute all suffering and disaster to human immorality and unbelief. It is wrong 
to generalise the idea of suffering as a punishment for sin since this may insult the 
sufferer. It is only one explanation, among several, to human suffering from the 
standpoint of God. Only God knows whether a disaster is a punishment for sin. What the 
sufferer can do at most is a soul-searching in an effort to determine and correct his or her 
faults. This is only an inward looking into one's own mental and emotional states. The 
Qur'An warns the faithful to avoid such an attitude as associating every blemish with a sin 
committed: "The blind are not at fault, the lame are not at fault, the sick are not at 
fault... " (alNür 24: 61). In another passage, "The blind are not to blame, nor the cripple 
451 Mehmet Aydin, Din Felsefesi (in Turkish; "The Philosophy of Religion"), third edition, (Ankara: Selcuk 
Yayinlan, 1992), 152. 
452 Ayoub, "The Problem of Suffering in Islam, " 276. 
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is to blame, nor the sick are to blame. Whoever obeys Allah and His Apostle, He will 
admit him into gardens beneath which rivers flow, but he who turns away, He will inflict 
upon him a painful punishment" (al-Fath, "the Victory, " 48: 17). 
2. The Free-Will Explanation 
To start with, the Qur'An, as Tanakh and the New Testament, views the cause of 
some suffering in human misuse of free-will ("Ikhtiyar" and "7räda" in Arabic). The 
following verse of the Qur'An succinctly describes this notion of freedom as a basis of the 
belief in life after death. "On that day, men shall emerge in clusters to see their works. 
Then whoever has done an atom's weight of good shall find it; and whoever has done an 
Without free- atom's weight of evil shall find it" (al-Zilzäl, "the Earthquake, " 99: 7-8) 
453 
will, no human beings could be held responsible justly for the actions done. 
Some exegetes of the Qur'an (al-mufassirün) have interpreted this verse in such 
a way as to cover this world and the one to come. Al-Älüs1, for instance, reports one 
interpretation that the unbeliever may be rewarded in this world for the good deeds he or 
she has done, and punished for his or her wickedness in the hereafter. The faithful person 
suffers here on earth for his or her sins, and is rewarded for his or her good deeds in the 
`s' The version of the Qur'an translation used in this work, unless otherwise stated, is The Qur'an: A 
Modern English Translation, translated by Majid Fakhry, (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1997). 
196 
afterlife. 454 In support of this interpretation, a tradition of the Prophet Muhammad is 
called into testimony. According to this tradition reported by the Prophet's companion 
Aba Ayyüb, the faithful shall see the reward of his good deeds in the hereafter. On the 
other hand, the faithful who has done something wrong shall see the recompense of his or 
her misdeeds in the guise of disasters and diseases in the world. 455 
Perhaps one of the most striking example of Free-Will Explanation in the Qur'än 
is in the chapter 11-i `Imrän verse 165. This passage is also what can be called an 
instance of the Qur'anic expression of the problem of evil. When the Muslims were 
defeated at the Battle of Uhud (3 AH - 625 CE), some, described by the Qur'än as the 
hypocrites, questioned the cause of the defeat and the suffering that resulted. God 
responds to them as follows: "And when a misfortune befell you after you had inflicted 
twice as much, you said: `Whence is this? '; say: `It is from yourselves. ' Surely Allah has 
power over everything! " The apparent cause of the suffering was the human beings 
themselves: They had relaxed after the victory of the previous combat, namely, the Battle 
of Badr (2 AH/624 CE); and also they did not have obeyed the orders given to them by 
the Prophet Muhammad before the Battle of Uhud. It was not God but the hypocrites to 
be blamed for the defeat and for the resulting suffering and insult. 
" Shihab al-Din Mahmüd a1-A1üsi, Rtuh al-Ma anf f Tafs>r al-Qur'an al- `A; im wa al-Sab' al-Mathanr 
(Bairüt: Dar Ihya al-Turath al-`Arabiyya, n. d. ) 30,212. 
4S5 Reported in a1., 1nsr Ruh al-Ma `ani, 30,212. 
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The verse in question, as noted above, ends with the proclamation that "Surely, 
Allah has power over everything! " In addition, it is said in the following verse that "And 
what befell you on the day the two armies met was by Allah's leave, that He might know 
the true believers" (alNisä', "the Women, " 4: 166). Clearly, the last passage suggests that 
human free-will is the source of their defeat and humiliation. Further, although God is all- 
powerful, he limits his power in order that human beings use their free-will. In the words 
of Ayoub, "God voluntarily, so to speak, limits His sovereignty by our actions. "456 It is 
necessary that human beings must have free-will because without it there is no meaning 
in testing one's faith and submission, which the Qur'An repeats over and over again. 
The emphasis of the Qur'än on God's absolute control over the creation is 
sometimes seen as an obstacle to the view of human free-will. Some Western scholars 
especially have emphasised that the Qur'fin strongly advocates a doctrine of divine 
predestination ("Qadar" and "Tagdrr"). Having discussed the Qur'anic passages on 
God's sovereignty and free-will, A. J. Wensinck, for instance, concludes, "Yet, to all 
appearance, the main attitude of Islam was in favour of predestination. "457 That is to say, 
God preordained everything in detail before their creation. It is true that God describes 
himself in the Qur'än as the sole creator of everything in the creation evil as well as good. 
For instance, he proclaims, "No affliction befalls in the earth or in yourselves, but it is in 
456 Ayoub, "Ihe Problem of Suffering in Islam, " 275. 
's' A. J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1932), 51. 
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a Book, before We create it; that is easy for God... " (al- fadid, "the Iron, " 57: 22). In 
another verse, "Whomever Allah wants to guide, He opens his heart up to Islam, and 
whomever He wants to lead astray, He makes his heart extremely constricted, as though 
he were ascending to heaven... " (al-An `äm, "the Cattle, " 6: 125) 458 
On the other hand, the Qur'An, as we have seen earlier, holds human beings 
responsible for their actions as they are their author. "Whatever calamity might hit you is 
due to what your hands have earned... " (al-Shürä, "the Counsel, " 42: 28). There are also 
certain Qur'anic passages notifying that God will justly reward and punish people in the 
afterlife. For example, "We set up the just scales for the Day of Resurrection, so that no 
soul shall be wronged a whit; and even if it be the weight of a mustard seed, We shall 
produce it. We suffice as reckoners" (al Anbiyä, "the Prophets, 21: 48). Certainly, the idea 
of just reward and punishment presupposes the existence of certain actions committed by 
free creatures. God himself says that he shall do no wrong or injustice on the day of 
judgement. Instead of holding one of the views as Wensinck does, one needs to accept 
both notions as Qur'anic, because they are in the Qur'än, and then to reconcile them. 
I shall leave the complex theological attempts at reconciling these two notions to 
a later section of the work where I explore the Islamic theological and philosophical 
responses to evil. For now, it suffices to point that the occurrences of evil in the world do 
not nullify divine sovereignty. As Ayoub states, "Evil happens in the world, not in spite 
'-" See also al-An `am 6: 102; al-Rad 13: 16; al-Zumar 39: 62; Ghafir 40: 62; al-$aff 61: 5,7. 
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of the Divine Will, but because God allows it to happen. s4S9 As Satan was given a respite 
"till the Appointed Day" (al"« jr, "the Rock, " 15: 37), the unbeliever and sinful was given 
a respite as well. That is why the Qur'An warns people of the Day of Judgement in which 
"each soul shall know what it advanced and what it deferred" (al-Infitar, "the Cleaving 
Asunder, " 82: 5). 
In short, the Qur'an spells out the source of some, not all, evils and sufferings as 
human free-will. The failure of human judgement between good and evil, right and 
wrong, and the negligence and breach of moral and religious duties bring about disastrous 
results at times. This is a prerequisite condition of human free-will. The possibility of 
choosing wrong and evil is necessary in order that human beings can also have the 
possibility to become a spiritual being higher than the angels. Without the possibility of 
and temptation to evil, doing good and becoming a righteous person does not make sense 
at all. 
The Qur'än informs that the angels, who had been created with only good 
nature, had foreseen the creation of free beings as a problem even before they were 
created. They expressed to God their concern about the negative effects of free creatures 
on earth. They said to God, "Will you place one who will make mischief in it and shed 
blood, while we sing Your praise and glorify Your sanctity? " (al-Baqara, "the Cow, " 
2: 30). This can be seen as an angelic expression of Free-Will Explanation in negative 
terms. In the last part of the passage, God rebukes the angels saying, "I know what you 
459 Ayoub, "The Problem of Suffering in Islam, " 280. 
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do not know. " The story seems to point out, in Muhammad al-Ghazali words, "when a 
creature with both options pursues the path of good and shuns the avenues of evil by 
one's own choice, such a person surpasses all angelic levels of spirituality. "460 Human 
beings are expected to use their free-will in accordance with divine will so that the 
purpose of God in creating the universe and humanity is achieved. To open the doors of 
heavens by their own choices, human beings must also have the realistic choice of doing 
evil as well as good even though the former is not God's wish. 
3. Suffering as Discipline and Test 
Another answer of the Qur'An to human suffering, which is closely related with 
Free-Will Explanation, is suffering as discipline and test of faith. One of the most 
important, if not the most, answers of the Qur'fin is that human struggle in life and 
sufferings may be an instrument of discipline and a test of faith. '' The faith and deeds of 
a human being are tested both to discipline the individual and to expose his or her true 
character. The conditions of life provide individuals with opportunities to acquire or lose 
and to show personal belief or unbelief in God. In addition, moral qualities such as 
courage and generosity could only develop in real conditions of life. It seems true to say 
that suffering as a test and discipline is the gist of all the answers. The Qur'an is full of 
references to this kind of explanation throughout. For instance, "We will certainly test 
you with some fear and hunger and with some loss of property, lives and crops. 
'60 Muhammad al-Ghazali, "The Problem of Evil: An Islamic Approach, " 71. 
461 Ayoub, "The Problem of Suffering in Islam, " 276. 
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Announce the good news to those who endure patiently" (al-Baqara 2: 154). This is 
apparently a means to achieve divine purpose in creating human beings. "He who created 
death and life so as to test you as to whoever of you is fairer in action. He is the All- 
Mighty, the All-Forgiving" (al-Mulk, "the Sovereignty, " 67: 2; cf. Süd, 11: 7). In this 
sense, human life including death is a stage of test and discipline providing humankind 
opportunities to realise the purpose of the creation, which is to know and worship God. 
The terms the Qur'fin most often uses for test and trial are mihna and imtihän 
("trial"), mucibat ("disaster"), bald ("affliction") and, from the same root, ibtild, and fttna 
("temptation"), Each of these terms does not necessarily signify something evil in itself. 
Any aspect, condition of, or object in human life, good as well as evil, can be a matter of 
test. God says in the Qur'an "Every living soul shall taste death, and We test you by evil 
and good as a temptation and unto us you shall be returned" (al Anbiyä' 21: 35). Having 
quoted this verse, al-Sha'rawi (d. 1998), an Egyptian scholar, maintains that what people 
believe as evil and good are test from God. He writes, "the life of this world is nothing 
but tests and trials for people. "062 In this sense, prosperity and abundance of goodness are 
not the signs of God's pleasure, but the test by honouring the individual (al-Fajr, "the 
Dawn, " 89: 15-20). In addition, the chapter al-Anfal verse 28, for instance, describes 
one's wealth and children as a temptation or trial (fitna). In short, faith of human beings 
is put to test through the conditions and components of earthly life. 
462 al-Sha'rawi, Good and Evil, 28. 
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Human beings are tested of their faith and actions along with other conditions of 
human life. The former seems to be the most important aspect of test, namely, a test of 
faith. 463 God has created humankind so that they can be, in the words of the Qur'An., true 
servants to him. They are asked to behave according to the will of God. This is the 
principal condition for the realisation of this divine purpose. He did not create human 
beings and leave them to themselves. In the words of the Qur'än, "Do the people reckon 
that they will be left to say `We believe, ' and will not be tried? " (al- Ankabfit, "the 
Spider, " 29: 1). 4" What is expected from the people who are subjected to a test is to say 
that, "We are Allah's and to Him we shall return" (al-Baqara 2: 155). Endurance and 
patience in the sufferer's trust in God is the only way one could succeed in a test. 
Clearly, what is important for the Qur'än is human reaction to these kinds of 
phenomena. This is because the whole purpose of human creation is described in the 
Qur'än, as we pointed above, in terms of test and trial. As Bowker points out, "This at 
first sight rather casual phrase is in fact extremely important. It means that prosperity is 
as much a test as suffering. "465 As noted earlier, the Qur'an gives precedence to human 
response to the situations and conditions of life. The following verse indicates this idea 
very well. "When an injury touches a man, He calls upon Us. Then if We accord him a 
bounty from Us, he says: `I have been granted it on account of some knowledge. ' 
463 Ayoub, "The Problem of Suffering in Islam, " 276. 
46' See also . 
41-I 'imran 3: 135; Ibrahim, 14: 6; al-Bagara 2: 46. 
"s Bowker, Problems of Suffering in Religions of the World, 110, n. 1. 
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However, it is a mere trial, but most of them do not know" (al-Zumar, "the Throngs, " 
39: 49). 
Perhaps the most important question in this context is why does God resort to 
the method of test at all? If God is all-knowing, the Qur'An affirms so, he must have 
known who is sincere or is not in their faith even before he put them into test. Surely, he 
is not a hedonist God who takes pleasure from the sufferings of human beings. There 
must be a purpose behind this. The following verses of the Qur'An come closer in 
answering this question. "Or did you suppose that you will enter Paradise, before Allah 
has known who were those of you who have struggled, and those who are steadfast" (11-i 
`Imrän 3: 141). "And We shall test you so as to know who are the fighters among you and 
who are the steadfast; and We shall test your news" (Muhammad, "the Prophet, " 47: 31). 
In short, the literal meaning of these passages suggests that God tests human beings so 
that he can know who is the true believer. As pointed out, ignorance cannot be thought of 
God; he knows everything in the past, present, and future. So, what is the true meaning of 
"test so as to know"? 
The exegetes of the Qur'An (pl. al-mufassirßn) interpret these passages in 
various ways. One of the most celebrated exegete ("mufassir") Fakhruddin al-RAIT, for 
instance, understands this verse in symbolic sense. That is to say, God uses a 
metaphorical language to describe a phenomenon that resembles the test human beings 
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do'" As humankind makes use of tests to know, God also uses a similar language to 
express his message. Another interpretation of "test so as to know" is to let the prophets 
and believers know who is a real believer. 467 Test is not for God to know, but God makes 
certain conditions known to other human beings. 
The Qur'anic notion of test is aimed at producing moral features for the people 
who are tested and for others as well. As Cebeci points out, "since ignorance cannot be 
thought about God, who has the knowledge of the unseen ("Ghayb"), his test and trial is 
heavenly, general and educative in the sense that it invites people to a perfect future and 
happiness. "461 The following verse of the Qur'An seems to support this educative 
interpretation: "We did not send forth a prophet to any city but afflicted its people with 
distress and suffering, that perchance they might humble themselves" (al A `räf, "the 
Ramparts, " 7: 93). Here suffering is described in positive terms as an instrument of divine 
discipline. It would seem that this is one way of putting the idea of suffering as a test in 
terms of its positive result. If one submits to divine will and makes right choices in the 
face of afflictions, then the so-called disasters will produce positive benefits such as 
humility, patience and gratitude as well as a true faith in God in this world and the one to 
come. Otherwise, the result is a total failure of the test, which the Qur'an expresses in 
terms of punishment. 
'" Fakhruddfi al-RAS, al-Tafsb a! -Kabir (Mafbtrh al-Ghayb), (Tabrän: Dar al-Kutub aI-'Ilmiyya, n. d), 30, 
55. 
46' Muhammad al-Tabar1 Cam! ' al"Bayan ft Tafsb al-Qur'an (al-Qahira: Dar al-Ma'arii 1978), 2,9. 
Cebeci, Kusan'da $er Kayramt, 214. 
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As pointed out above, I believe that the notion of test and trial can be taken as a 
direct means to educate and discipline the individuals, who are experiencing the 
phenomenon, and the other people as well. Here the emphasis is on the purpose of test, 
which is to provide the opportunity to develop a good morality and righteousness in this 
world, salvation in the hereafter. As Austin writes, 
"suffering may be seen as serving one overriding purpose in Islam and that is 
as a reminder of God's reality and power and of man's creatureliness, of 
God's power to do anything He wishes and of man's obligation to accept that 
will, of God's demand that man should ever remember Him and of man's 
frequent lapses from that awareness. " 
Consequently, the challenges and threats faced throughout life provide humankind the 
opportunity to build character freely and to recognise God's reality. This is what God 
wants from human beings. The failure of the realisation of this purpose is expressed in 
the Qur'än in terms of punishment. 
4. The Eschatological Response 
Connected with the idea of test in this world, the Qur'än affirms a future life 
after death in which all wrongs will be corrected. Those who behave in a desired fashion 
are rewarded if not here most certainly in the hereafter with bountiful blessings of God, 
most importantly with the beatific vision. For those who fail their tests, there is severe 
punishment in hell. It seems to me that the eschatological resolution the Qur'än intensely 
'9 `Umar Austin, "Suff ing is Muslim Religious Thought, " The Islamic Quarterly, 26 (1982), 34. 
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offers throughout, is prerequisite to the idea of test and trial in human's earthly life. The 
reason for this can be seen in the fact that such testing can sometimes bring about 
undeserved and untimely sufferings and death in this world. Here I explore the Qur'An's 
eschatological resolution to suffering under a separate heading since it is distinctly 
another phase of human life, which is beyond our perception now. In addition, it deserves 
a special interest because the Qur'an puts a great deal of emphasis on it. 
The instances of suffering of the innocent and prosperity of the wicked are some 
realities of this world Probably they are also an important part of the test to which human 
beings are subjected. Therefore, it becomes necessary, according to the Qur'än, that the 
innocent and the faithful are rewarded, and the wicked and the disbeliever are punished. 
To illustrate this idea, the Qur'än uses the analogy of the "records" of actions every 
individual conducted in this world. These records will be opened on the Day of 
Judgement ("Yawm al-Din, Yawm al-Qiyama"). While the believer will be recompensed 
with the blessings of the Garden (al-Janna), the disbeliever will end up in the Fire, hell 
("al-Nar, Jahannam"). The Qur'An describes the blessings of Paradise and the 
punishments of hell very vividly in both spiritual as well as material terms 470 
One of the names of the hereafter (al Akhira) in the Qur'än is the Day of 
Judgement (Yawm a! -Qiyama) that designates the day of divine justice. The chapter al- 
170 Ste, for instance, of-Tawba 9: 74; al-TM 52: 24; al-Waq! 'a 56: 171.; al-Qiyama 7523; al-Insan 76: 11-21. 
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Anbyä verse 47 emphasises the justice of God in the hereafter. The verse reads, "We set 
up the just scales for the Day of Resurrection, so that no soul shall be wronged a whit; 
and even if it be the weight of a mustard seed, We shall produce it. We suffice as 
reckoners" (al Anbiyä' 21: 47). The exegete al-Räzi spells out that be it a real or 
metaphorical, the scale of God measures correctly, and does justice properly. 47l 
According to al-Tabari, God's weighing the deeds of human beings openly might be for 
the purpose of removing any grounds of objection that might come from human 
beings 472 
In practical terms, endurance in the face of suffering and submission to divine 
will make sense considering the belief in life after. One could ignore the disasters and 
injustices in this world hoping that they will be recompensed in the hereafter. This belief 
gives to the sufferer a certain degree of strength to endure pain and to hold onto his or her 
faith. For the unbeliever, sufferings in this world are only foretastes of the punishments in 
the afterlife. "We loosed upon them a roaring wind on inauspicious days, so as to make 
them taste the punishment of disgrace in the present life. However, the punishment of the 
Hereafter is more disgraceful and they shall not receive support" (Fuscilat, "Well- 
expounded, " 41: 15). The sufferings in the afterlife are not comparable with the ones in 
this world. "Indeed, whoever commits a sin and his sin takes complete hold of him is one 
471 Al-Razr, al-Tafsrr al-Kablr, 22,176. 
472 Al-TabarT, Cami' al-Bayän Jt Tafsir al"Qur'an, 8,92. 
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of the people of Hell, wherein they will dwell forever (al-Baqara 2: 80). "... Their 
punishment shall not be lightened, nor shall they be helped" (2: 85). 
Moreover, the Qur'än seems to teach that God will redeem the sins of the 
believers as long as they endure suffering patiently holding onto their belief in God. In 
chapter 3 verses 139-40, for instance, God professes that he "might purify the believers 
and annihilate the unbelievers" because of their response to suffering. In this sense, the 
suffering of the believer becomes redemptive for the sufferer as long as he or she is 
faithful to God. In response to a question asked by the Prophet's companion `Abü 
Wagqäs, the Prophet says, "the believer is inflicted with calamities until he is free from 
any sin clung to him. "473 The belief in life after death gives strength to the sufferer, who 
knows that the sufferings in this world will expiate his or her sins in the next. 
To sum up, here the reason for the creation of human beings is to be true 
servants of God. The realisation of this purpose depends on whether human beings have 
acquired faithful dispositions. In this sense, the development of moral disposition is the 
true objective behind the idea of test and trial. Since human beings are not born with 
these desired qualities, they are expected to develop them along with their life 
experiences. 
In other words, human beings experiences including suffering form character. 
As a person starts experiencing the good and evil of this life from his or her birth, then 
'". Abmad b. Hanbal, Musnad (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islam!; 1966), 174. See, also, Muslim bin Iiaccac al- 
Qushayrl, al-Jam! ' al-$ahrh, ed. by M. F. Abdulbagt, (Egypt: 1955), Birr wa al-Sila, 14. 
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suffering and other conditions of human life serve the purpose of creating personal 
dispositions and, also, reviewing and disclosing the acquired ones together. At death, the 
desired personality and faithfulness is either acquired or not. If it is, God will reward the 
person recompensing his or her struggle, suffering and endurance on earth. If not, the 
punishment in hell is awaiting for the wicked. 
In conclusion, could we say that Qur'An solves the problem of evil? From a 
philosophical point of view, it seems to me that it is difficult to make that conclusion. The 
Qur'än describes God as having power over everything and merciful on the one hand, it 
affirms the existence of evil on the other. Although a Muslim earnestly believes that 
whatever God wills is good, it is difficult especially for an atheist to accept that such 
sufferings as a birth of a handicapped baby, an instance of rape and extermination of 
countless people by plagues or any other disaster are good. 
Why does God allow sufferings and death at all? He does not need to test people 
and, accordingly, reward or punish them. Besides, human beings do not come to this 
world as mature beings ready to be tested; they acquire certain qualities in the process of 
life here. The idea of test seems to overlook this notion. Moreover, God would have 
created, if he needed to create at all, humankind as free creatures choosing good in any 
occasion when they face to make a decision. The Qur'än seems to be ambiguous 
concerning such questions. 
A limited answer is from within the faith. The faithful always believe that 
human intellectual ability cannot understand divine wisdom. We cannot know what is in 
God's mind. In addition, there is a life after death in which all the sufferings endured in 
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the world will be recompensed in the hereafter. However, the notion of eternal damnation 
calls further problems about the nature of God. Many would find it difficult to accept that 
God punishes the wicked eternally. Consequently, the Qur'anic answers to evil do not 
seem to offer conclusive response to the problem of evil. They may alleviate to a certain 
degree the sufferings of the faithful providing the strength to hold on to his or her faith 
until the Day of Judgement. 
J. The Muslim Theological And Philosophical Theodicies 
1. The Privation of Good 
Muslim philosophers such as Ikhwän al-Safä' ("Brethren of Purity"), al-FärAbi 
and Ibn Sind (Avicenna) fully developed a philosophical system influenced by the 
thought of Plotinus (c. 204-270 CE). The problem of evil finds its expression in the 
theories of emanation or effusion (lay 1 or $udür) in the writings of these Muslim 
Neoplatonists. The two general characteristics of this thinking are that evil is, firstly, 
accidental to good as all that exits has proceeded from the ultimate Good and the source 
of providence, namely, God. Secondly, evil serves for a good end in God's creation when 
it is seen from the totality of the creation. 
Brethren of Purity, who were a group of Muslim intellectuals emerged in al- 
Ba, ra in the second half of 4t' AH/10`h CE century, discussed some aspects of the 
problem of evil in their corpus of fifty-two Epistles known as Rosa 'ii in Arabic. They do 
not deny the existence of evil in the world, but what is essential is good in the totality of 
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the creation. The wise and omniscience God does not will anything evil. If something 
appears to us as evil, we must bear in mind that there is always a good purpose behind 
it. 474 In this sense, their view of evil can be described as consequential and instrumental 
in the sense that the instances of evil serve a good purpose even though human beings 
cannot always understand what that purpose might be. If this total picture is lost, one may 
easily lose his or her faith in the face of particular evils. 475 A similar view can also be 
found in the writings of al-Kind! (c. 185-260 AH/801-873 CE), who is known to be the 
first philosopher of Islam 476 In short, according to Ikhwän as well as al-Kindi, the whole 
creation is the manifestation of divine wisdom, and, therefore, it cannot be evil. 
Individual sufferings administer a good purpose in the total picture of the creation. 
According to this instrumental view, God has created good and evil in the world in 
accordance with his wisdom. 
The Turkish philosopher al-Fkäbi (c. 256-339 AH/c. 870-950 CE), who is also 
called "the Second Master" (in Arabic al-Ustäz al-Thant) after Aristotle, maintained that 
there is no evil (shar) in nature. He even went so far as to content that what is called evil 
in nature is good (khayr). While refusing to call natural calamities as evil, he concedes 
the reality of moral evil. He points out this distinction pointing that he is talking here 
474 IkhwRn al-$a+, Rasd'il Ikhwdn al-$af '(Beirut: Dar $äder, n. d. ), 4,73-5. 
475 Ikhwan al-$afd', Rasa 'ii, 3,506-7. 
476 See, for instance, a1-KindI Rasa'il al-Kindtal-Falsafiyya, ed. by M. A. Abu Rids, (Cairo: 1950), 1,215. 
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about natural events which human free-will has nothing to do. r Such natural evils as 
earthquakes, floods and diseases are, for him, not evil but good. For they are, firstly, 
emanated from God; secondly, they are good in terms of their function from the 
standpoint of the totality of the creation. 
As pointed out earlier, al-Fbi grounds his view on the theory of emanation 
(fay(l or pdür). According to this theory, by contemplating himself God, who is the 
Necessary Being (Wäjib al-Wujüd), emanates the first intellect (al- `Aql al Awwal) from 
himself. The First Intellect, by contemplating himself, emanates the Second Intellect, and 
so forth until the emanation of the Tenth Intellect. The just and good God is the ultimate 
perfection from which only good emanates. The goodness decreases with each emanation 
since each Intellect from which the following Intellect emanates is more perfect than the 
emanated. 478 In this sense, the imperfection in matter is a natural result of successive 
emanations, of separation from the ultimate Good, namely, God. 
According to al-Färäbl, the apparent evils have a purpose within the totality of 
the creation. They function for a good end. In addition, the amount of evil is less than the 
amount of good in the world. Therefore, they are good in terms of their function. Let us 
take fire as an example. No one doubts that fire is necessary for human survival. It is also 
a fact that the uncontrolled fire sometimes destroys human lives and livelihood. However, 
' Abo Nasr Muhammad al-FaräbT Fusül al Madanr, ed. by D. M. Dunlop, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1961), 81. 
47' Necip Taylan, Islam Di1yüncesinde Din Felsefeleri (Istanbul: M. Ü. tlahiyat Fakiiltesi Vakfi Yaymlan, 
1994), 136. 
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to sustain life in the world the existence of fire is necessary with the possibility that it 
may cause disaster as well. Therefore, even the imperfections of the world manifest order 
in and purposefulness of the creation. 
It seems that Ibn Sum (369-428 AIV979-1037 CE), one of the greatest Muslim 
philosophers, discusses the problem of evil more than any other Islamic philosopher does. 
Following his master al- Fbr, Ibn Sind affirms that the creation is emanated from the 
good and providential God. Therefore, it is good when it is seen from the totality of the 
creation. In addition, the imperfections in the world are accidental to and necessary for 
good. In its ultimate sense, evil is privation of being. God cannot create a world free from 
imperfection. 
One central point in Ibn Sin's dealing with evil as in al- Färäbi is that evil (al- 
Shar bi' I I? ät) is privation (`adam) of being and of something natural. However, this 
privation is not to be understood in the sense of absolute negation (`adam muulaq) or non- 
being. It is a sort of privation that involves in the removal from the nature of the 
perfection that is fixed for its nature (tabT `atih) 479 This is a natural consequence of 
successive emanations from God, who is the ultimate Good. Ibn SinA gives the example 
of fire and water to explain his theory of privation. According to this, both fire and water 
are necessary elements for human life, therefore, they are good. Yet we also know that 
sometimes they both cause disasters and sufferings. It is then they are called evil. 
479 Abü `Ali Ibn Stnä, al-Ship al-Ildhryydt, edited by G. C Anawati and S. Zäyed, (Cairo: 1960), 2,416. 
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However, this is not a healthy judgement because their essential nature is good; the 
imperfections they cause are accidental to their essential nature. Therefore, the 
occurrences of such evils as fire and water cause cannot in any circumstances remove 
their true nature, which is good. 480 Therefore, evil has no autonomous existence in the 
universe; but it exists as a potential within being. 
The traces of the privative theory of evil can be found in the thinking of Ibn al- 
`Arabi, (560-638 AH/1165-1240 CE), who is known "the Greatest Master" (al-Shaykh al- 
Akbar) among ýfffis, Muslim mystics. According to Ibn al-`Arabr, all that is called evil 
such as human and animal suffering, poverty and diseases is relative. That is to say, there 
is no evil in itself in the creation (Khalq) because God cannot be thought to have created 
any evil. He is Pure Being, the Good. 
Ibn al-`Arabi asserts that "essential evil (al-shar al-mahc) is essential 
nothingness and darkness (al- `adam al-mahd wa al-culma al-mahda), and essential being 
(al-wujüd al-mahd) is essential good and light (al-khayr al-mab(l wa al-nur al-mahd). "481 
As A. E. Affifi pointed out, "darkness" and "light" in Ibn al-`Arabi are not two 
autonomous principles as they are believed to be in Zoroastrian faith. 482 Instead, the 
former, to Ibn al-'Arabi, designates non-existence, the latter existence. However, it must 
490 Ibn Sinn, a1-Shp al-Ildhoilt, 2,420-1. 
481 Muhyiddin Ibn al-`Arabi, al-Futuhat al-Makkfyyah (Cairo: AH 1293), I, 520. 
482 A. E. AffIfi, The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din-Ibnul Arab! (Lahore, Pakistan: SH. Muhammad 
Ashra1; 1979), 159. 
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be pointed out that according to his theory of the "Oneness of Being" (Wahdat al-Wujüd), 
the distinction of good and evil is on the level of "appearance. " There is no such thing as 
good as well as evil in "reality" (JIagq). Because according to Ibn al-'Arabr, there is only 
one "Reality" in existence, that is, God (al-5agq) 483 
The modem influential Shi'i philosopher Murta4A Mutahhari (1921-1979), too, 
maintains that "a simple observation shows that the nature of evil is `privation' and `non- 
existence'. " 4 However, he points out that privation does not mean that there is no evil in 
the world. No one can deny the reality of such evils as blindness, deafness, death and 
earthquake. Otherwise, there would be no point in struggling in life to eradicate suffering, 
pain and injustices. So, how is one to understand the privative theory? Mutahhari 
explains, "All of these [evils] are of a kind of `privation' ("adamiyyat") and `deficiencies' 
(°° ikdanai ')... They are evil because they are either deficient, lacking, empty or absent, 
or the source of deficiency, lack, emptiness or absence. "485 It. is the responsibility of 
human beings to remedy the situations of privation and deficiency. Muta1i1 rl believes 
that his analysis eliminates the question as to who created evil. Because evil is not being, 
but it is absence of being. Therefore, to ask "whence evil" is futile as there is no such a 
being as evil. 
483 ft al-. Arabr, Fusü a! -Wkam, with the Commentary of al-Qashsnt, (Cairo: AH 1309), 147. 
`a` Mula>bäri, Adl-1 Ildhl, 155. 
`u Mutabba11 Adl-i IldR 156-7. 
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However, I am not sure that this theory can provide a solution to the problem of 
the source of evil. First of all, the distinction between evil and good is not as clear as 
Muaahh ff thinks. In fact, the author himself admits this in the following paragraph. He 
says, "good and evil are mixed to each other. 9486 One cannot firmly say in any instance 
that this is good or that is evil. An implication of this is, if we agree to the theory of 
privation, that good is no different from evil. That is to say that good is privation of evil. 
Moreover, even if we suppose that one can make such judgements, this 
explanation does not justify God in the face of evil. If God is just and good as it is 
believed to be, why did then he allow these deficiencies and privation? Surely, he must 
be powerful enough to remove them or to create so to speak "perfect beings" without any 
want. Mehmet Aydm articulates this point very well. He writes, 
"to deny the reality of evil is not a solution to the problem, but it is an escape 
from it. Evil belongs to our world as good does. Rain is good as long as it is in 
the right quantity for soil. If the term "good" here has a meaning, it must have 
a meaning to say evil for flood as well. "`$' 
However, it seems to me that the theory of privation does not comply with an 
essential reason for the existence of religions. If evil had no reality, why would 
humankind be urged to eradicate evil as much as possible and help the sufferer? Of 
course, this is not the case. Most of the religions of the world affirm the reality of evil, 
and urge their followers to terminate the causes of suffering. As the Muslim philosopher 
4i' Mutabl ail, Adl-i llaht. 157. 
427 Mehmet Aydin, Din Felsefesi, 152. 
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Ibn Rushd (520-595 AH/1126-1198 CE) contends, "He is the creator of all things, both 
good and evil, because of what most of the communities have believed, that there are two 
Gods, one of them the creator of good, and the other the creator of evil. i488 Since there is 
only one creator, and evil is as real as good is, then God must be the cause evil as well as 
good. Consequently, it seems safe to say that the privation theory does not solve the 
problem of evil by denying its reality. 
2. The Free-Will Explanation 
It seems that the majority of Muslim theologians and philosophers have affirmed 
that the cause of some moral evil is human free-will. In plain language, they all believe 
that human beings have been equipped with certain qualities such as senses and intellect 
to distinguish good from evil and right from wrong. In addition, God sent his messengers 
to human beings in order that they would use their free-will sensibly. It is for this reason 
that humankind is responsible for their actions to God as well as to human fellows. 
Although it does not sound problematic if it is expressed crudely, the problem as to who 
is the creator of human actions, God or human beings, seems to have caused serious 
discussions among Muslim theologians from the early times. The reason for this debate 
appears to be the Qur'anic ambiguity over divine predestination and human free-will. 
The Qur'Wc references seem to be convenient to understand the notions of 
God's predestination and human free-will side by side. The same trend can be observed 
483 Ibn Rushd, Kitöb al-Kashf an Mandhic al Adilla, quoted from J. W. Sweetman, Islam and Christian 
Theology: A Study of the Interpretation of Theological Ideas in the Two Religions (London: Lutterworth 
Press, 1967), 172. 
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in the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. Since the Prophet did not allow Muslims to 
enquire about the nature of predestination at that time, 489 this mystery was not unravelled 
completely. A century after the Prophet died, a serious controversy erupted among 
Muslim theologians concerning divine predestination and human free-will. 
For the first time in Islamic history MA'bad al-Juhani (80 AH/699 CE), the 
originator of the Qadariyya school of theology, asserted that human beings, not God, 
determined their own actions. The Qadart theologians refused to accept divine 
predestination in the sense that God predetermines everything before creation. "" The 
majority of Muslim theologians accused them of heresy. There are no more 
representatives of the Qadariyya sect in Muslim intellectual circles today. On the other 
hand, the founder of the Jahmiyya sect Jahm b. $afwwn (128 AW745 CE) denied human 
free-will and thought that humans were under the total control of God as inanimate 
beings were. 491 To attribute action to human beings should be taken figuratively rather 
than literally in the sense that "water runs" or "the sun rises. " As God makes the sun rise, 
he also creates the actions of human beings. 
Later the views of the Qadariyya was taken over by the founder of the Mu'tazila 
school of theology W Sit b. `AtA' (80-131 AH/699-748 CE). The Mu'tazil theologians 
would call themselves "the People of Justice and Unity" (Ahlu al- `Adl wa al-Tawhtd). 
489 See, for instance, Jalal al-Din al-Suyüti, Fayz al-Qadrr (Egypt: 1938), 1,347. 
490 `Abd al-Karim al-Shahristanl, al-Milal wa'lNihal (Cairo: 1961), 1,37. 
491 al-shahristänI, al-Milal wa'l-Nihal, 1,37. 
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Accordingly, human beings were the creator of their own acts. As a reaction to the 
Mu'tazila, al-Ash'arr (260-324 AH/873-935 CE) abandoned his old school and took a 
position against the Mu'tazila, later it would be known as the Ash'ariyya. Al-Mäturidi 
(333 AH/944 CE), the founder of the Mäturidiyya, tried to find a middle way between the 
Mu'tazila and the Ash'ariyya. Here I shall explore briefly the views of the last three 
schools of thought. 
The Mu'tazili theologians affirmed human free-will as a source of human good 
and evil, a view which the majority of Muslim theologians have described as unorthodox. 
Although the sect ceased to exist, the teaching of the Mu'tazila seems to have found 
fertile ground among Shi`i Muslims. According to Mu'tazila, human beings "creates" 
their actions, good and evil; therefore, they are to be blamed or commended for their 
actions. 492 God cannot create evil, infidelity, and wickedness in a person. He cannot even 
desire these things to happen because he is all-good and just. Their evidence is from the 
Qur'fin. "... Then unto your Lord is your return and He will tell you what you used to do. 
He knows the secrets within the breasts" (al-Zumar 39: 7); and `But as to the unbelievers, 
wretched are they and perverse are their works" (Muhammad 47: 8). Therefore, the 
Mu'tazili theologians attribute moral evils to human free-will. Connected to this, they 
asserted that the intellectual capacity to make choices is inherently present in human 
'92 Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 208. 
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nature. Revelation is only a favour of the good and all-wise God. Without revelation, 
human intellect has the ability to distinguish good from evil. 
One of the greatest Mu'tazili theologians W1 Abd al-Jabbär (323-415 AH1935- 
1025 CE) maintained that the work of creation can be attributed to others beside God. He 
refers to the Qur'fin in support of his argument. Some of his evidences are that Jesus 
"created" the likeness of a bird (al-Mkida, "the Table, " 5: 110), and Allah is described as 
"the Best of Creators, " (al-Mu'minun 23: 14). K24i Abd al-Jabbär asserts that as the 
Qur'än attributes creation to creatures, there is no danger of polytheism (shirk) in 
attributing creation to human beings as well 493 Therefore, it is safe to say that human 
beings create their own actions, and are responsible for them. In this sense, the cause of 
moral evil is the human failure of making the right choice. 
In response to the Mu'tazili assertion, Ibn IIazm (384-456 AIV994-1064 CE), 
who lived in Muslim Spain, argues that even if we can accept that human beings are the 
creators of their own choices and actions, this does not solve the problem. As an all- 
powerful God, he could have prevented any moral evil before it happened. He would not 
have allowed a person to commit sins and immoral actions or to deny divine reality. "" 
God has the power to do this. 
493 KAI Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh Usßl al-Khamsa, ed by `Abd a1-Karlm Uthman, (Cairo: Maktaba Wahba, 
1965), 379-80. 
494 Ibn Ham, Kitab al-Fisdl fi'l Milal (Cairo: AH 1317), 3,142. 
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Al-Ash'arl and later al-MAturidi developed a theory of "acquisition" in order to 
reconcile human responsibility with God's omnipotence and justice 49s According to al- 
Ash'arr, God is the absolute and sole creator of human actions, and human beings 
"acquire" these actions. The theologian describes acquisition as follows: "It is necessary 
for the action that there must be an acquirer (muktasib) as it is necessary that there must 
be a creator (Fa `il) to create the action. "496 In this sense, a human being acquires an 
action with his volition (iräda), which is created by God (hudith), and God creates it. For 
instance, a human being acquires the state of being a believer or unbeliever, and God 
creates both faith (Tmkn) and infidelity (kufr) in those people. 97 Therefore, God is not 
responsible for human acquisitions. If we translate this into our issue, human beings 
choose to acquire sin and other moral evils and God accordingly creates them. God does 
not force anything on them. 
One could ask, if human beings acquire an action that is created by God, is it not 
true to say that they are the real agents of their actions? Al-Maturidr, who also developed 
a theory of acquisition (kalb) similar to al-Ash`ari, maintains that "everyone knows from 
himself that he is autonomous (mukhtär) in what he does, and he is agent (f1fi1) and 
4" W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1995), 42. 
496 Aba al-Hasan al-Ash`ari, Kitob al-Luma' (Beirut: 1952), 73. 
497 Al-Ash'arZ Kitab al-Luma, 74. 
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acquirer (kösib). "498 The difference between al-Ash`ari and al-Mäturidi seems to be that 
while the latter attributes only the creation of an action to God and the agency and 
acquisition to human beings, the former attributes the agency to God as well. However, 
this subtle difference seems to me not significant since both the theologians say the same 
thing in the final reckoning. That is, human beings acquire an action with their created 
volition and God creates it. If so, how could individuals be entirely free, and responsible 
for their actions. God could have created human volition in a way that he or she would 
always choose good whenever he or she made a decision. Since he did not, the question 
stands: Is God also not responsible for moral evils committed by human beings? 
It seems to me that Muslim philosophers were more concerned with the problem 
of natural evil rather than moral evil. A pressing question for them was the disorders in 
nature, which they believed to be good. As pointed out earlier, al-Fbi denies the reality 
of natural evil, and recognises human free-will as the cause of moral evil. Although he 
does not discuss moral evil in as much detail as he does natural evil, one can still trace 
some indications of the Free-Will Explanation. Concerning moral evils, al-Frbi 
associates moral evil with the privation of "happiness" and actions leading to 
unhappiness. The term he uses as opposed to "happiness" (sa `kda) is "wretchedness" 
(shagä 1. For al-Faräbt, the cause of this evil is human will or volition (iräda). 499 
4" Abü Mangür al-Maturidl Kitäb al-Tawhid, edited by Fatl}ullah Khulayf, (Beirut: 1970), 226. 
"" A1-Faräbr, Fusill al-Madanl, 81. 
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Muhammad Abduh (1265-1323 AH/1849-1905 CE), who is widely regarded 
among the founders of Muslim modernism, affirms that human free-will is responsible 
for moral evils. He believes that human intellect is able to differentiate between good and 
evil. Therefore, some actions chosen freely by an agent contain the quality of good and 
evil in themselves S0° According to Abduh, human intuition and intellect can determine 
which action is good or evil. If this were not the case, human intellect, and consequently, 
free-will would have no significance whatsoever. sol If human beings were not free in 
their actions, it would be unjust to hold them responsible for their actions. 
The Shi'i philosopher Mutalihari also affirms that human beings have free-will, 
and the failure to make the right choice is a cause of moral evil such as sin and immoral 
conduct. He seems to talk about two different kinds of causes of moral evil. One is the 
privation of good human qualities such as in the case of incapacity (`ajz) and poverty 
(faqr). Accordingly, moral evil proceeds from human beings not because God refrains his 
providence (imsäk-i fayz) from them but because there is a lack or deficiency of certain 
good qualities in certain people 502 
The other cause of moral evil is brought about by the intentional choice of 
human free-will. Mutahhan asserts that since human beings are free creatures and 
responsible for themselves and their surroundings as the "vicegerent of God, " they are 
S0° Mu1}ammad `Abduh, Risdla a! -TawhTd, (Cairo: 1966), 56. 
501 `Abduh, Risäla a1-Tawhid, 57. 
502 Mutabbär Adl-i 1lah7 173. 
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bound to behave in a certain way. 503 The failure to do so brings about moral evils such as 
sin and corruption. 
Two objections could be raised to Mutahharr in particular and to other defenders 
of Free-Will Explanation in general. Firstly, it is difficult to understand how a person 
who was born and brought up within, say, a criminal environment could be entirely free, 
and therefore responsible for his or her criminal acts. Most probably, the person will tend 
to follow the examples he presently has. God could have created that person in a neutral 
environment or prevented the bad effects he was subjected to from birth onwards. Since 
this is not the case, how is it possible that that person could be free in the ultimate sense 
and responsible for his or her actions. Secondly, although the Free-Will Explanation 
offers a partial solution to the origin of moral evil in the sense that human beings are the 
authors of their actions, it does not answer why God had to create free creatures to 
disobey him. He could have created free creatures that would choose good rather than 
evil every time they made a decision. 
3. The Best-Possible-World Theodicy 
The best possible world explanation enjoys a special place in Islamic tradition 
even though it has lost its charm in the Western traditions. An optimistic account of the 
world has been a common feature of Islamic thought. As mentioned above, a great 
number of Muslim theologians, pfis, and philosophers have argued that this is a good 
world and there is no genuine evil. Be it created or emanated, the all-wise and just God 
Mu ät , Aal-i 
11uhi 173-4. 
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would not bring about anything evil, let alone anything useless. However, this optimist 
approach took its mature form in the writings of one of the most influential theologians 
and philosophers, namely, al-Ghazni (450-505 AH/1058-1111 CE). This is an influential 
theodicy developed in Islamic tradition even before Leibniz's Best of All Possible 
Worlds theodicy. 
Before exploring al- GhazAlt's Best of All Possible Worlds theodicy, I shall 
summarise the Mu'tazili doctrine of al-aslah. As perhaps the founders of optimism in 
Islamic theology, the Mu'tazill theologians argued that God was obliged to create the 
best. Although some of them held that God had to create the best in the hereafter not in 
this world, they all believed that God created only good if not the best. 504 This is the idea 
which actually led al-Ash'arl to secede from the Mu'tazila. It is often narrated that one 
day al-Ash`ar questioned his Mu'tazili master al-Jubba'i's notion of optimism with a 
story. It is known as "the story of the three brothers. " They are a child, a believer and an 
unbeliever who die and are recompensed accordingly. The conversation between al- 
Ash`arr and al-Jubba'r runs as follows: 
"What, asked al-Ash`ari, if the child who had died should say, `0 Lord! If 
only you had let me live, it would have been better (aclah), for then I would 
have entered paradise? ' God, replied al-Jubbä'!, would say to the child, `I 
501 Kä«Abd al-Jabbar, Sharer Usül al-Khamsa, 301. 
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knew that if you had lived, you would have become a sinner and then entered 
hell. ' But, then, countered al-Ash`ari, the unbeliever in hell would exclaim, `0 
Lord! Why did you not kill me as a child, too, so that I would not sin and then 
enter hell? ' At this, according to the accounts, al-Jubbä'T was left 
speechless "sos 
Al-Ash`ari refused the idea that God had to create good or the best, and 
embraced that God was the sole creator of evil as well as good. Al-Ash`ari writes, "Good 
and evil (occur) through the decree and power of God. We believe in God's decree and 
power ... the good as well as the evil, the sweet as well as the bitter. s506 Human beings can 
only acquire acts; it is God who creates. It seems that the tide turns back with al-Ghazäli. 
Al-GhazAli, who was an Ash`arr, maintained that this world is the best of all 
possible worlds because the omniscient, powerful and just God would not do less. Al- 
Ghazälr maintains, "there is essentially no better, more perfect, and more complete world 
than this one" (laysafi'l-imkan aslan ahsana minhu wa la atamma wa la akmala). 507 In 
subsequent years, this saying was to spread in a shorter form among Muslims: "there is 
no possible world better than this" (laysa fi'l-imkän abda' min mä kän). Although al- 
505 Eric Linn Ormsby, An Islamic Version of Theodicy: The Dispute over al- Giuzälr's "Best ofAll Possible 
Worlds" (PhD: Princeton University, 1981), 27. 
506 al-Ash`arl, al-lbdna `an Usi21 al-Dydna, 291 as quoted in Ormsby, An Islamic Version of Theodicy, 27. 
"I Aba Hamid Muhammad a1-GhazM Ihyd al-Ulum al-Drn, (Cairo: 1968), 4,321. 
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Ghazali's theodicy can be found in several of his works, we shall concentrate on one of 
his most influential books, Ibyb al-Ulum al DIn ("The Revival of Islamic Sciences"). 
When discussing God's unity, al-Ghazali asserts that for one to have the true 
faith it is necessary to believe without any doubt that it is not possible to have a world 
better, more beautiful and more perfect than this one. Al-Ghazäli writes, "If people 
directed their gaze and considered steadfastly everything that God has created in heaven 
and earth, they would see neither discrepancy nor rift. " He continues, "Everything which 
God apportions to man, such as sustenance, life-span, pleasure and pain, capacity and 
incapacity, belief and disbelief, obedience and sin, is all of it sheer justice, with no 
injustice in it; and pure right, with no wrong in it. " The following passage is perhaps the 
heart of al-Ghazili's argument. He contends, "Indeed, it is according to the necessarily 
right order, in accord with what must be and as it must be and in the measure in which it 
must be; and there is not in possibility anything whatsoever more excellent, more perfect 
and more complete than it. "508 This is the best world among all the possible worlds. 
The Turkish philosopher of religion Cafer Yaran analyses al-Ghazäli's theodicy 
of the best of all possible worlds, and detects two kinds of arguments. One is a priori 
argument, and the other is a posterior. 309 According to al-Ghazäll's a priori argument, 
the creation of the best of all possible worlds is a necessity of being God. Al-Ghazali 
501 Al-Ghazäll, Ihyä al-Ulum al-Dm, 4,222-3 as quoted in Ormsby, An Islamic Version of Theodicy, 46-7. 
50 Cafer S. Yaran, Kötuluk ve T7jeodise, 157. 
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states, "For if there were and He had withheld it, having power to create it but not 
deigning to do so, this would be miserliness contrary to the divine justice. But if He were 
not able, it would be incapability contrary to divinity. "510 Firstly, if God had the power to 
create the best, and had not created it, it would be injustice on his part. Therefore, as a 
just God he has to create the best of all possible worlds. Secondly, if he did not have the 
power, then he would be incapable and impotent. God cannot be thought to be powerless. 
Therefore, he must be capable of creating the best possible world. Consequently, it is 
necessary that the just and all-powerful God must create the best of all possible worlds. 
This is, therefore, the best possible world. 
Is that really so? We observe that there are many natural and moral evils in the 
world. If this is the best that God could do, is he really powerful or just? Is it not true that 
this notion limits God's power? A similar kind of concern led many theologians 
immediately to criticise al-Ghaz. li's argument. Among them is al-Biqa. He refuses to 
accept that the world containing evils such as deafness, lameness, vengeance and hate 
could be the best world. God could have done better than this. He could have created 
human beings with such perfect qualities as knowledge and power so that they would not 
do any evil. Al-Biq9i reverses al-Ghazhli's statement and says, "There is in possibility 
more wonderful than what is" (käna fi'l-imkän abda' min ma kän). 
sll 
510 a1-Ghazalr, l zya al Ulüm al-DIn, 4,222-3 as quoted in Ormsby, An Islamic Version of Theodicy, 47. 
su JbrabIm b. 'Umar al-Bigät, Tabd m al-Arkan min Laysa fr'l-Imken Abda' min ma Kan, as quoted in 
Ormsby, An Islamic Version of Theodicy, 166. 
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Cafer Yaran argues that this is not a correct way to understand the optimistic 
view because it overlooks the purposeful nature of the creation. "An analysis that does 
not take into account the teleological aspect of the world and human being, " writes 
Yaran, "can see the creation deficient or evil, and can suggest a better one. "s12 Such a 
world will not be better than this because the structure of the world will be different. In a 
world in which there is no natural and moral evil, human beings cannot be entirely free in 
the sense that there will be no requirement from them to behave in a certain way. Because 
the conditions giving value to human existence will not be present any more. They will 
not be free creatures as they are now. 
It is true that the purposefulness of the creation in al-Ghazäll's argument seems 
to be overlooked by the critics in most of the cases. In order to show what they imagine 
to be the best possible world, the critics often tend to exaggerate and ignore the whole 
picture. This is partly al-Ghazfili's fault because sometimes he depicts the world as if 
there is no evil and everything is perfect. This is not actually true; he believes that there 
are some imperfections in the world such as poverty and disease; but he does not believe 
that they are actually evil. However, God designs the ills of the world for a good purpose, 
and their reward will be in the hereafter. In the words of al-Ghaz. li, 
"Indeed, all poverty and loss in this world is a diminution in this world but an 
increase in the next. Every lack in the next world in relation to one individual 
is a boon in relation to someone else. For were it not for night, the value of 
512 Yaran, Kotalak ve Theodfse, 159. 
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day would be unknown. Were it not for illness, the healthy would not enjoy 
health. Were it not for hell, the blessed in paradise would not know the extent 
of their blessedness. In the same way the lives of animals serve as ransom for 
human souls; and the power to kill them which is given to humans is no 
injustice. "513 
Therefore, al-Ghazäli's main concern seems to be the purposefulness of the world. Since 
the world is purposeful, it must be the best of all possible worlds. However, there is no 
way of knowing whether it is the best or not, or whether God has a conception of possible 
worlds. Some of our experiences in this world force us to acknowledge that this may not 
be the best world God could have created. This takes us to the Muslim philosopher's a 
posterior argument. 
Al-Ghazäli, as Yaran pointed out, 514 employs a posterior argument in his best of 
all possible worlds theodicy. In order to support his argument that this is the best world, 
al-Ghazäli argues that the extant world is so perfect so that it cannot get any better than 
this. Even the slightest change in the constituents of the world would spoil the perfection 
of the creation. The Muslim philosopher supports this assertion with evidences from 
nature and human life. For instance, he writes, 
"A gnat is a small thing to see; and yet, were the inhabitants of the heavens 
and earth, the angels and those below them in both worlds, and all the other 
creatures, to wish to know how the Creator apportioned its parts and perfected 
513 AI-Ghaz2lt, 1hy0 al-Ulüm al-Din, 4,222-3 as quoted in Ormsby, An Islamic Version of Theodicy, 47. 
5" Yaran, Köti11fük ve Theodise, 163. 
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the symmetry of its limbs' forms, they would not be capable of anything 
beyond displaying their inability, for they are ignorant of the truth of the 
matter. """ 
Divine wisdom has fashioned the creation so perfect that the limited human 
mind cannot truly understand the true nature and the purpose of the creation. From the 
smallest creatures such as the gnat to complex ones like humankind there is no creature 
without any purpose. In the words of al-Ghazali, "Consider whether you can find in the 
creation of the body anything without its meaning. ""' The philosopher extends his notion 
of the perfection of the creation to human social order. He, for example, regards the use 
of money (dirham and dinar) as "one of God's greatest blessings toward man"517 due to 
the crucial role they play in human society. 
However, God is under no obligation (wujüb) to create the best for human 
beings, but is free to do so. Nothing is necessary for him. Otherwise, he would not be 
God. He tries to reconcile the idea of the best world with God's transcendence. Al- 
Ghaz21T states, "God is generous (mutafaddil) in creating, in inventing, and in imposing 
obligation, ... not out of any necessity (wujüb)... and He is lavish in providing favors and 
515 AI-Ghaza1I, al-. (Iikma ft Makhlügati'1-ldh, 54 as quoted in Ormsby, An Islamic Version of Theodicy, 55. 
516 pl-Ghazäli, a1-JIikma tMakhlilgäti'l-1dh, (Cairo: 1934), 23 as quoted in Ormsby, An Islamic Version of 
Theodicy, 58. 
517pl-Ghazall, lhya al-Ultzn al-Drn, 4,79 as quoted in Ormsby, An Islamic Version of Theodicy, 59-60. 
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`the optimal' (al-aclah)... not out of any obligation (luzüm). "518 As an Ash`ar% al-Ghazäli 
believes that God is the sole creator of the whole existence including human actions. The 
characteristic expression of this idea can be seen in his following saying, "What He wills, 
is and what He does not will, is not. "519 He follows the Ash'arr view of human 
acquisition and God's creation. 
To sum up, it seems to me that al-Ghazall's Best-Possible-World Theodicy can 
be seen as an attempt at reconciling divine justice and wisdom with the apparent evils of 
the world. God is the sole creator, and from him only good proceeds. In this sense, the 
creation is a manifestation of divine goodness and wisdom. As for the imperfections of 
the world, they cannot be evil since they, at least some of them, constitute certain portion 
of divine creation. Therefore, earthquakes and diseases are created for a purpose. In this 
sense, they are good. 
However, I think that there is no way of checking realistically whether this is the 
best world. Although the beauty and orderliness of the world appears to support the idea 
that this is the best world, some human experiences make it bitterly difficult to accept. 
Moreover, the Best-Possible-World Theodicy does not explain why God is silent to the 
sufferings of many innocent people, and why certain people are more subjected to a 
greater suffering than others. Apart from instances of excessive suffering in the world, 
513 AI-Ghazali, Ihyd al-b7am al-Din, 1,80 as quoted in Ormsby, An Islamic Version of Theodicy, 328. 
519 A]-Ghazalt, a1-Igtis4d fi'l-1'tigdd, 108 as quoted in Ormsby, An Islamic Version of Theodicy, 244. 
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the irregularities of distribution of suffering and pain as well challenges the view al- 
Ghaz IT presents. 
The Muslim philosopher and theologian must have seen these difficulties. No 
wonder, then, that he refrains from discussing certain aspects of the problem of evil such 
as divine predestination and divine wisdom. It is not rare to meet such expressions as the 
following: "an explanatory treatment of this is not allowed; " or "disclosure of the 
mystery of God's lordship is kufr ["infidelity"] . 
020 He also retreats in the notion of 
divine mystery in the last resort. 
4. Suffering as Redemption 
One answer to the problem of human suffering in Islamic tradition often 
associated with ShI't thought is that certain suffering is redemptive. In its simple sense, 
redemptive suffering affirms that the faithful are delivered from sin through such 
sufferings as disease, injury and death. There seem to be some references alluding to the 
redemptive understanding of suffering both in the Qur'än and the Prophet's tradition. 521 
Yet, there is no doctrine of redemption formulated in the Qur'dn and Islamic theology, 
520 A]-Ga Ibya al-Ulmn al-Dcn, 4,213 as quoted in Ormsby, An Islamic Version of Theodicy, 89. 
521 See "the Eschatological Responses" in "The Problem of Evil and the Answers of the Qur'an" above. 
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either in Shi`i or Sunni thought. 522 However, in recent years, there have been some 
attempts to understand suffering in redemptive terms in ShI'I thought. 
It appears that Sunn1523 Muslims are reluctant to affirm the idea of redemptive 
suffering. For instance, Muzammil Siddiqi in his essay "The Doctrine of Redemption: A 
Critical Study" contends that the idea of redemption is not mentioned in the Qur'an, and 
therefore, it is not an Islamic notion. 524 He further argues that Muslim Scripture rejects 
the idea of original sin, Incarnation and vicarious suffering, which are the bases of the 
notion of redemption. Then he admits that there is a passage in the Qur'än in the story of 
Abraham's sacrifice to God of his son, which is very similar to the one in the Hebrew 
Bible (Numbers 3: 45-6). 525 Abraham obeyed God's order and attempted to sacrifice his 
son. Pleased with Abraham's intention, God ransomed Ishmael with a large sacrifice. The 
Qur'anic passage reads, "And We ransomed him with a large sacrifice" (al-$aj9 t, "the 
Rangers, " 37: 107). To commemorate this event, Muslims still make an animal sacrifice 
once a year. 
However, I believe that one ought to differentiate the Christian notion of 
Redemption from the idea of redemptive suffering. While the former emphasises Jesus' 
522 See Muzammil H. Siddigi, "The Doctrine of Redemption: A Critical Study, " Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar 
Ashaq Ansari (eds. ), Islamic Perspectives (Leicester, UK: the Islamic Foundation, 1979), 99 and Mahmoud 
Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of 'Ashurä' in Twelver Shi'ism 
(The Hague, the Netherlands: Mouton Publishers, 1978), 15. 
523 The term Sunni Islam designates the mainstream and majority of Muslims in contrast to SiTa. 
524 Siddigi, "Tbe Doctrine of Redemption: A Critical Study, " 99. 
521 Siddiqi, "The Doctrine of Redemption: A Critical Study, " 100. 
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death on the cross in order to atone the sins of humankind at a cosmic level, the latter 
may not necessarily mean that. We may call the former the cosmic event of redemptive 
suffering, the latter an individual redemptive suffering. It is true that the Qur'än rejects 
the ideas of Incarnation and Crucifixion. 
On the other hand, we can, as mentioned above, find references in the Qur'än 
and in the Prophet's tradition expressing a notion of individual redemptive suffering. 
Nevertheless, this does not come near to the Christian concept of, what we called, the 
cosmic redemptive suffering. For that, as `Umar Austin points out, s26 one needs to look 
up Shl' thought. In this respect, the Shl'aS27 is completely different from Sunni Islam. 
Mahmoud Ayoub, a champion of the notion of redemptive suffering in the 
Twelver (Ithna `Ashariyya) ShrI thought, in his book Redemptive Suffering in Islam 
attempts to formulate a Shri version of redemptive suffering from the Shrr hagiography. 
He argues that any suffering can be redemptive for the faithful. His main concern is, 
however, the suffering and martyrdom of Iman Husayn (4-61 AH/626-680 CE), the 
grandson of the Prophet and the third Iman of the Shia. Ayoub argues, "the suffering of 
Imam Husayn has been taken by the ShII`Y community to be a source of salvation through 
the interiorization and emulation of that suffering by the community and through the high 
526 `Umar Austin, "Suffering in Muslim Religious Thought, " 35. 
sn ShI`a is the party of those who believe that `Ali b. Abi Taub, the fourth khal[[ a, the head of Muslim 
community, and the fast Imam of ShI`a, is the most virtuous of all people following the Prophet, and, 
therefore, he should have been the first khalrfa. 
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favor of the ImAm as an intercessor. s528 The major themes of redemptive suffering such 
as redemptive martyrdom, a suffering community of faith, and intercession of the martyr 
for the faithful can be detected in the ShVI notion of redemptive suffering. 
At the heart of the ShVI ethos of redemptive suffering lies the doctrine of Imäms 
and the "People of the House, " the Prophet's progeny descended from his daughter 
FAlima (c. 605-632 CE). According to the Shil imamology, The Imams are regarded as 
"the proofs" (hujaj) of God. They are "the concrete embodiment of the Divine Word. "529 
Only through the Imams ("esoteric leaders of the Shr`i community") can human beings 
understand the true meaning of divine revelation (wahy). The eighth Imam `Ali al-Rich 
(c. 148-203 AH/765-818 CE) is reported to have said, "Had it not been for us, God would 
not have been worshipped. 030 The Imans are the most respected people for the pious 
Shrl community after the prophets. 
Among the Imams, Husayn has a distinguished place because of his sufferings 
and martyrdom. As Mostafa Vaziri notes, the martyrdom of Husayn seems to have 
affected the Shrr community even more than the martyrdom of their first Imam `Ali b. 
528 Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam, 15. 
529 Ayoub, "The Problem of Suffering in Islam, " 287-8. 
53° Kulayni, al-USO1 min al-Kajt, 1,275 as quoted in Ayoub, "The Problem of Suffering in Islam, " 288. 
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AbT Talib (c. 598-661 CE) 531 The tragic death of Husayn at Karbala, an Iraqi city 
containing his tomb-shrine, is seen to be the basis of the Shi`i notion of redemptive 
suffering. 
The martyrdom of Ijusayn is the necessary consequence of the fulfilment of his 
imamate ("esoteric Sht`Ileadership") as the leader of the Shi`r community. Because his 
role of imamate requires him to become "the paradigm of selfless sacrifice, the measure 
of truth and falsehood, and the intercessor on the Day of Judgment for his followers. ""' 
Therefore, redemption and intercession in Shl't tradition are closely connected to each 
other since intercession is understood as divine gift for the suffering of the Imams and 
their family. 
The sufferings and martyrdom of Ijusayn are seen as cosmic events, which has a 
universal significance for human history. Ayoub argues that the sufferings before the 
martyrdom of Husayn were events foreshadowing his tragic death. In addition, the 
suffering and martyrdom of the Shi'r community after the martyrdom is the participation 
of the pious ShI'Is in Ijusayn's martyrdom. 533 
531 Mostafa Vaziri, The Emergence of Islam: Prophecy, Imamate, and Messianism in Perspective (New 
York: Paragon House, 1992), 107. 
532 Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam, 15. 
533 Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam, 27. 
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`Ali Naqi Naqvi (1904-), an Iraqi Shi`i scholar, says that Husayn knew the 
sacrifices his ancestors such as Abraham, the Prophet Muhammad, and his father `Ali 
made. Naqvi writes, "He [Husayn] represented a stock which had an unbroken record of 
sacrifice. "334 The way to Husayn's intercession was to emulate his struggle, suffering and 
even martyrdom. The Shi`i community's participation into the sufferings of the Imams, 
and of the Imam Ijusayn particular, can be seen in the memorial services called majails 
al-ta'ziya. On the tenth of Muharram, called the days of 'äshürä', the pious Shirr 
community participates in the suffering of Husayn and other ImAms through mourning, 
weeping, and even inflicting pain upon themselves. 535 
The participants to the suffering and martyrdom of Ijusayn are promised 
forgiveness for their sins and high places in paradise. In this sense, weeping, mourning 
and sorrow become a means of salvation for the faithful 536 The believers are urged to 
remember and share the suffering of Husayn and the other Immens. The eighth Imam `Ali 
RidA is reported to have said, 
"He who recalls our afflictions and weeps for all we have suffered will be with 
us in our high station on the day of resurrection. He who is reminded of our 
" `Ali Naqi Nagvi, The Martyr for Mankind (Shahid-e-Insanryyat), an abridgement, trans and ed by S. 
`Ali Akhtar, (London: The Muhammadi Trust, 1986), 4. 
535 Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam, 148-9. 
s'6 Ayoub, "The Problem of Suffering in Islam, " 291. 
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sufferings and weeps, and causes others to weep, his eyes shall not weep on 
the day when many eyes shall weep. He who sits in an assembly wherein our 
memory is kept alive, his heart will not die on the day when many hearts shall 
die.. "537 
Redemption in the ShI'r tradition is the consequence of voluntary suffering and 
sometimes death. This is true for the Imäms, who are the redeemers of their community, 
as well as for the participants in the suffering of the Imams. God bestows redemption on 
the redeemer and their community through their steadfastness to their faith in the face of 
suffering and death. In this way, the Shl'T community becomes the "faithful remnant" or 
the "elect community"538 as the Imäms are the elect friends (awliyä) of God. 
Here the intercession of the Prophet and his household (Ah! al-Bayt) plays a 
major role. The Shr`i Muslims expect that the ImAms, especially the Imam Husayn, will 
intercede for the faithful granting them high places in paradise. Ayoub writes, 
"Redemption in Shi`i Islam is not expressed in the idea of ransom or the ancient 
ritualistic sacrifice, but through intercession. The martyred Imäm earned this prerogative 
of intercession through frustration, failure and, finally, the cup of martyrdom. 039 As he 
13' Mubammad Bagir Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, 44,278 as quoted in Ayoub, "The Problem of Suffering in 
Islam, " 292. 
533 Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam, 210. 
539 Ayoub, "Tbe Problem of Suffering in Islam, " 292. 
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earned his place in the eyes of God, the faithful may also earn their respected place 
through emulating the suffering of the Imam. 
To sum up, the Imans, and especially Husayn, as the Prophets throughout 
history, struggled, suffered and sometimes died in conveying God's revelation to 
humankind. Through their constant suffering and death, they earned a respected place in 
paradise. Among them, the suffering and martyrdom of Husayn at Karbala is especially 
significant as the third Imam of Shia. He suffered, and was eventually martyred for God. 
Consequently, he was granted a high place in the heavens, and will intercede with God 
for the pious Shi`i individuals on the Day of Judgement. In order to redeem their sins and 
benefit from the intercession, the Shi'r community also needs to suffer and die if 
necessary. Through this way, every affliction becomes redemptive suffering. 
I believe that there are two issues to scrutinise closely here. One is the 
theological significance of these "passion" narratives in the Sbi'r thought. The other is the 
question of whether the redemptive suffering of Husayn is any different from what I have 
earlier called the individual redemptive sufferings. 
To begin with, my reading suggests me that the writings of hagiography 
depicting the Imams, especially the Imam Husayn, in supernatural terms do not represent 
even the position of the mainstream Shi`i thought. Mostafa Vaziri points that "these 
supernatural stories connected to the tragedy of Karbala formed part of the system of 
Arab belief, as well as part of the dogma promulgated by the aggrieved Iraqis known as 
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Penitents (tawwabun). "-"40 In this sense, the stories of the superhuman Imäms can be seen 
as a pre-Islamic Arab attitude to divinise their heroes. In addition, Abu Mikhnaf, who 
reported these stories first, is thought to have narrated them in a "mythological and 
supernatural format "sal It appears that the ShVT doctrine of the Imäms also support this 
argument. Apart from marginal Shi`r groups rejected by the mainstream Shia, no Shi`i 
theologian believes that the Imams are even partly divine. They believe that the Imams 
are the most pious, knowledgeable human beings after the prophets. Therefore, the idea 
of supernatural Imams has no place in the mainstream Shri thought. 
Moreover, since the Imams were not supernatural beings, is their suffering and 
martyrdom, including Husayn's, any different from a pious believer's suffering and 
martyrdom? I believe that there is not much difference between them in essence. Since 
i 
they are human beings and obliged to follow divine revelation, the suffering and death of 
the faithful is as redemptive as that of the Imäms. The only difference is perhaps in the 
SbT'T notion of intercession. The Shia believes that the Imams will intercede with God 
for the Shi'i community on the Day of Judgement. Perhaps it is here that Shia comes 
closer to the cosmic notion of redemptive suffering in Christianity. 
540 Vaziri, The Emergence of Islam, 107. 
541 Vaziri, The Emergence of Islam, 108. 
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To conclude, does Mahmoud Ayoub's explanation of redemptive suffering solve 
the problem of evil? First of all, the scope of the solution is limited with the Shi`i 
community, which is insignificant compared with the suffering people around the world. 
Since those who are not Shi`i will not benefit from the intercession of the Imams, an 
important part of the problem remains. In practical terms, to know that one's suffering 
will redeem sins committed is a consolation. However, the question "why me? " is as 
much a problem as ever. 
It appears that the major response to evil from Muslim theologians and 
philosophers are limited. The response from the privative theory does not solve the 
problem of evil. To say that evil is privation is no different from saying that good is 
privation, because good and evil participate in human life on the same level. There is no 
reason to differentiate one from the other. In addition, to deny the reality of evil goes 
against the heart of Muslim faith. If there is no evil, why is there Islam? Why should one 
struggle to behave oneself? 
Moreover, although the Free-Will Explanation offers a partial solution to the 
origin of moral evil in the sense that human beings are the authors of their actions, it 
seems to me that the majority of Islamic theologians does not recognise full human 
freedom. The emphasis is always on divine predestination even when the theologians are 
talking about human freedom. If God is so dominant, and predestines everything, why 
has he allowed evil and suffering? It seems that Muslim theologians have not succeeded 
in reconciling divine predestination and human free-will. 
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Furthermore, while the idea of the purposefulness and orderliness of the universe 
appears to support the Best-Possible-World Theodicy, realistically there is no way of 
checking whether this is the best world. Besides, it does not explain why God is silent to 
the sufferings of many innocent people, and why certain people are subjected to more 
suffering than others are. In addition, the irregularities in the distribution of suffering and 
pain challenge the Best-Possible-World Theodicy. 
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PART THREE 
ANALYSIS 
V. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
I have explored so far the major responses of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic 
traditions to the problem of evil and suffering separately. The major scriptural responses 
to the reality of human suffering and the following major theological and philosophical 
theodicies in each religious tradition have been examined. Now I shall attempt at an 
analysis of the scriptural as well as theological and philosophical responses to evil. The 
primary questions to be sought answer here are whether there are any similarities 
between different responses of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions to the problem of 
evil. If there is, what are they? Moreover, in which aspects do they differ from each other 
if there is any dissimilarity? 
Before tracing the similarities and differences between the theodicies, I believe it 
is appropriate to answer the question why the comparison and contrast are so important. 
What is one to expect from a comparative analysis? The objective of a comparative study 
of religion can be expressed in terms of seeking the truth wherever it is. In the words of 
the great scholar of religion Wilfred Cantwell Smith, the purpose of this "grander 
attempt" is 
"to interpret intellectually all human faith, one's own and other'; 
comprehensively and justly. Seeing one's own group and its history thus far as 
making up one complex strand in the total history of religion until now, a total 
history that one is endeavouring to understand from within, one may essay a 
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theory that aspires to be part of a movement towards the truth. Seeing one's 
own group as a component in the total community of humankind, a total 
community whose corporate critical self-consciousness in this matter has yet 
to be articulated, again one may endeavour to contribute to its formulation. "542 
From here, one may infer that there may be two major aims of a comparative 
study. The first one is that comparison and contrast may contribute to understand the 
truth in one's own religious tradition within a wider context of humanity. The second aim 
may be that a comparative examination may contribute to articulation of true and 
meaningful religious notions within a wider context of world religious community. 
I believe that the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic responses to evil are all 
important, and their comparison is also necessary for a true understanding of suffering, 
human being and God. As the contemporary Muslim theologian Mahmoud Ayoub writes, 
,, The truth is far too great and too profound to be contained in any one religious tradition, 
philosophy or ideology. Nor is the truth static; it is rather a dynamic force forever 
challenging and enriching our lives, whatever our understanding of God and man may 
be. 043 Therefore, the comparison and contrast of the theodicies in Jewish, Christian, and 
Islamic traditions help us to seek a true understanding of suffering and evil. 
Having pointed out the significance of a comparative study in general, we can 
now return to our main subject; that is, the comparison and contrast of theodicies in the 
Scriptures and the theological and philosophical traditions in question. As pointed out, 
342 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Towards a World Theology: Faith and the Comparative History of Religion 
(London: Macmillan, 1989), 152. 
511 Ayoub, "The Problem of Suffering in Islam, " 293. 
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the comparison of the answers within each religious tradition is naturally expected to 
show us some similarities and dissimilarities. As the geographical areas, cultural milieu, 
social conditions, and historical period in which Judaism, Christianity, and Islam 
emerged show differences and divergences, it is natural that they accommodate dissimilar 
features in their beliefs, rituals and responses to everyday phenomena. 
In this sense, it is quite natural that some conceptions of evil are different among 
the people who lived thousands of years away from each other in different cultural and 
social conditions. As human conceptions of life and its conditions are shaped by 
experiences, different happenings may lead to develop different ideas and beliefs. This is 
also true for the responses to the occurrences of evil. However, a closer research such as 
this one indicates that there are intriguing similarities between the scriptural, and 
theological and philosophical responses to the problem of evil in the three religious 
traditions in question. 
This analysis may also indicate inconsistency of each theodicy with other 
teachings of individual faiths as well as its reasonableness in its claim against the 
atheistic argument from evil. It seems that the dilemma of evil is so a comprehensive 
problem so that it permeates some other religious doctrines along with the belief in God 
such as human free-will and eschatology. In this sense, a reasonable and consistent 
theodicy needs to take into account of the idea of human free-will and life after death. 
The comparative analysis in this part of the study shall question and seek the coherence 
of such beliefs from the standpoint of the problem of evil. 
From the comparison and contrast of the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic 
theodicies among each other shall emerge some similarities and dissimilarities naturally. 
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While the similarities may help to find a common approach to the problem of evil within 
a wider context of theism, the dissimilarities are expected to emphasise the particularities 
of each religious tradition. The latter will indicate the characteristic theodicies developed 
in order to reconcile the belief in God and the reality of evil within the framework of each 
faith. It seems to me appropriate to start with a comparison and contrast of the scriptural 
foundations of the theological and philosophical theodicies in Jewish, Christian, and 
Islamic traditions. 
K. An Analysis of the Scriptural Theodicies 
One can notice in our examination of the scriptural foundation of the theological 
and philosophical theodicies that Tanakh, the New Testament, and the Qur'An offer 
similar solutions to the problem of evil along with certain dissimilarities. It is possible to 
find in the sacred books that the three faiths allude to the notions of retributive suffering, 
Free-Will Explanation, and disciplinary suffering. While majority of Christian scholars of 
religion and a relatively small number of Jewish scholars interpret some passages in the 
Jewish Scriptures and the New Testament in terms of redemptive suffering in cosmic 
sense, some other Jewish scholars and their Muslim counterparts as a whole deem that 
their scripture does not contain such a notion. The latter affirms that Tanakh and the 
Qur'An focuses more on redemptive acts of individuals. 
Moreover, the idea of life after death is another scriptural answer to the problem 
of evil that is common in the New Testament and the Qur'An. The Jewish Scriptures seem 
to be departing to a great extend from the others in this respect. At least one can say that 
even if there is a notion of life after death in Tanakh, it is totally absent in the earlier 
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books of the Torah, and there are only vague references in the later Hebrew Scriptures 
ascribed by the later scholars to life after death. 
The first similar answer of the Jewish Scriptures, the New Testament, and the 
Qur'fin that will be analysed here is that the sacred books of the three religions all contain 
references to the idea of suffering as a punishments for sins. They all seem to suggest that 
there is a correlation between suffering and sin . generally speaking, since God is just in 
essence, injustice and wrong cannot be attributed to him. If there is suffering in the world, 
and if there is God who is the Creator, he must be the ultimate cause of evil as well. If he 
inflicts suffering on anyone, he cannot do it unjustly without any reason. 
One purpose of such incidents may be that God inflicts suffering in order to 
punish the wicked. Since a good supreme being cannot be thought to be doing wrong and 
injustice, the sufferer must be deserving affliction. Thus, God punishes the wicked for his 
or her wickedness by inflicting pain and sorrow. The sudden death of Hanniah, an 
adversary of Jeremiah, in Jeremiah 28-15-17 in Tanakh, a similar fate of Ananias and 
Sapphira in Acts of the Apostles 5: 1-11 in the New Testament, and the destruction of 
people of old such as Sodom and Gomorrah in the chapter al Ankabüt 29: 33-34 in the 
Qur'An suggest that some disasters, suffering and death may be punishment for sin. Many 
centuries Jews, Christians and Muslims believed, and some still continue to believe, that 
some sufferings and death in this world are God's punishment for the sins committed, 
and that prosperity is a divine blessing. 
However, the idea of retributive suffering seems to be challenged in the very 
same Scriptures as well. For example, the epitome of suffering in the Hebrew Bible, 
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namely, Job, objects the idea of retribution in the following words, "He destroys the 
blameless and the guilty" (Job 9: 22). That is to say, God as the ultimate cause inflicts 
suffering on people regardless of being innocent or wicked. Jesus negates the suggestions 
that retributive suffering in the case of a blind man (John 9: 1-3). Accordingly, the 
blindness of that man is not because of his or his parent's sinfulness. The Qur'än also 
warns, "The Blind are not at fault, the lame are not at fault, the sick are not at fault... " 
(al Nür 24: 61). Therefore, evil and suffering is not necessarily a divine retribution for 
human wickedness. The destruction of the innocent as well as the guilty, and the birth of 
disabled and lame infants without any guilt are some indications that evil, at least some of 
them, cannot be a divine punishment. God cannot inflict afflictions or destroy the 
innocent. 
It appears that there is a growing tendency today among modern Jewish, 
Christian and Muslim thinkers towards the latter position even though there are still those 
who accept that suffering is a punishment for sin. That is to say that some modern 
scholars of religion deny that Tanakh, the New Testament, and the Qur'än offer the 
notion of retribution as a response to the problem of suffering. 
The Christian theologian Brian Hebblethwaite, for instance, refers to Luke 13: 4 
in his rejection of retributive suffering. 544 A similar attitude can be observed among the 
majority of modern Jewish thinkers with the exception of some ultra-orthodox Jews. The 
brutal reality of the Holocaust seems to be the major motive behind this position. For 
Hebblethwaite, Evil, Suffering and Religion, 49. 
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example, the Jewish theologian Shmuel Boteach rejects the suggestions of some orthodox 
Jews that the Holocaust might be a divine punishment for Israel's sins. Boteach asks, 
,, Was is it not God who, when asked by Moses, `Show me Your Glory, Your essence, ' 
responded, `I am full of mercy, compassion, benevolence, and long-suffering when it 
comes to man's iniquities' ? "S45 According to Boteach, such a merciful God cannot be 
thought to have punished the people of Israel in the gas chambers. Furthermore, the 
Turkish philosopher Mehmet Aydm approaches to retributive explanation of suffering 
from the viewpoint of enormous disasters befell on a people. He asserts that God's 
punishment of a society for her wickedness cannot be defended against the objections of 
the atheist sah The idea of retributive suffering does not seem to offer an adequate and 
satisfactory solution because the realities of life do not seem to support this claim. One 
may without great difficulty observe that many wicked people die without any significant 
suffering, and, in some cases, the wicked often becomes more prosperous than the 
righteous in the world. If God is just, and punishes the sinful in this life, the questions 
turns out to be that why he punishes some, not others. Why should he discriminate some 
of his creatures over others? 
Besides, there is no one apart from God to verify that a particular suffering is 
retribution, that is, a punishment for a certain sin. It seems that no human being is in a 
position to be able to determine that a certain evil is a genuine divine retribution. Even 
the defenders of retributive suffering do not dare to claim that God informed them that 
'5 Shmuel Boteach, Wrestling with the Divine: A Jewish Response to Suffering (Northvale, New Jersey and 
London: Jason Aronson Inc., 1995), 188. 
W Mehmet Aydm, Din Felsefesi, 152. 
251 
certain evil is retribution. What is done is nothing else than reiterating the once popular 
response to evil in a religious tradition. This seems to be true for Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam. 
Another similarity between the answers of the three Scriptures is that the cause 
of some suffering lies in misuse of human free-will. Free-Will Explanation is perhaps one 
of the most antique responses to the problem of evil. The primeval sin committed by the 
human ancestors Adam and Eve and its punishment are shared by Jewish, Christian, and 
Islamic traditions. The first human beings sinned by misusing their freedom against 
divine will. This brought about their expulsion from paradise and fall onto the earth. 
Hypothetically speaking, if there were no sin committed by Adam and Eve in paradise, 
human beings would be enjoying a suffering-and-struggle-free life without any blemish. 
The fact that the three Scriptures recognise is that Adam and Eve sinned with their own 
freewill, and was, consequently, expelled from paradise exposing the subsequent 
generations as well as themselves to life-long challenges, threats, and sufferings in the 
world. 
Furthermore, the commands of the Torah, which are regarded as Jewish law, 
strongly suggest that human beings are able to choose between good and evil, 
righteousness and wickedness. In a similar fashion, the following passages from the 
Letter of James in the New Testament openly state that temptation to evil is not from God 
but from human free-will. It reads, "No one, when tempted, should say, 'I am being 
tempted by God"; for God cannot be tempted by evil and he himself tempts no one. But 
one is tempted by one's own desire, being lured and enticed by it" (Jas. 1: 13-14). 
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Here one needs to point out a misinterpretation. It is that the Qur'än teaches a 
fatalistic notion of human actions. Some western scholars of religion such as Wensinck547 
assert that the predestinarian view dominates the Muslim sacred book. God preordains 
everything in detail including human actions. Thus, nothing takes place without God's 
will. I believe it is to misread the Qur'An, if not to distort the truth, to say that the Qur'anic 
view of human action is predestinarian in essence. In this context, the negation of human 
involvement in suffering and evil is not a Qur'anic attitude. As John Bowker affirms, "a 
fatalistic and indifferent attitude to the occurrence of suffering is ruled out by the Qur'an 
itsel£i348 It is true that the Qur'fin affirms the notion of God's absolute sovereignty and 
human freedom side by side. However, it is misleading to assert that the Qur'anic 
teaching is totally fatalistic and predestinarian. 
Furthermore, there is a close relationship between freedom and responsibility of 
actions of human beings. In this sense, the idea of free-will is at the centre of all other 
responses. The existence of freedom is the necessary condition of disciplinary suffering, 
and eschatological response. If human beings had no free-will to choose between good 
and evil, there would be no way that one could have talked about other answers. 
However, it ought to be noted here that neither Tanakh nor the New Testament nor the 
Qur'an explains how to reconcile divine attributes of omnipotence and omniscience with 
human free-will. 
" See above, pages 197-8. 
54° Bowker, The Problem of Suffering in the Religions of the World, 116. 
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Connected with the Free-Will Explanation, the next similarity that occurs in 
Tanakh, the New Testament, and the Qur'an is the idea that suffering in this world is to 
discipline human beings. In this sense, suffering of human beings in this world is the 
instrument of divine discipline. The Hebrew Bible sees a similarity between the 
discipline of a father and God. `Bear in mind that the Lord your God disciplines you just 
as a man disciplines his son" (Deut. 8: 5). In this sense, suffering is to educate and built a 
moral character through which God can be worshipped properly. Paul in his Letters to 
Romans advises that we must rejoice in our suffering because it produces endurance, 
character, and hope (Rom. 5: 3-5). 
The Qur'An describes the purpose of human life and death in terms of test and 
discipline. "He who created death and life so as to test you as to whoever of you is fairer 
in action" (al-Mulk, 67: 2). Here suffering is described in positive terms as an instrument 
of building moral character. According to this instrumental view, suffering does not occur 
outside the control of divine will; instead instances of affliction take place by the leave of 
God for a purpose. 
A further similarity between Jewish and Christian Scriptures is the idea of 
redemptive suffering. It is often asserted that the Qur'an does not affirm a concept of 
redemption in the sense that the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament do. According to 
the redemptive interpretation of suffering, the sins of the faithful are redeemed by the 
suffering of the righteous. The idea is sometimes extended further to all the suffering 
expiating the sins of any individual or community. 
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Some scholars see the epitome of redemptive suffering in the suffering of the 
servant in the Servant Songs in Isaiah 40-66. The innocent servant suffers so that the 
misdeeds of the people of Israel can be redeemed, and a peaceful future is built. Philip 
Sigal, for instance, contends that the people of Israel suffer for the rest of humankind. 549 
However, others object that the idea of vicarious suffering, that is, transmission of sin 
from one person to another, is a biblical notion. They believe that the idea of vicarious 
suffering lacks the support of Tanakh, and opposes the Jewish concept of the covenant 550 
On the other hand, majority of Christian theologians understands the passages of 
the Servant in the Hebrew Bible, or the Old Testament as they prefer to call it, as the 
foretelling of Jesus' suffering and death. A Christian expression of redemptive suffering, 
sometimes called vicarious suffering, is found in John 3: 16: "For God so loved the world 
that he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him may not perish but may 
have eternal life. " 
Marilyn Adams interprets this passage as follows, "God was so eager to win our 
love that he became incarnate and volunteered for martyrdom himself. "ssl Therefore, the 
suffering and death of Jesus Christ was not an ordinary event, but it was for a purpose. 
According to Christian theologians, the Incarnation of God, namely Jesus Christ, suffered 
on the Cross in order to redeem the sins of human beings and to reunite with them. This 
has bee the view of mainstream Christianity throughout history. 
M9 Philip Sigal, The Emergence of Contemporary Judaism, 1,132. See above, pages 29-30. 
SS° See, for instance, Harry M. Orlinsky, "Studies on the Second Part of the Book of Isaiah: The So-called 
`Servant of the Lord' and `Suffering Servant' in Second Isaiah, " 17. See above, page 29. 
551 Marilyn McCord Adams, "Redemptive Suffering: A Christian Solution to the Problem of Evil, " 259. 
255 
The Qur'An does not mention any notion of redemption in cosmic sense. 
Furthermore, it challenges the issues involved in the idea of redemption. 552 Accordingly, 
the Muslim Scripture strongly objects the Christian doctrine of Incarnation. It is often 
reiterated in the Qur'an that Jesus Christ is a human messenger of God like any other 
prophets (al-Mä'ida 5: 75). His whole endeavour was to spread the divine message so that 
human beings could bring themselves to God as righteous people. Moreover, the Muslim 
sacred book affirms that human beings are created without any blemish. They have free- 
will, and are responsible for their actions in the world (al-Shams 91: 8-9). Thus, each 
individual is accountable only for their own wickedness before God. 
Furthermore, the Qur'An does not suggest any idea of transference of sins and, 
correspondingly, transference of punishment to another person instead of the sinner. 
Every individual is bound to give a full account of his or her own action, no one else's 
(Fa/ir 35: 18). There is one instance in the Qur'an in which God himself redeems the 
person from his suffering. God ransoms Ishmael's life, the son of Abraham, with a large 
sacrifice (al-Sagt, 37: 107). In this Qur'anic story, the patriarch Abraham intends to 
sacrifice his son, but God intervenes and saves Ishmael's life by paying the ransom with a 
sacrifice. 
This seems to be the only instance in the Qur'än in which God pays the ransom 
to relieve a human being from suffering. However, here God does not forgive sins of 
552 M1 Husain Siddigi, "The Doctrine of Redemption: a Critical Study, " 99. 
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Abraham and his son Ishamel. This is traditionally interpreted a way of test through 
which God tries both Abraham and Ishmael. The sacrifice is, in this context, a reward 
from God for their submission to divine will. Here there is a parallel with the passage in 
Numbers 3: 45-50in the Torah. 553 Here it is reported that God commanded Moses to take 
redemption money from the first-born of the people of Israel for "those who are in 
excess. " 
One ought to note here that God may, according to Islam, redeem the sins of the 
righteous in the hereafter as long as he or she endures suffering patiently without 
disobeying him. In the case that the believer holds onto the belief in God even in times of 
disaster, God may purify the believer in the hereafter (Äl-i 'Imrän 3: 139-40). This 
scriptural view is often supported with a tradition of the Prophet Muhammad. He is 
reported to have said that "the believer is inflicted with calamities until he is free from 
any sin clung to him. ""' In this sense, suffering becomes redemptive for the sufferer as 
long as he or she is faithful to God. Closely connected with this view, in some other 
passages in Tanakh, the New Testament, and the Qur'An is that suffering is a prerequisite 
to taking up the responsibility to spread divine message. In this sense, afflictions endured 
redeem the sufferer from his or her sins. Here redemption is not a cosmic event in the 
sense that God in person intervenes in the natural process of human life. In fact, it is in 
the sense that 'God forgives sin as a result of personal endurance to afflictions out of 
divine love. 
S53 Siddigi, "the Doctrine of Redemption: a Critical Study, " 100. 
"' Al-Tabar1 Cami' al-Bayan ft TafsYr al-Qur'an, 8,92. 
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The prophets and the pious suffer while they call people to know and worship 
God. Some Jewish scholars understand the suffering and death of the Jewish prophets in 
redemptive terms. Therefore, their devotion to Yahweh often evoked suffering and even 
death. 555 Within Christian context, redemption in this sense seems to be closely related 
with the notion of following the example of Jesus Christ. The biblical notion expressing 
this idea is "taking up the cross. " Accordingly, taking up cross after the crucifixion of 
Jesus will naturally rouse hostility and hatred against the Christian, will bring about 
suffering or, even in some cases, death (Mark 13: 1-13). Here suffering is, as Simundson 
puts it, "a direct consequence of bringing the message of Christ to a sinful world. 056 
Accordingly, bearing the burden of spreading the good news to people may engender 
suffering. The Qur'än also teaches that God will redeem the sins of the believers as long 
as they endure suffering holding onto their belief in God (Al-i `Imrkn 3: 139-40). 
The final similarity to be considered is the eschatological response to suffering. 
The New Testament and the Qur'an, as pointed out, appeal to the idea of life after death 
as a solution to the problem of evil. The concept of the afterlife in Judaism is generally 
accepted to be a very late development. According to the eschatological response, the 
believer is promised eternal happiness in paradise in return for the sufferings he or she 
endured in earthly life. On the other hand, the wicked is warned of punishment in hell for 
his or her infidelity. 
555 Jacob B. Agus, The Evolution ofJewish Thought, 24. See above, page 30. 
556 Simundson, Faith under Fire, 131. 
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A well-defined Jewish concept of life after death emerges not in the Torah but 
later "in the Greco-Roman world. " Thus, one cannot see an explicit eschatological 
response to evil in the Torah. It is believed the rabbis developed an idea of compensation 
in the Hereafter for the evils of this world. In the words of Rabbi Dan Cohn-Sherbok, 
"The notion of a future world in which the righteous would be compensated 
for the ills they suffered in this life was prompted by a failure to justify the 
ways of God by any other means. According to Biblical theodicy, men were 
promised rewards for obeying God's law and punishments were threatened for 
disobedience. ""' 
While some earthly states of affairs such as human well-being, the existence of children, 
and prosperity are described in terms of reward; such evils as plagues, famines, and 
poverty are punishments from God for obedience or disobedience of Jews to divine law. 
The rabbis observed that the reality of life did not coincide exactly with the 
promises of the Scriptures. The irregularities in human state of affairs such as the 
suffering of the innocent and the prosperity of the wicked seem to have urged the rabbis 
to develop a doctrine of life after death in general, an eschatological response to evil in 
particular. This was the belief that the rabbis believed the Jews needed then. In the words 
of Cohn-Sherbok, "Such a belief helped Jews to cope with suffering in this life, and it 
also explained, if not the presence of evil in the world, then at least the worthwhileness of 
creation despite the world's ills. "558 
557 Dan Cohn-Sherbok, "Death and Immortality in the Jewish Tradition, " in Linda and Paul Badham (eds. ), 
Death and Immortality in the Religions of the World (New York: Paragon House, 1987), 25. 
558 Cohn-Sherbok, "Death and Immortality in the Jewish Tradition, " 25. 
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Having formed an eschatology, the rabbis read it back to the Bible interpreting 
certain passages that they believed alluding to the Hereafter. For instance, according to 
Rabbi Joshua b. Levi, the origin of the doctrine of resurrection in the Torah is Psalm 
84: 5, which reads "Happy are those who dwell in Your house; they forever praise You. " 
As the last sentence is in future tense, this must be, to the rabbi, in life after death. 559 
Although some find allusions to eternal life in the writings of the Jewish prophets in 
Tanakh, they are understood by modem biblical scholars560 in the sense of restoration of 
Jewish prosperity in this life not in the hereafter. 
In Luke 18: 28-9, Jesus promises his disciples of reward in this life and in the 
hereafter for their steadfastness and endurance to hardships. The Qur'än describes the 
hereafter in terms of the day of judgement in which God's justice shall prevail (al- 
Anbyä' 21: 47). On that day, God assures the righteous of reward, and the sinful of 
punishment. This is believed to recompense the innocent sufferings in this world and to 
justify God in the final reckoning. The scriptural references to the afterlife in response to 
the problem of evil have been fully formulated later by Jewish, Christian, and Muslim 
theologians. 
A distinctive New Testament answer to evil is that Jesus shall vindicate 
suffering in his second coming to the world. On the other hand, we do not come across 
with a notion of the second coming of Jesus Christ in Jewish religious tradition. While 
559 Cohn-Sherbok, "Death and Immortality in the Jewish Tradition, " 26. 
56° Helmer Ringgren, "Resurrection, " in the Encyclopaedia of Religion, (New York, MacMillan Publishing 
Company, 1987), 12,345. 
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the Qur'än does not elucidate the idea of the second coming of Jesus, some Muslim 
exegetes interpret certain Qur'anic verses in this sense. The explicit references can be 
found among the prophetic traditions of Muhammad. 
The second coming of Jesus Christ (the Parousia in Greek) has been for 
centuries, and is still by especially fundamentalist Christians, regarded as the culminating 
point in Christian eschatology. 561 For instance, 2 Corinthians 5: 10 is traditionally 
understood in the sense that Jesus will come back at the end of the world, and confer 
reward and punishment for the earthly conducts of human beings. The passage in 
question reads, "For all of us must appear before the judgment seat of Christ, so that each 
may receive recompense for what has been done in the body, whether good or evil. "562 
Furthermore, Oscar Cullmann contends that the second coming of Jesus is the 
consummation of Jesus' raison d'etre in terms of salvation. 
563 That is to say, Jesus' role as 
the bringer of salvation will be complete at the Parousia. 
The Qur'An does not explicitly mention the idea of the second coming of Jesus. 
However, some classical exegetes interpret certain verses of the Qur'fin referring to the 
notion of the second coming of Jesus Christ. Among the Quranic passages of this kind we 
see alNisä 4: 159 and al-Zukhruf ("Adornment") 43: 61. The former, for instance, reads, 
"And there is none of the People of the Book but must believe in Him before his death; 
561 S. H. Travis, Christian Hope and the Future of Man (London: Intervarsity Press, 1980), 63. 
1561 See, also, 2 Thessalonians 2; and Revelation 12: 13. 
So See Travis, Christian Hope and the Future ofMan, 85. 
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and on the Day of Judgment he will be a witness against them. "364 The classical exegetes 
al-Tabari understands this verse in the sense that there will not be left even one person 
from the People of the Book who does not believe in Jesus as a messenger of God before 
the death of Jesus. 
According to the orthodox Muslim view, it was not Jesus who died on the cross, 
but was someone looked like him. Allah raised him to himself. In this context, Jesus is 
still alive in the body, and shall come back to the world before the Judgment Day. He 
shall kill the Antichrist, that is, a great evil force, shall purify the world from sin and 
wickedness, and all shall believe in him. Finally, Jesus shall die before the end of the 
world. 565 Al-Tabari supports his interpretation with a tradition of the Prophet 
Muhammad. According to this tradition narrated by Abü Hurayra, in his second coming 
of Jesus, "There will be such security on the earth in his time that lions will lie down with 
camels, leopards with cattle and wolves with sheep. Youths and boys will play with 
snakes without harming them or being harmed by them... "S" Here Islam comes close to 
the Christian concept of the second coming of Jesus Christ. 
In conclusion, it must be stated that the examined scriptural explanations do not, 
critically speaking, offer a conclusive solution to the problem of evil. Although each 
response provides to a certain extent help to understand evil in this world, they do not 
This passage is from the Holy Qur-an, (al-Madinah: King Fahd Holy Qur'an Printing Complex, 1410 
AH. ). 
'5 Neal Robinson, Christ in Islam and Christianity: The Representation of Jesus in the Qur'an and the 
Classical Muslim Commentaries (London: Macmillan- 1991), 81. 
566 Cited in Robinson, Christ in Islam and Christianity, 81. 
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reconcile the reality of evil with the goodness of God completely. In a sense, this 
outcome is natural because Scriptures are not theological books justifying certain beliefs. 
They are the account of dynamic relationship between God and humankind. Therefore, 
human beings are expected to find an answer within their experiences with God. The 
theological and philosophical theodicies can be seen as the intellectual reflections from 
one's own point of view. As we shall see now, the scriptural accounts of evil and 
suffering have been the foundation and main source of inspiration for the majority of 
theological and philosophical theodicies to develop later. 
L. An Analysis of the Theological and Philosophical Theodicies 
An analysis of the theological and philosophical responses to evil ought to start 
with determining similarities and dissimilarities of the theodicies within each tradition 
first and then among each other. This will probably help us to find more sensible and 
reasonable responses in accord with the theistic concept of God. 
The Christian philosopher of religion John Hick, for the first time, classified the 
traditional Christian theodicies under two main headings; namely, the Augustinian 
Theodicy and the Irenaean Theodicy. Having explored the major theodicies of Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam, we can infer that the Jewish and Islamic theodicies have not been 
classified as the Christian theodicies have been done. They are scattered in the writings of 
Jewish and Muslim scholars. We can note that a possible reason for that the Jewish and 
Muslim theodicies are not classified yet, may be seen in the fact that critical and 
analytical thinking has a prominent place in the West. Therefore, Western philosophers of 
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religion have explored, clarified, and classified the classical solutions to evil as opposed 
to the Jewish and Muslim scholars. 
I believe that the Jewish and Islamic theodicies may be classified in a similar 
fashion as well. The Jewish, Christian, and Islamic theodicies including the traditional 
Christian theodicies can be classified in two main groups: The theodicies that affirm God 
as the cause of evil and the theodicies that deny God as the cause of evil. This, I believe 
is an encompassing classification as the enterprise of theodicy is an endeavour to justify 
the ways of God. Before comparing the Jewish and Islamic responses to evil, one needs 
to clarify the distinction between the Augustinian Theodicy and the Irenaean Theodicy, 
which is expected to shed some light on understanding the differences and similarities 
among Christian, Jewish, and Islamic solutions to the problem of evil and our 
classification of the theodicies as a whole. 
I firstly propose to outline the differences and then the similarities between the 
two traditional Christian theodicies. This will help us to understand the gist of modem 
theodicies as well as the traditional ones. Following Hick's comparison and contrast, the 
differences between the Augustinian Theodicy and the Irenaean Theodicy can be 
summarised in three main points. 
The first difference between the two traditional theodicies is seen in their 
position on the origin of evil. The Augustinian Theodicy denies that God is the source of 
evil. To prove that God has nothing to do with evil, the Augustinian theologians adopt the 
Neo-Platonic idea of evil as privation of being. The creation is good as God's work, but 
the deficiencies, lack and privation of perfection emerges as if they are separate evil 
entities. Evil is not a being, but a privation of being. If there is any evil in the world, it is 
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brought about by human free-will. God is good, and he cannot and does not create evil. 
The Irenaean Theodicy, on the other hand, sees evil as well as good as a work of God. 
Therefore, he is the ultimate cause of everything in the creation; and the responsibility for 
evil lies with God. Consequently, what is needed to be done is to seek justification for 
God's creating or allowing evil and suffering in the world. 
Moreover, while the Augustinian Theodicy is built upon the primeval event of 
the Fall, the Irenaean theory is oriented towards the future world. The former sees the 
ultimate cause of evil in the event of the fall. For the latter, evil as a work of God serves a 
purpose that will be fully realised in the hereafter. John Hick writes, 
"The Augustinian type of theodicy looks to the past, to a primal catastrophe in 
the fall of angels and/or men, for the explanation of the existence of evil in 
God's universe. In contrast, the Irenaean type of theodicy is eschatological, 
and fords the justification for the existence of evil in an infinite (because 
eternal) good which God is bringing out of the temporal process. ""' 
While the Augustinian Theodicy holds that evil entered into human realm with the 
original sin committed by the primeval human beings, the latter understands this event as 
an indispensible stage in the person-making process, a process going from childhood to 
spiritual maturity and, consequently, unity in God. 
Finally, the Augustinian theologians categorise people as the saved and the 
damned in the hereafter. The Irenaean theologians expect that God's love shall save 
m7 Hick, Evil and the God ofLove (1966), 263. 
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all ?8 Connected with the idea of free-will and the traditional view of hell as the abode of 
evil beings, the Augustinian theodicists find it necessary that those who deny God will be 
punished eternally after death. On the other hand, there seems to be a growing tendency 
among Irenaean theologians to reject the doctrine of eternal hell. 
Does this mean that there is no converging point between the Augustinian and 
Irenaean theodicies? Although the differences between these two theodicies go very deep, 
there are certain convergences as well. Firstly, both the Augustinian and Irenaean 
theodicists share the Christian theme of the "0 felix culpa". That is to say that, there is no 
suffering in vain in the world. There is a divine purpose behind all suffering that justifies 
God in the face of evils. 
"And even the greatest evil of all, the murder of the son of God, has been 
found by subsequent Christian faith to be also, in an astounding paradox, the 
greates good of all, so that through the centuries the Church could dare to sing 
on the eve of its triumphant Easter celebrations, '0 felix culpa, quae talem ac 
tantum meruit habere redemptorem'. "569 CO fortunate crime..., which 
merited ... such and so great a redeemer! 
']"" 
Although it is more explicitly reflected in the writings of the Irenaean theodicists, the 
Augustinian theologians, too, affirm that the creation of such a universe is better than the 
one there is no evil. In Hick's words, the idea that "the final end-product of the human 
story will justify the evil within that story points to an eschatological understanding of the 
Hick, Evil and the God of Love (1966), 262-3. 
569 Hick, Evil and the God ofLove (1966), 280. 
S70 This phrases of unknown origin are a part of the Roman Missal in the Ezultet sung in the evening before 
Easter Day. The translation is taken from Hick, Evil and the God of Love (1966), 280, n. 1. 
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divine purpose which gives meaning to human life. i571 In this sense, the creation has a 
value in the eyes of God, and for that matter there are divine purposes at work in the 
universe. These purposes can be known to the extent that God reveals them to human 
beings in his relation. 
Secondly, the Augustinian Theodicy and the Irenaean Theodicy are in the 
opinion that God's power must be understood in the sense that he can do only what is 
logically possible. It is not possible for God that he creates free beings and not allows 
evil, and that free beings are built in the state of fully grown in spiritual sense. However, 
this is not to be understood a genuine limitation upon divine power. Because, as Hick 
states, "the inability to do the self-contradictory does not reflect an impotence in the agent 
but a logical incoherence in the task proposed. "572 However, Leibniz's use of this 
principle, who thought that divine will is subject to logical necessity in determining the 
cosmic possibilities, is found far-fetched even by later Augustinian theologians. 
A similar distinction seen between the Augustinian Theodicy and the Irenaean 
Theodicy can be traced in Jewish and Islamic responses as well. The kernel point in this 
distinction seems to be the question of the source of evil. It is possible to see in the three 
religious traditions those who see God as the ultimate cause of evil as well as good, and 
those who hold that God does not create evil. While the former puts emphasis on the 
purpose of life, the latter regards human free-will and privation of existence as the origin 
of evil. 
571 Hick, Evil and the God of Love (1966), 265. 
572 Hick, Evil and the God of Love (1966), 265. 
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We have seen that Saadia and Maimonides in the Jewish tradition, Ikhwän al- 
$afä, al-Färäbi, and Ibn Sinä on Islamic side argue that evil is privation, lack, or 
deficiency of being. In this sense, existence is excellence as it is brought about by God. 
They all do not attribute the creation of evil to God because he is all-good and wise. Such 
a deity cannot cause suffering. The creation is his purposeful action; therefore it cannot 
be evil. All that is called evil emerges out of material world that cannot accept whole 
perfection. The ultimate perfection is God. According to this group, the only real evil in 
the world is moral evil. That is to say, human beings can bring about evil by their own 
free-will. They are the cause and source of evil on earth. 
The Jewish philosopher Judah Halevi and the Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd, on 
the other hand, reject the theory of privation in a manner similar to the Irenaean 
theodicists. They assert that God is the ultimate cause of everything evil as well as good 
for he is the Creator. Halevi negates the assertion that evil is the privation of goodness or 
being. He insists that evil is as real as good in this life, and God is their "Prime Cause. " 
Every single object and occurrence in this world is brought about by divine will either 
directly or through intermediary causes. 573 Likewise, the Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd 
rnaintains, "it is necessary that evil should be attributed to Him [God] just as there is 
attributed the creation of good. s574 Ibn Rushd's main concern is that if evil is not 
attributed to God, this may lead to people believe that there is a creator of evil as well. 
573 See above, pages 35-6. 
574 Ibn Rushd, Kitdb al-Kashf an Manahic al Adilla, quoted from J. W. Sweetman, Islam and Christian 
Theology, 172. See above pages 217-8. 
268 
Since this is logically impossible, God must be recognised as the creator of both good and 
evil. 
From purely philosophical standpoint, it appears that the theory of privation does 
not, even if we accept it, justify God in the face of evil. As the Turkish theist Mehmet 
Aydin contends, 575 to ignore the reality of evil does not solve the problem. If God is just 
and good as it is believed to be, why did then he allow these deficiencies? Surely, he is 
powerful enough to remove them or to create so to speak "perfect beings" without any 
want. We know from the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions that he is able and has 
created perfectly good creatures, that is, angels. Since God is able to create such perfect 
and good creatures as angels, he would have created human beings in a similar fashion. 
Therefore, the ultimate responsibility for evil lies with God. Consequently, evil is no less 
reality in our world than the occurrences of good. 
Moreover, we have seen that some contemporary process theologians such as 
David R. Griffin developed a theodicy, namely, Process Theodicy, in order to reconcile 
the existence of God with the occurrences of evil. Process Theodicy presents completely 
different picture from the traditional Christian theodicies. As pointed out, the gist of 
Process argument is that God is limited in his power. His power is persuasive, not 
coercive. That is to say, he cannot prevent evils from happening by using force; he can 
tries to change the course of an event by using his persuasive power. 576 Therefore, he is 
575 Mimet Aydm, Din Felsefesi, 152. 
576 See above, pages 128-37. 
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not to be blamed for the occurrences of suffering in the world. Without having a coercive 
power, he cannot prevent evil; consequently, he cannot be blamed for evil. 
However, the three monotheistic faiths, namely, Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam, affirm God's omnipotence as opposed to process theology. Generally speaking, 
God is described in the Jewish Scriptures, the New Testament, and the Qur'än, and by 
majority of the subsequent theologians, as the creator of heavens and earth, and the 
sustainer of the creation. He, for instance, saved the people of Israel from the hands of 
Pharaoh cleaving the Nile for a passage for them. He is also the healer of diseases and the 
granter of immortality. There is nothing possible that he cannot do. It is often emphasised 
that the God of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam is an all-powerful deity. Divine power is 
restricted only by logical limitations. God can do only what is logically impossible. This 
is not a limitation in divine power in the real sense of the word as the notion of logical 
limitation suggests "a logical incoherence in the task proposed. "s" For instance, if it is 
impossible for God to create a sun of ice-cream, this does not mean that God is impotent. 
In fact, it signifies that the idea of creating a sun of ice-cream is a logically incoherent 
task. This is totally different from Process understanding of limitation in divine power. 
Christian, Jewish and Muslim critics often point out that the process God is not 
the God of Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions S78 The Jewish philosopher Alvin J. 
Reines states, "I see no explanation in panentheism for the deity unsurpassable in love, 
knowledge, and power not having rid the world of evils with which even very limited 
sn Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 265. 
5" J. Hick, "Critique, " F. Sontag, "Critique, " and S. T. Davis, "Critique, " in S. T. Davis (ed. ), Encountering 
Evil, 122-8. 
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humans have done away. 079 If humans are able to bring about some actualities using 
their freedom and power as the process theologian asserts, do these humans need such a 
God? 
Similarly, Mark W. Worthing, a Christian theologian, criticises the process 
conception of God saying that "God... is maintained by Christian theology to be the 
conductor of the final act (if indeed our universe has a final act), not just a spectator with 
better than average chances of finding a way to survive the consummation of the 
universe. "580 If God has no power to conduct the final act as the Process theologians seem 
to argue, then this god cannot be the deity of Christian faith. 
The contemporary Turkish philosopher of religion Mehmet Aydin, too, asserts 
that "... it is obvious that the idea of a limited God cannot satisfy ethical and religious 
conscience. A limited God may not be hold responsible for the evils in the world perhaps, 
but it is also not possible to praise him for the goods to be achieved in the end. "58' We 
come to the point again that why would human beings need, pray and praise such a God 
then? 
It seems to me that the process conception of God might not be so a radical 
challenge to Christian faith as it can be to Jewish and Muslim traditions. This is because 
it is the heart of Christian faith that God entered into human history in Jesus Christ, the 
579 Alvin J. Reines, "Hylotheism: A Theology of Pure Process, " in Sandra B. Lubarsky and David Ray 
Griffin (eds. ), Jewish Theology and Process Thought, 278. However, I do not share Reines' conviction of 
God as radically imperfect. 
580 mark W. Worthing, Worthing, Goo Creation, and Contemporary Physics, 196. 
58' Mimet Aydin, Kant ve cagda; Ingiliz Felsefesinde Tanrt Ahlak J14kisi, (Ankara: Ümran Yaymlari, 
1981), 132-3. 
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second person of the Trinity. While Godhead is unchangeable and outside human sphere, 
Jesus as the Incarnation of God was in human sphere and subject to change. He was born 
like any other child surrounded by natural risks, grew stronger, and died like human 
beings. There were things that he could do or could not do. Yet, Godhead is all-powerful 
and complete control of human history. The "bipolar" conception of God seems to be 
more problematic for Jewish religious thought and almost inapplicable to Islamic faith. 
Although there are some attempts at developing a process theology in recent years, they 
are not regarded as a mainstream Jewish faith. As Cohn-Sherbok notes, 
"Within Judaism such a conception of a limited God has not gained many 
adherents: instead most religious believers have continued to accept the 
traditional doctrine of an all-powerful God who has created the universe and 
continues to direct its destiny without any limitation. "582 
The Qur'an and the following Muslim intellectual tradition, as we have 
emphasised a number of times, proclaim that God is all-power. Although the process 
theologian Charles Hartshorne introduces Muhammad Iqbal as a Muslim "panentheist" 
and his thought as "a panentheistic version of Islam, "183 Iqbal never affirms a limited 
conception of God. Neither does he spell out that he is a process thinker. He simply 
objects to the understanding of omnipotence as a blind and capricious divine power. He 
regards God's power as "intimately related to Divine wisdom, and finds the infinite 
power of God revealed, not in the arbitrary and the capricious, but in the recent, the 
5'2 Dan Cohn-Sherbok, The Jewish Faith, 49. See, also, Louis Jacobs, A Jewish Theology, 75-77. 
511 Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1953), 294. 
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regular, and the orderly. 9)584 Igbal does not limit God's power; he only points out the fact 
that the operation of divine power in the world is not irregular and aimless. The Muslim 
thinker points divine purpose and orderliness of the universe. 
In short, the process theologian may argue that Process Theodicy offers a 
solution to the problem of evil by changing the theistic conception of God as there is no 
other way to do it. As one cannot deny the existence and reality of evil, the only 
alternative left is to change the classical understanding of God. However, the process 
God has, as we have seen, very little to do with the traditional Jewish, Christian, and 
Islamic doctrine of God. Process Theodicy does not solve the problem of evil directed 
against theistic concept of God, but they escape from the challenge by jettisoning the 
traditional belief in God. I believe that this cannot be taken as a theistic solution to the 
problem of evil. It seems to me that this is side-stepping the real problem. 
A major dissimilarity is between the theodicies and the anti-theodicies 
developed to explain the Holocaust. While the theodicies seek reconciliation between 
God and the reality of evil, the anti theodicies seem to negate, or tend to negate, the 
traditional conception of God. A relatively complicated approach is of Elie Wiesel. His 
negative theodicy attempts to protest the traditional Jewish notion of God, while rejecting 
the atheistic claim that evil disproves the existence of God. However, he does not offer an 
alternative concept of God. Richard Rubenstein, on the other hand, rejects the traditional 
doctrine of God, and replaces it with the idea of "nothingness" that is similar to Buddhist 
notion in the final stage of the development of his conception of God. As Rubenstein's 
S" Igbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, 80. 
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concept of God is not a Jewish notion, it does not solve the problem of evil. The only 
response perhaps lies in the future life. 
The idea of redemptive suffering is another response to evil that is reflected in 
Jewish, Christian and Shl ! thought. As pointed out, the explanation of redemptive 
suffering can take two different forms. That is, individual, or personal, redemption and 
cosmic, or universal, redemption. The former signifies the redemption of a human soul 
from sin through one's own suffering. The latter is used in the sense of salvation of a 
people as a whole through the suffering of God himself or of a charismatic personality. 
The latter takes different forms in Jewish, Christian, and Slü`i traditions. While Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam commonly affirm an idea of individual redemption, they differ 
concerning the latter. It is the latter form of redemptive suffering that is most often 
referred to by theologians. 
The suffering servant theme in Isaiah 40-66 constitutes the scriptural foundation 
of the Jewish and Christian theological explanation of redemptive suffering. While 
Christian theologians traditionally understand the suffering and death of Jesus Christ in 
terms of redemptive suffering, in Jewish tradition redemption signifies a messianic event 
that will take place in the future. Differently, the Jewish theologian Ignaz Maybaum 
explains the reason behind the death of the Jewish people under the Nazi oppression in 
terms of vicarious suffering. In a similar way with his Jewish and Christian counterparts, 
the Shi`i theologian Mahmoud Ayoub, too, develops an explanation of redemptive 
suffering based on the martyrdom and intercession of the ImAms, especially Imam 
Husayn. 
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The Shi`i "imamology, " the Christian "Christology" and the Jewish concept of 
the "messianism, " although messianism is not accepted by many Jewish scholars today, 
appears to be corresponding with each other in some particular. Like Christ in 
Christianity, the `Imams in Shi'r Islam and the Messiah in Judaism are chosen for a 
particular purpose. They are charismatic personalities and the sources of redemption for 
the rest of community. As Christ's suffering and death on the cross redeem the sins of his 
followers, the martyrdom of the `Imäms, especially `Imam Husayn, can be a source of 
redemption from the sins of their followers. 585 
The main difference of Jewish messianism from Christology and imamology is 
that while the latter two signify a past event as a source of redemptive act, the messianic 
redemption has not been realised yet. Its fulfilment is a long-awated promise and 
consummation of history. Christianity affirms that God sacrificed his only son Jesus 
Christ to redeem the sins of humankind. In this sense, the crucifixion of Jesus is the 
redemptive suffering expiating the sins of humankind. Therefore, redemption can be 
experienced in the inner world of each individual. In a similar way, the suffering and 
death of the Sh! 'I 'Imams, especially 'Im9m Husayn, are purposeful divine works that 
already took place. The difference of Shr`a notion of redemption from its Christian 
counterpart here is that redemption will take place in the end of time. While messianic 
redemption will be realised in the future as well, the Messiah has not come yet. 
525 Ayoub, "The Problem of Suffering in Islam, " 288. 
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Another difference between these three accounts is that while Christianity 
affirms that Jesus Christ is God's Incarnation, neither Judaism nor Shi'r Islam makes 
such a claim for Messiah and the 'Imfims. In the case of Christianity, it is God himself 
who involves in history as the second person of the Trinity. However, the Messiah and 
the `Imfims are human beings, not divine although they are divinely ordained for a special 
purpose. What makes them special is their chosenness by God for the purpose of 
redemption. 
A major difficulty with vicarious suffering is that in what way it solves the 
problem of evil. Even if we ignore the question whether the Shi'r theory of redemption 
lacks the support of mainstream Shi`i faith, how does it solve the problem? Suffering and 
death are everyday phenomena as it was before the vicarious suffering of the servants. 
Human beings still suffer around the world. Is it enough to hold that they have no more 
sin? It seems that salvation, which is vicarious suffering is supposed to bring, is limited 
with a certain community. One excludes the others. How can one explain the suffering of 
non-Christian, non-Jews, and non-Shi'l? It seems to me that vicarious suffering offers a 
solution of limited scope leaving a large number of sufferings unexplained. 
Here one ought to point that Sunni Islam departs from Shi i schools in this aspect. The 
former rejects the view that there is an idea of redemption in Islam. This is the view of 
the majority of Muslim scholars. Muhammad Igbal holds a similar view. He writes, 
"There is no mediator between God and man. God is the birthright of every 
man. The Qur'an therefore, while it looks upon Jesus Christ as the spirit of 
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God, strongly protests against the Christian doctrine of Redemption, as well as 
the doctrine of an infallible visible head of the Church-doctrines which 
proceed upon the assumption of the insufficiency of human personality and 
tend to create in man a sense of dependence, which is regarded by Islam as a 
force obstructing the ethical progress of man. "586 
The idea of redemption has been regarded as an event impeding spiritual development of 
individuals. 
The last common theological response I shall consider here is the eschatological 
resolution. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam teach a notion of life after death in which 
moral endeavours of individuals are met. Accordingly, this earthly life is not the only life 
human beings have. There is life after death, and human beings will know God properly 
in the next world. Although the idea of life after death in Hebrew Bible is a later 
development, Jewish theologians and philosophers saw that the doctrine of life beyond 
grave is necessary to vindicate inequities in this world. It is necessary because injustices 
faced here can only be corrected in the hereafter. 
The eschatological response to evil has been one of the major Jewish theodicies 
throughout history. Saadia and Albo in the Middle Ages, Dan Cohn-Sherbok among 
contemporary Jewish philosophers hold that the promise of life after death is necessary 
for vindication of earthly sufferings. The latter asserts that if the people of Israel sustain 
the belief in God after the Holocaust, "the promise of immortality" is the only way. 587 
536 Muhammad Igbal, Thoughts and Reflections of Igbal, ed. by S. A. Vahid (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad 
Ashraf, 1964), 38. 
537 See above, pages 47-9. 
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The eschatological resolution has been at the centre of the traditional and modern 
Christian theodicies. Moreover, while Augustinian theologians such as Swinbume 
maintain life after death in which divine justice will be fully manifest, Irenaean 
theodicists such as Hick find it essential for a Christian theodicy. 588 Furthermore, the 
Muslim belief in life after has a high place among other responses to the problem of 
evil S89 This is a world of test, and its results will be seen in the hereafter. 
Grace Jantzen, a contemporary philosopher of religion, objects that the 
eschatological response can be a solution to the problem of evil. Jantzen writes, 
"One might argue that only if it (the afterlife) is, is God just: the sufferings of 
this present world can only be justified by the compensation of eternal life. 
But this, in the first place, is shocking theodicy: it is like saying that I may 
beat my dog at will provided that I later give him a dish of his favourite liver 
chowder. What happens after death-no matter how welcome-does not make 
present evil good s590 
Jantzen simply contends that the future reward does not change the experienced 
suffering. However, she ignores the goods gained through suffering in this world as well 
as in the hereafter. We know from our experience that on several occasions we forgot our 
experiences of suffering when time pases or reward is returned. Therefore, it is possible 
that the sad memories of human beings can be easily forgotten. Furthermore, I believe 
that the joyous moment of encounter with God in life after death shall make people forget 
5u See above, page 123,162. 
589 See above, page 202-6. 
590 Grace Jantzen, "Do We Need Immortality? " Modern Theology, 1,1 as quoted in Charles Taliaferro, 
Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 321. 
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the sad instances of suffering in this world. It seems to me that the problem lies 
somewhere else. It is the religious doctrine of eternal damnation. 
The Augustinian theologians, the majority of Muslim theologians, both Sunni 
and SIM, and in a lesser degree Jewish theologians affirm that some is destined to 
paradise, some to hell. The fate of the unbeliever is eternal damnation. The Jewish 
philosopher Joseph Albo discusses the problem of hell. Having noticed that there was no 
way that anyone could escape from the torture of hell, he affirms that God's mercy will 
overcome, and hell like paradise with its inhabitants will be abolished. In Christian 
tradition, the theologians of the Irenaean approach, more clearly from Schleiermacher 
onwards, maintained an idea of universal salvation. Every individual will be reconciled 
with God in the end. The universalist conception comes to its culmination in the thought 
of John Hick. 
The mainstream Islamic teaching, Sunni and Shi i, is that hell is eternal for those 
who deny the existence of God. The main reason for this position seems to be the high 
place Muslims ascribe to the Qur'an. That is to say, it is the word of God that was 
brought down to human beings. As the Qur'än is believed to describe the ultimate destiny 
of the believers and unbelievers in terms of eternity in paradise or in hell respectively, the 
mainstream Islamic thought has shaped in that way. However, it is possible to find some 
scholars in Islamic tradition denying the eternity of hell. One needs to note that theirs is a 
marginal view. They believe that there is no such a thing as eternal damnation even 
though there is Hell for a certain period of time. 
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The Cossack Muslim theologian Musa Carullah Bigiyef (1874-1949), for 
instance, refuses to accept that the doctrine of eternal damnation is among the decrees of 
Muslim faith. He emphasises, "I cannot introduce the idea of eternal damnation among 
the doctrines of Islam, a religion that the Qur'än describes as God's mercy to 
humankind. "591 Musa Carullah believes that God's mercy includes every individual 
regardless of believer and unbeliever. Therefore, the notion of eternal damnation is 
inconsistent with divine mercy. 
Moreover, Muhammad Iqbal understands Hell as another chance for stubborn 
people to complete their spiritual development. Once they are ready to unite in God, the 
purpose of Hell will be attained. Iqbal writes, 
"Tbe word `eternity' used in certain verses, relating to Hell, is explained by 
the Quran itself to mean only a period of time (78: 23)... Hell, therefore, as 
conceived by the Quran, is not a pit of everlasting torture inflicted by a 
revengeful God; it is a corrective experience which may make a hardened ego 
once more sensitive to the living breeze of Divine Grace. "592 
For Iqbal who sees human life as a continuous process, the merciful God cannot torture 
human beings eternally. Hell may be a necessary stage in which human beings come to 
realise God. I ought to emphasise here one more time that this is a marginal view within 
Islamic tradition. With the eschatological resolution, the study has come to the 
conclusion. 
S91 Musa Carullah Bigiyef Rahmet-i tlahrye Burhanlan, 88 as quoted in Mustafa Sabri and Musa Carullah, 
PahrAdalet (Istanbul: Pmar Yayinlan, 1996), 33. 
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M. Conclusion 
The problem of evil is one of the atheistic arguments against the theistic belief in 
a good and powerful God. The principal target of this argument is the monotheistic 
religions. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are the major religions who teach that there is 
a God, who is all-powerful and all-good. Therefore, the atheist's main purpose is to 
destroy such a theistic conception of God in view of the occurrences of evil in the world. 
It is his or her contention that if he or she succeeds in this attempt, the belief in God is 
inconsistent with the realities of the world. 
The ideas taken as scriptural responses in the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament, 
and the Qur'an would not help because the sacred writings are not systematic theology 
books providing logical and rational answers to the problem of evil. Their primary 
concern is to help human beings to build a relationship with God. In this sense, it was 
down to the believers to explain the existence of evil in a way that is not irrational to be 
believe in God. having realised that, Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions have 
developed theodicies, in the general sense of the term, in order to reconcile the belief in 
God, whether is called Yahweh or Allah, and the occurrences of evil in the world. The 
main purpose for such an attempt is to show the atheist primarily that the theistic belief in 
a good and powerful God makes sense even in the face of evils. 
Although the atheistic problem of evil is originally a philosophical or intellectual 
problem, it has been difficult to isolate it from the practical consequences. The particular 
592 Igba1, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, 123. 
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disasters such as earthquake, famine, drought and the like and human and animal 
sufferings seem to exasperate this problem. The Nazi Holocaust is, for instance, 
particularly important. It appears that this tragedy has immensely affected Jewish thought 
in a way that radical responses to evil find a strong ground to accelerate. This can be seen 
as an after shock of the terrible tragedy. 
The Christian theology and philosophy of religion seem to be enjoying the 
enterprise of theodicy. This is because the enterprise of theodicy is more popular in 
Christian tradition than Islamic tradition. However, the similarities between Jewish, 
Christian, and Islamic responses to evil striking. In general terms, it appears that there are 
two major trends within the theodicy tradition in the three faiths. One is that God is the 
creator of evil as well as good. Therefore, he has a reason for allowing evil. The other 
trend is that God is a good deity; therefore, he cannot create evil. There is no evil in 
nature; the only evil is brought about by human free-will. 
I concluded that God as a powerful deity must be the creator of evil. This is most 
often associated with the Irenaean Theodicy in Christian theology. It is also possible to 
see a similar kind of approaches in Jewish and Islamic traditions of theodicy. To ignore 
evil in the world does not solve the problem. Even if he did not create it, he would have 
prevented it. I believe that the Soul-Making Theodicy explains evil in a way that it is 
reasonable to hold the belief in God even in the face of evil. However, the Soul-Making 
Theodicy seems to have no answer for what it calls "dysteleological" instances of 
suffering. That is to say, the idea of soul-making does not do justice to the excessive 
sufferings such as the Holocaust. It seems to me that Hick overcomes this difficulty to a 
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great extent by postulating a universalist view of salvation, which is the essential part of 
his eschatological resolution. 
Although Hick's version of the Irenaean Theodicy offers a relatively reasonable 
solution to the problem of evil, it does not solve it conclusively. Does this mean that to 
believe in God is irrational, or no more makes sense? Of course, that is not true. The 
atheistic problem of evil cannot prove that there is no God, or that the belief in God is 
inconsistent with the reality of evil. To say that the extant theodicies cannot solve the 
dilemma of evil conclusively is different from saying that the atheist's argument from evil 
disproves the belief in God. As theodicy is a human endeavour to find the reason for evil 
in the world with the help of available knowledge, it is a limited enterprise from the 
beginning. It is possible that God did not let human beings to know the reason for 
allowing evil in the world even though he has a reason for it. Therefore, it is still 
reasonable to believe in God. Human knowledge is evolving constantly. Perhaps we shall 
find an answer in the future. 
Moreover, even if we cannot find a satisfactory response, religion provides the 
believer comfort, a sense of purpose in life, and, perhaps most importantly, a hope to hold 
onto. Religion provides these human needs with its beliefs, rituals, and festivals. In 
addition, religion urges people to overcome evil in the world. This practical approach to 
the problem of evil is the source for the believer of the sense of meaning and purpose in 
life. 
One of the most significant contribution of this study is that this research 
introduces the discussions of the problem of evil within Islamic theology and philosophy 
to the Western philosophy of religion. There seems to be a considerable gap in this area. 
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This is especially true for this subject; namely, the problem of evil. In this sense, this 
study aims to fill this gap in this area to a great extent. The philosophy of religion in the 
West is traditionally done within the framework of Judeo-Christian religious tradition. 
Generally speaking, the views of Muslim philosophers on the issues of the traditional 
philosophy of religion are not included. This is true particularly for the discussions of the 
problem of evil as well as other issues undertook by the Western philosophers of religion. 
Moreover, the thesis provides an opportunity to see the major Jewish, Christian, 
and Islamic responses to the problem of evil side by side. To do this, the atheistic 
problem of evil is, first, spelled out as it is formulated in the traditional philosophy of 
religion. Then, the theodicies of each religious tradition are explored. Doing this, I 
thought that it would be appropriate to sketch out the Scriptural foundation of the 
theological and philosophical theodicies. This, I believe, gives a chance to see the origin 
of the later developed rational responses to evil. The exploration of the theodicies in all 
religions in question provides an opportunity to see the religious responses separately and 
side by side. This is very useful in comparing and contrasting the religious theodicies. 
Furthermore, in this research the problem of evil and theodicy is discussed 
within the framework of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic intellectual traditions rather than 
as a pure philosophical problem. In this sense, here the theological and philosophical 
responses to evil given by the monotheistic religions are explored and subjected to 
philosophical criticism. It is my contention that this kind of approach to the problem of 
evil, that is, the enterprise of theodicy within a certain religious context, is more 
constructive and more effective. This is one of the major goals of this work. 
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Another important contribution of this research is to analyse the major 
monotheistic theodicies in addition to their exploration. First, the similarities and 
dissimilarities among the theological and philosophical theodicies within each religious 
tradition in question are pointed. Then, the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic theodicies are 
compared and contrasted with each other in order to find out common and different 
aspects between the three religious traditions. I believe that this very part fills an 
important gap in the discussions of the problem of evil. 
The analysis of the theological and philosophical theodicies shows us that there 
are important similarities between them. One can easily notice some correspondences and 
affinities in the Scriptural, theological and philosophical responses to evil in Jewish, 
Christian, and Islamic theodicies. The detailed research of the question as to the origins, 
causes and motives behind these similarities between different religious traditions is a 
subject of another work. Although it is believed that Muslims met philosophy through the 
translation movements during the rule of the Umeyye dynasty, there is need to determine 
which aspect of the problem of evil, through which translation came into and left what 
kind of impact on the Islamic intellectual tradition. 
The major concern of this research is the theological ad philosophical responses 
to the atheistic problem of evil. Although the Scriptural accounts of evil are outlined 
before the discussions of the theological and philosophical responses, further research 
from religious standpoint is needed to see the interpretation of the relevant passages and 
chapters in Scriptures. Understanding of the sacred books may show differences from one 
scholar to another or one school to another. In order to find out the biblical and Qur'anic 
responses to the reality of evil and their similarities and dissimilarities, one needs to point 
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out different interpretations of the sacred texts concerning good and evil. The limited 
nature of this work forces us to leave this aspect of the religious problem of evil to 
another study. 
The similarities between Imamology in Shrr Islam and Christology in 
Christianity are striking. I have limited my research here to point out correspondences 
between the two religious traditions. However, whether there is certain Christian 
influence upon the formation of the Shill Imamology, if there is, what kind of influence 
there is and through which channel that influence came into Islamic tradition is again the 
subject of another research. 
The main subject of this research is the responses to the problems of evil given 
by Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions. Even if Scriptural responses are given place 
in our study, this ought to be understood in the sense that they have the nature of being 
foundation of the later theological and philosophical responses to evil. Therefore, this 
study does not attempt to research in detail into the problem of evil and theodicy in the 
Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Scriptures, namely, Tanakh, the New Testament, and the 
Qur'an. This is left out as it is seen a subject of another research. 
Furthermore, a part of the Old Testament known as Apocrypha is left out as the 
Jewish Scriptures, namely, Tanakh, does not contain the books of Apocrypha in 
distinction from the Catholic Scripture. Moreover, for similar reasons I thought it to be 
more appropriate to left out the subject of the problem of evil and theodicy in the Muslim 
prophetic tradition. 
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Additionally, I have spent considerable effort to limit the study with recent 
works as much as possible since the thesis is not a research of historical nature. This is 
not to say that there is no historical material referred in this study. One can see a range of 
historical figures from Saadia in Jewish tradition to Aquinas in Christian faith, and to 
Ghazali in Islamic thought. This is to emphasise the historical origin of major responses 
to evil in the three religious tradition in question. 
Theodicy is a subjective and ever-growing enterprise focused on understanding 
the reason for and purpose of evils and sufferings in the world from a human perspective. 
In this sense, the problem is not that there is no purpose for the evils of the world, but that 
God does not spell it out. Human beings try to apprehend the possible reasons and 
purposes from their standpoint. That is why theodicy can take different shapes as human 
knowledge develops. Therefore, it must be understood to be an open ended project 
constantly developing. 
This study shows that the currant theodicies and defences face some 
philosophical difficulties in answering the atheist's argument from evil. Although these 
difficulties do not pose a serious threat to the core of the theistic faith, namely the 
existence of God, the atheist is waiting for an answer to his or her objections. From the 
results of our research, we can conclude that a future theodicy must contain the following 
main characteristics if it claims to be rational. 
A future theodicy must affirm the original innocence of human beings by birth, 
human free-will, constant process of mental and spiritual growth, and the belief in life 
after death. It seems that these are the main features of any reasonable future theodicy. 
Among these characteristics life after death is very important. The survival from death is 
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expected to bring earthly memories back along with regret and realisation of the ultimate 
aim of life, that is to unite with God. Additionally, this will produce repentance and re- 
orientation towards God. As God's mercy overcomes his justice, he is expected to end 
human suffering and forgive them when they cleanse their impurities. 
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GLOSSARY 
Ah! al-Bays: The family of the Prophet Muhammad. 
AI Äkhira: The Arabic word for the Hereafter, the Next World beyond grave. 
Ash'ariyya: A Muslim school of theology established by Abü al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (873- 
935 CE). 
Atheism: The theory or belief that God does not exist. 
Atonement: A doctrine in Christian theology affirming the reconciliation of human 
beings with God through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
Covenant: An agreement or contract between God and the people of Israel, which is seen 
as the basis of the traditional Jewish faith. 
Diaspora: The Jewish people who are scattered to the lands outside of modern Israel 
after the Babylonian captivity. 
Docetism: An early Christian belief that denied any real physical suffering of Jesus while 
asserting his divinity. 
Dualism: The theory of two opposing principles or forces at work in the universe such as 
good and evil. 
Eschatology: The doctrine of last or final matters, as death, judgement, or an afterlife. 
The Fall: A Jewish and Christian doctrine concerning the sin of Adam and Eve and its 
consequences. 
Gevurah: One of the sefirot, divine potencies in kabbalistic teaching, that signifies God's 
power and judgement. 
Gezerah: An anti-Jewish and evil decree and program. 
Hesed: One of the sefirot, divine potencies in kabbalistic teaching, that signifies divine 
loving-kindness. 
Hester Panim: A biblical concept of God's hiding his face in human history. 
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The Holocaust: The extermination of European Jews in Nazi concentration camps during 
World War II. 
The 'Imims: A group of charismatic spiritual SMI leaders in a line of succession running 
through the third caliph Ali and his descendants. 
Jinn: A class of spirits made of fire. 
The Ka'ba: The cube-like Muslim sacred building in the courtyard of the central mosque 
in Mecca. 
Kabbalah: The Jewish mystical teachings evolved since the Second Temple times. 
The Kaläm: The Muslim dialectic theology. 
Kiddush ha-Shem: The Hebrew phrase for the glorification of God through prayer, 
conduct, and martyrdom. 
Manichaeism: A religious dualism that originated in Babylonia in the 3rd century CE. 
Maturidiyya: A Muslim school of theology established by Abü Man$ür al-Maturidi (d. 
944). 
Messiah: A charismatic figure who is believed to restore the kingdom of Israel. 
Monotheism: The doctrine or belief that there is only one God exists. 
Mu'tazila: A Muslim school of theology dating from the 8`h century. 
Mysterium Tremendum: A concept of Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) in his interpretation of 
religious phenomena. The notion signifies the abysmal mystery of the 
sacred being beyond rational analysis. 
Panentheism: The doctrine that God and the universe is one, and God is, at the same 
time, greater than the universe. 
optimism (al Aflah in Arabic): The theory that the existing world is the best of all 
possible worlds. 
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Original Sin: The traditional Christian doctrine that human beings have an innate 
tendency to evil, transmitted from Adam to his offspring in consequence 
of his sin. 
Parousia: The second coming of Jesus Christ. 
Reconstructionism: The progressive Jewish movement founded by Mordecai Kaplan 
(1881-1983). 
Sefirot: The emanations of God in kabbalistic teaching. 
The Shema: The Jewish declaration of faith, and a central prayer in Jewish liturgy. 
ShT'a: One of the two main religious divisions of Islam that regards Ali, the son-in-law of 
Muhammad, as the legitimate successor of Muhammad. 
Sunni: The majority of Muslims who believe that they represent orthodox Islam. 
Tanakh: An acronym for the Hebrew Bible. 
Theism: The belief in the existence of one God. 
Theodicy: The vindication of divine providence and justice in the face of the existence of 
evil. 
Yetzer hat-ov: The Jewish concept of good inclination in human beings. 
Yetzer ha-ra: The Jewish concept of evil inclination in human beings. 
Zoroastrianism: The religion founded by Zoroaster in Persia during the 6th century BCE. 
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